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INTRODUCTION

Since its inception in the 1960s, the genesis of modern identity
politics has had a continual, indelible impact on American political thought
and practice.1 Identity politics, broadly construed, has found expression and
provided a foundation for public policy since the founding of the United
States as a formal political unit in 1791 through the present.2 The extremely
divisive United States’ presidential election of 2016 is but one (albeit
significant) event that embodies politicized identity and the identarian basis

*

Marvin L. Astrada (Ph.D., M.A., Florida International University; J.D., Rutgers University
Law School; M.A., C.A.S., Wesleyan University; B.A., University of Connecticut). Lecturer,
Politics & History at New York University — Washington D.C. Scott B. Astrada is a
legislative executive based in Washington D.C., and adjunct Professor of Law at Georgetown
University Law Center (BA, University of Wisconsin-Madison, JD/MBA, Marquette
University, LLM Georgetown University Law Center).
1.
Rogers M. Smith, Identities, Interests, and the Future of Political Science,
2 PERSPS. ON POL. 301, 302–03 (2004).
2.
See CHARLES A. BEARD, AN ECONOMIC INTERPRETATION OF THE
CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES 204, 251 (1913) (contending that the structure of the
United States Constitution was motivated primarily by the personal financial interests of the
Founders, a cohesive economic elite sector that sought to protect the elite minority from the
mass majority regarding private property and wealth); Eric Bradner et al., 9 Takeaways from
CNN’s Equality Town Hall, CNN: POL. (Oct. 11, 2019, 12:23 AM),
http://www.cnn.com/2019/10/11/politics/cnn-lgbtq-equality-town-hall-takeaways/index.html.
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of American politics in thought and practice.3 In this examination,
politicized identity (“PI”) is conceptualized as a discursive product
manufactured for public consumption by various sociocultural, political, and
economic group-based platforms, composed of ideological content
propagated by the self-appointed leadership of what can be termed Identity
Based Factions (“IBFs”).4 Thus, IBFs, through PI, have and continue to
exercise a substantial degree of influence on the character and content of
American law and politics throughout the nation’s history, especially in the
political and legal process.5 The need to examine PI as an explanatory
variable when analyzing the form and substance of American politics,
especially in the realm of ascertaining what exactly constitutes an American
national identity or political community, has been recognized as a necessary
exercise when considering PI and its impact on democracy, political
consensus, and potential authoritarianism.6
The intent of this work is to therefore identify and critically discuss
the broad impact and potential pitfalls of PI for the character and content of
the nexus between American law and politics, generally, and how PI
specifically impacts the interrelationship between notions of a national
American identity or community and identity within PI sub-groups.7 This
3.
See Daniel Kreiss, The Media Are About Identity, Not Information, in
TRUMP AND THE MEDIA 93, 95–96 (Pablo J. Boczkowski & Zizi Papacharissi eds., 2018);
Smith, supra note 1, at 304.
4.
See Kreiss, supra note 3, at 95; Smith, supra note 1, at 304.
5.
See, e.g., the following cases, in which the Court relied upon identitybased binaries such as Black or White to ground its reasoning and holdings: Brown v. Bd. of
Educ., 347 U.S. 483, 495 (1954) (prohibiting racial segregation of public schools because
segregation creates a badge of inferiority for non-whites); Bailey v. Patterson, 369 U.S. 31, 33
(1962) (prohibiting racial segregation of interstate and intrastate transportation facilities);
Loving v. Virginia, 388 U.S. 1, 12 (1967) (holding that state laws prohibiting interracial
marriage are unconstitutional); Jones v. Alfred H. Mayer Co., 392 U.S. 409, 443–44 (1968)
(holding that federal law bars all racial discrimination (private or public) in the sale or rental
of property); Lau v. Nichols, 414 U.S. 563, 568–69 (1974) (finding that a city school system’s
failure to provide English language instruction to students of Chinese ancestry amounted to
unlawful discrimination); Regents of Univ. of Cal. v. Bakke, 438 U.S. 265, 379 (1978)
(holding that a public university may take race into account as a factor in admissions
decisions); Batson v. Kentucky, 476 U.S. 79, 99 (1986) (finding that a state denies Black
defendants equal protection when members of his or her race have been purposefully excluded
from a jury); Obergefell v. Hodges, 135 S. Ct. 2584, 2608 (2015) (holding that the
fundamental right to marry is guaranteed to same-sex couples by both the Due Process Clause
and the Equal Protection Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment).
6.
See, e.g., Andrew Mason, Political Community, Liberal‐Nationalism, and
the Ethics of Assimilation, 109 ETHICS 261, 262–65 (1999); Smith, supra note 1, at 301–04.
7.
See discussion infra Parts II, III; Marvin L. Astrada, Reevaluating
Politicized Identity & Notions of an American Political Community in the Legal & Political
Process, 8 IND. J.L. & SOC. EQUAL. 19, 58 (2020).
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work is relevant and timely because PI requires periodic reexamination due
to the historical and culturally-contingent nature of identity.8 Indeed, it is a
misnomer to view PI as an essentialist, static state of affairs, although there
are differing perspectives when assessing the utility of identarian frameworks
and platforms.9 Also, despite the value that PI purports to bring about as far
as giving voice to marginalized groups in society or promoting and obtaining
legal protections for oppressed groups in legal and policy discourse,
nonetheless, PI requires periodic re-evaluation to ensure that it functions as
an actual driver of equity and democracy in the true sense of each term.10
One must also account for the effects of time as far as affecting the ebb and
flow of the basis, meaning, purpose, and consequences that emanate from an
identity-based signifier.11 This work thus seeks to provoke thought, debate,
and further exploration of salient themes, concepts, principles, problems, and
challenges that PI may pose for American political thought, public policy,
and the legal process in the present and going forward.12
At the center of this discussion is the interrelationship between PI
and the aim of ascertaining whether or not PI, in the present, facilitates
democratic civility, genuine political representation and attempts to define
and posit an American national identity-based notion of an American
political community.13 Is such an identity desirable, as opposed to the
current conduct of politics-based—and to a substantial degree—on
fragmented political communities premised on PI?14 Such questions are key
to a re-examination of American political thought and practice in the context
of a cohesive political community, unit, identity vis-à-vis law, and public
policy spaces.15 The rise of what can be termed IBFs16 has profoundly
impacted thought, practice, and policy spaces.17 IBFs, for instance, employ
Identity-Based Metrics (“IBMs”)18 in the form of biological and sociocultural
traits; experientially-based indicators of an identity are politicized and exert
8.
9.

See Smith, supra note 1, at 303.
See, e.g., WILL KYMLICKA, THE ESSENTIALIST CRITIQUE OF
MULTICULTURALISM: THEORIES, POLICIES, ETHOS 2 (2014).
10.
Id. at 1; Smith, supra note 1, at 305.
11.
Astrada, supra note 7, at 37, 49.
12.
See id. at 20.
13.
See id. at 19–20.
14.
See id. at 21–22; Jessica Knouse, From Identity Politics to Ideology
Politics, 3 UTAH L. REV. 749, 751, 761 (2009).
15.
See Astrada, supra note 7, at 20–24.
16.
See id. at 28.
17.
See id. at 34, 45.
18.
See Knouse, supra note 14, at 752–53. For the legal framework that has
provided, in part, the genesis for modern PI and IBFs. See United States v. Carolene Prods.
Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152–53 n.4 (1938) (positing that discrete and insular minorities may
require heightened judicial protection under law).
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considerable influence on the political process, legal process, and policy
spaces, as well as the overall notion of what exactly constitutes
representation and community.19
The aforementioned questions seek to explore the complexity of
modern PI and IBFs vis-à-vis notions of representation and community.20
These two states of affairs are key to the articulation of American law and
politics.21 Does PI and the IBFs that advocate identarian-based politics,
predicated on notions of discrete and insular political communities, adversely
affect the dynamic between sub-PI groups and a broader American national
community?22 Is it accurate to state that if one desires a national community,
then this needs to be prioritized over identarian-based political
communities?23 Are these two notions mutually exclusive?24 Each seems to
inform the other; each seems to play a formative role in being a producer and
product of the other so that the relationship between the national community
and identarian political communities (and subcommunities) needs to be (re)examined within the legal and political process.25
In light of the above, this work explores and critically examines "the
complexity of the politics of identity, politicized identity, and notions of
American identity and political community as manifested in the political and
legal process."26 More specifically, this work analyzes the tensions
immanent in “[PI] vis-à-vis positing an American political community, as
well as the impact that it has on the character and content of inclusive
representational politics—the medium by which [an] American
[national/]political community is framed and posited.”27 What constitutes a
PI exactly, and what qualifies an IBF or PI as “politically cohesive”28 for the
purpose of law are equally important questions that this work seeks to
critique and analyze.29 The aim is to contribute to a discourse that seeks to
better bridge the gaps between theory and practice, to appreciate and gauge
the conceptual and empirical complexity of politicized identity, reveal how
the conceptual directly informs the practice of identity politics, and highlight
and critically analyze the power-effects of politicized identity in the political

19.
20.
21.
22.
23.
24.
25.
26.
27.
28.
29.

See Astrada, supra note 7, at 45.
See id. at 26.
See id.
See id. at 37.
See id. at 38.
See Knouse, supra note 14, at 751.
See Astrada, supra note 7, at 19–20.
Id. at 19, 22.
Id. at 22–23.
League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 425 (2006).
See discussion infra Section II.
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and legal process.30 Rather than focus on particular IBFs, this work is
conceptual and structural in nature.31 Revisiting PI and IBFs on a
macroscopic level of analysis sheds light on the importance of a:
[S]hared national identity [as] a precondition for the existence of
the kind of trust which makes compromise possible in the face of
conflicting interests . . . . [A] shared national identity is a
necessary condition for a politics of the common good and
widespread support for redistribution on [the] grounds of social
justice.32

It is important to note that identity, as an idea and in practice, is part
of a broader phenomenon that involves intense, normative struggle.33 The
struggle to authoritatively define identity is pervaded with issues of power
and control.34 To disaggregate and critically assess the politics of identity,
critical examination needs to be conducted outside the rules of formation that
identity elites employ to manufacture and deploy an identarian discourse for
30.
See Astrada, supra note 7, at 50.
31.
See id. at 23, 50.
32.
Mason, supra note 6, at 263. The difficulties in obtaining this in law and
policy are exemplified by the Court’s judgment and reasoning in Evans v. Abney, 396 U.S.
435, 447 (1970). In Evans, the Court held because a public park could not be operated on a
racially discriminatory basis, and that the intention of a testator who left property in trust for
creation of a public park for the exclusive use of white people could not be fulfilled and that,
accordingly, the trust had failed and that the trust property had reverted to heirs of testator, the
Georgia court’s refusal to apply cy pres doctrine to override the testator’s will did not violate
Black citizens’ rights to equal protection and due process under the Fourteenth Amendment.
Id.
Petitioners also advance a number of considerations of public policy
in opposition to the conclusion which we have reached. In particular, they
regret, as we do, the loss of the Baconsfield trust to the City of Macon, and they
are concerned lest we set a precedent under which other charitable trusts will be
terminated. It bears repeating that our holding today reaffirms the traditional
role of the States in determining whether or not to apply their cy pres doctrines to
particular trusts. Nothing we have said here prevents a state court from applying
its cy pres rule in a case where the Georgia court, for example, might not apply
its rule. More fundamentally, however, the loss of charitable trusts such as
Baconsfield is part of the price we pay for permitting deceased persons to
exercise . . . continuing control over assets owned by them at death. This aspect
of freedom of testation, like most things, has its advantages and disadvantages.
The responsibility of this Court, however, is to construe and enforce the
Constitution and laws of the land as they are and not to legislate social policy on
the basis of our own personal inclinations.

Id. (emphasis added).
33.
See Astrada, supra note 7, at 19, 21.
34.
Id. at 59; Scott B. Astrada & Marvin L. Astrada, Being Latino in the 21st
Century: Reexamining Politicized Identity & the Problem of Representation, 20 U. PA. J.L. &
SOC. CHANGE 245, 262 (2017).
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mass consumption.35 PI can be utilized to perpetuate and preserve the power
to control the conceptual mode(s) of identity production.36 The identity of an
epistemic community that monopolizes the character and content of a
politicized identity—e.g., an IBF—is intimately bound up with issues and
practices of power and control.37 Critique and analysis are thus not
concerned with the subject matter/technical mechanics of official statements
of what it means to be part of a PI, nor with the particular actors, personnel,
agencies, etc., involved in processes of articulating PI.38 This work focuses
on PI as a structural variable, state of affairs, and how it functions within the
larger context of law, politics, power, and control.39
The immurement of individuals within discursive modalities that
think the subject, which produces rather than is the product of the subject,
occurs when critical appraisal is not conducted from without the rules of
formation propagated by elites that control legitimate articulations of a PI
through IBFs.40 Control is a less straightforward state of affairs in identarian
discourse.41 Žižek’s notion of prohibition in the law seems applicable to PI
and IBFs:
[T]he true regulating power of the law resides not in its direct
prohibitions, in the division of our acts into permitted and
prohibited, but in regulating the very violations of prohibitions:
[T]he law silently accepts that the basic prohibitions are violated
(or even discreetly solicits us to violate them), and then, once we
find ourselves in this position of guilt, it tells us how to reconcile
the violation with the law by violating the prohibition in a
regulated way.42

This notion of power seeks to understand identity as a structure that
creates meaning for the subject, rather than a dynamic of
oppressed/oppressor.43 This is what Zizi Papacharissi calls affective publics,
i.e., a desire to feel information, events, and political occurrences.44 This is
in line with research finding that “citizens do not rationally weigh policy

35.
36.
37.
38.
39.
40.
41.
42.
43.
44.

See Astrada, supra note 7, at 44, 67.
See id. at 19, 60.
See id. at 22, 53.
See id. at 21, 23.
See id. at 23; discussion infra Parts II–IV.
See Astrada, supra note 7, at 27, 60.
See id. at 37, 69.
SLAVOJ ŽIŽEK, LIVING IN THE END TIMES 19 (2010).
See id.
See ZIZI PAPACHARISSI, AFFECTIVE PUBLICS: SENTIMENT, TECHNOLOGY,
AND POLITICS 125–26 (Andrew Chadwick & Royal Holloway eds., 2015).
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information in the course of an election.”45 “They vote based on their social
identities, . . . how they perceive themselves and others, their partisan
identities, and their sense of the groups they believe the two political parties
represent.”46 PI in this context functions in a related, but distinct, dynamic of
The
power than traditional notions of power and representation.47
consumption of identity, while inescapably political, becomes a dynamic of
reaffirmation and emotive validation, rather than between a subject and an
external oppressor.48
The morality, appropriateness, desirability, and practice of
particularized IBF and/or PI are beyond the scope of this inquiry.49 To view
PI from without prescribed limits and to move beyond specific iterations of
PI guides this analysis.50 The production of a definitive conclusion is not the
point of this exercise, but rather to increase our collective intellectual burden
of awareness—to probe, engage, and problematize the complexity that
pervades exercises of power and control.51 “Objects contain the possibility
of all situations.”52 Identity as noun, verb, and adjective defines spaces of
thought and practice.53 A theoretical and normative analysis is not an
obscure activity divorced from so-called actuality and practice in the empiric
realm.54 Thought and teleology precede practice;55 therefore, a continual and
critical examination of identity, PI, IBFs, and identity politics is requisite for
producing accurate explanations and understandings of the aforementioned.56
While broad in nature, such a perspective frees one from the constraints of
having to focus upon a singular perspective undergirded by mono-causal
analysis.57
Why critically examine PI and the politics of identity from outside
the proper discursive parameters?58 Because a particular problem to one
individual (or group) can be no problem at all to another; “it depends upon
45.
See Kreiss, supra note 3, at 95.
46.
Id.
47.
See id.
48.
See Astrada, supra note 7, at 21.
49.
See id. at 38; discussion infra Part III.
50.
Astrada, supra note 7, at 38.
51.
Id. at 46, 62–63.
52.
LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, TRACTATUS LOGICO-PHILOSOPHICUS 7 (D. F.
Pears & B. F. McGuinness trans., Routledge 2002) (1921) (ebook).
53.
See Astrada, supra note 7, at 21.
54.
See WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 52, at xviii–xix.
55.
See EDWARD H. CARR, THE TWENTY YEARS’ CRISIS 1919-1939: AN
INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY OF INTERNATIONAL RELATIONS 8 (2d ed. 1946).
56.
See id.
57.
See id. at 8, 10.
58.
See C. WRIGHT MILLS, THE SOCIOLOGICAL IMAGINATION 76 (Fortieth
Anniversary ed. 2000); Astrada, supra note 7, at 32.
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what each is interested in, and upon how aware [an individual] is of his
interests; . . . [humans, however,] are not always . . . so rational . . . .”59 The
power to define identity and make it the primary basis for the conduct of
politics thus merits scrutiny from without, due to the fact that “students of . .
. society assume and imply moral and political decisions” in what is studied
and how it is studied.60 To generate an understanding of the human
condition is to look beyond the obvious or stated truth about power and
control and subject each to an analysis that attempts to reveal other
dimensions that give rise to and/or are engendered from the exercise of
power.61 It is very easy for those enmeshed within the status quo to be
dismissive, for if they were to examine some of the foundational aspects of
their ideology, e.g., democracy, root causes of poverty, rationality, effects of
power, state-corporate-managed “capitalism,” class sectors, and “freedom,”
they would perhaps find serious discrepancies between actuality and the
rhetoric espoused.62 “[Q]uestion[ing] and understand[ing] the fluctuating
possibilities, the necessary or contingent historical limits of intellectual
discourse,” then, is an operative premise underlying this work.63 To shed
light on “the decisions and regulations which are among its constitutive
elements, its means of functioning, along with its strategies, its covert
discourses and ruses, . . . which are not ultimately played by any particular
[actor], but which are nonetheless lived, and assure the permanence and
functioning of the institution”64 of identity underpins this examination.65
This dimension of inquiry, then, qualifies as a problem worth studying, in
that identity in thought and practice have immeasurable implications for the
workings of the political, which in turn provides the operative context for the
ordering of a polity’s affairs.66
Identity is a highly problematic basis upon which to conduct politics
because it is subject to the ebb and flow of multifarious meaning and
interpretation.67 There is no fixed, organic, essentialist point from which one
can posit the singular derivation-point, ascent, and clearly confined

59.
MILLS, supra note 58, at 76.
60.
Id.
61.
See id. at 31, 207–08.
62.
See id. at 95–96; Astrada, supra note 7, at 31–32.
63.
Colin Gordon, Preface to MICHEL FOUCAULT, POWER/KNOWLEDGE:
SELECTED INTERVIEWS & OTHER WRITINGS 1972-1977 ix (Colin Gordon ed., Colin Gordon et
al. trans., 1980).
64.
MICHEL FOUCAULT, POWER/KNOWLEDGE: SELECTED INTERVIEWS &
OTHER WRITINGS 1972-1977 38 (Colin Gordon ed., Colin Gordon et al. trans., 1980).
65.
Id. at 73–74.
66.
See Astrada, supra note 7, at 43–44, 57.
67.
See Smith, supra note 1, at 305.
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parameters of an identity.68 Once politicized, identity becomes even more
fraught with subjective and relative interpolation.69 Thus, key notions of IBF
discourse such as inclusion, equity, and fairness are not monochromatic in
thought and application, but rather, encompass multifarious shades of
nuanced meaning and interpretation.70 As the Court notes (when courts
attempt to assess fairness vis-à-vis gerrymandering), “‘[f]airness’ [is] not . . .
a judicially manageable standard.”71
REPRESENTATION, LAW, POLITICS, IDENTITY, AND NOTIONS OF
COMMUNITY

II.

It seems to be an inescapable fact that the individual subject
functions in the context of Madisonian factions groups, factions in the
American representative political system and legal process.72 In modern
identity politics, IBFs have become the primary vehicle by which political
interests and goals are conceptualized, articulated, and implemented.73 As
Justice Stewart contends within the context of representation and
68.
69.
70.
71.

See id. at 302.
See id. at 302–03; Kreiss, supra note 3, at 95.
See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 291, 299 (2004).
Id. at 291. Justice Kennedy, in his concurrence, went on to note:

When presented with a claim of injury from partisan gerrymandering,
courts confront two obstacles. First is the lack of comprehensive and neutral
principles for drawing electoral boundaries. No substantive definition of fairness in
districting seems to command general assent. Second is the absence of rules to
limit and confine judicial intervention . . . .
That courts can grant relief in districting cases where race is involved
does not answer our need for fairness principles here. Those controversies . . .
involve sorting permissible classifications in the redistricting context from
impermissible ones . . . . Politics is quite a different matter.
A determination that a gerrymander violates the law must rest on
something more than the conclusion that political classifications were applied. It
must rest instead on a conclusion that the classifications, though generally
permissible, were applied in an invidious manner or in a way unrelated to any
legitimate legislative objective.
The object of districting is to establish “fair and effective representation
for all citizens.” [I]t might seem that courts could determine, by the exercise of
their own judgment, whether political classifications are related to this object or
instead burden representational rights. The lack, however, of any agreed upon
model of fair and effective representation makes this analysis difficult . . . .
Because there are yet no agreed upon substantive principles of fairness in
districting, we have no basis on which to define clear, manageable, and politically
neutral standards for measuring the particular burden a given partisan classification
imposes on representational rights.

Id. at 306–08 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (citations omitted).
72.
THE FEDERALIST NO. 10 (James Madison); see also Peter H. Schuck,
Against (and for) Madison: An Essay in Praise of Factions, 15 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 553,
555 (1997).
73.
Smith, supra note 1, at 304.
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apportionment, “[r]epresentative government is a process of accommodating
group interests through democratic institutional arrangements . . . . to insure
effective representation . . . by a realistic accommodation of the diverse and
often conflicting political forces operating within the State.”74
“Accommodation has been a fundamental ordering principle in the
constitutional system.”75 “One major change [that can be] observed in the
notion of representation [and accommodation in the present] is the shift from
a historical focus on liberty to equality and inclusion . . . .”76
Just as, in the earlier days of anarchy, the most thoughtful men
worshipped law, so during the period of increasing State power
there was a tendency to worship liberty. . . . The impulse toward
liberty, however, seems now to have lost much of its force . . . it
has been replaced by the love of equality.77
This shift has noteworthy consequences for how identity-based
politics and [IBFs] manifest in thought and practice. Indeed,
equality in the form of inclusion—a driving force of [IBFs]—is in
line with and has facilitated the power of formal identity-based
groups as opposed to a liberty ethos [or] focus[] [regarding]
politics and policy. The consequential impact that formal identity
groups have on the political and legal process renders them, in
essence, [IBFs], which thrive by priming or activating certain
identities in the electorate to support or reject specific policy
agendas as well as credit or discredit particular politicos or
parties.78

Representation is quite complex, especially in a nation of 330
million people.79 “It can be viewed in different ways . . . in a universalist or
74.
Lucas v. Forty-Fourth Gen. Assembly of Colorado, 377 U.S. 713, 749
(1964) (Stewart, J., dissenting).
75.
See id. at 748; Astrada, supra note 7, at 34.
76.
Astrada, supra note 7, at 34.
77.
BERTRAND RUSSELL, AUTHORITY AND THE INDIVIDUAL 28–29 (AMS Press
1968) (1949); Astrada, supra note 7, at 34.
78.
Astrada, supra note 7, at 34; see also Samara Klar, The Influence of
Competing Identity Primes on Political Preferences, 75 J. POL. 1108, 1109 (2013).
79.
See U.S. and World Population Clock, U.S. CENSUS BUREAU,
http://www.census.gov/popclock/ (last updated Feb. 10, 2021); Astrada, supra note 7, at 34–
35; Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 299 (2004).
While one must agree with Justice Breyer’s incredibly abstract starting point that
our Constitution sought to create a “basically democratic” form of government, that
is a long and impassable distance away from the conclusion that the Judiciary may
assess whether a group (somehow defined) has achieved a level of political power
(somehow defined) commensurate with that to which they would be entitled absent
unjustified political machinations (whatever that means).
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pluralistic community-based framework, which results in very distinctive
paradigms for characterizing representation.”80
The liberal focus on the individual [for instance,]
presupposes difference among citizens: [B]ecause individual ends
are not homogeneous, they are incompatible with the existence of
an overarching common end. But the universalist assumption at
the base of liberal thought is that, because humans are identical in
their status as moral beings, moral obligation cannot be contingent
on individual attributes, merits, or circumstances. The liberal
conception of the moral equality of persons requires that law have
universal application: [I]t must treat all persons identically and
disinterestedly, and its grant of rights and liberties must extend to
all persons in the polity.81

“Representation in the United States [national society] is profoundly
challenging given the diversity and difference that permeates the national
landscape,” e.g., regionally, politically, ideologically, socio-economically,
and socio-culturally.82 “Difference permeates norms, values, morals, and
other ideational ordering mechanisms that enable a group or groups of people
to effectively cohere around a stable and universalizable set of ordering
concepts and principles, such as the rule of law,” (“ROL”).83 An example of
this is within the Latino community.84 Depending on race and affluence,
Vieth, 541 U.S. at 299 (citation omitted).
80.
Astrada, supra note 7, at 34.
81.
Note, The Myth of Context in Politics and Law, 110 HARV. L. REV. 1292,
1294 (1997); see also Thomas Morawetz, Understanding Disagreement, the Root Issue of
Jurisprudence: Applying Wittgenstein To Positivism, Critical Theory, and Judging, 141 U.
PA. L. REV. 371, 375 n.5 (1992).
Many writers go further and characterize liberal assumptions about
value consensus as devious and repressive. The dominant groups in society, on this
view, universalize their interests and experience and repress the self-expression of
groups (e.g. women and minorities) without power. According to Robert Gordon,
one can represent law as a legitimating ideology in the view that “the ruling class
induces consent and demobilizes opposition by masking its role in widely shared
utopian norms and fair procedures, which it then distorts to its own purposes.”
Gordon himself seems to proffer an account wherein these preferences are
concealed even from the actors themselves because “the discourse of law — its
categories, arguments, reasoning modes, rhetorical tropes, and procedural rituals —
fits into a complex of discursive practices that together structure how people
perceive.”

Morawetz, supra, at 375 n.5 (brackets omitted) (citation omitted).
82.
Astrada, supra note 7, at 34–35.
83.
Id. at 35.
84.
See Marvin L. Astrada & Scott B. Astrada, Law, Continuity and Change:
Revisiting the Reasonable Person Within the Demographic, Sociocultural and Political
Realities of the Twenty-First Century, 14 RUTGERS J.L. & PUB. POL’Y 196, 212 (2017).
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being Latino can mean very different things for one’s life experience.85 This
experience can result in policy and economic priorities that can be both
aligned and contradictory.86 In the case of ROL, the Court has declared that
it “is confronted with the task of reconciling conflicting rights of the diverse
communities within our society and of individuals.”87
A.
Ethics, Homogeny, and Representation:
Resistance

The Inevitability of

The question of pluralism within a political economy, composed at
its root of heterogeneous individuals’ wills and directives, is inescapably an
ethical one.88 A central question at the center of the consideration of political
identity is how the group function of consensus processes dissent from
internal constituents.89 On the one hand, at the heart of political organizing,
is political power through coalescence.90 A political community leveraging
critical mass to drive social change.91 Yet, when does the question of
democratic conflict, or how a community processes internal dissent, become
relevant?92 PI, in the context of this article, is paramount when considering
this question.93 Is the historical tradeoff between necessity of uniformity for
social influence and the equity of internal diversity simply grafted into the
current schema of political identity, or is there an atypical presence of
fluidity of political will at the heart of PI?94 And if this is the case, how does
this impact the efficacy of political representation within the scope of
national policy?95 The question of consensus and authoritarianism resides at
85.
86.

See id. at 218.
IDELISSE MALAVÉ & ESTI GIORDANI, LATINO STATS: AMERICAN HISPANICS
BY THE NUMBERS 7 (2015).
With just over half of Latinos identifying themselves first by national country of
origin and residing in communities generally comprised of people from the same
region or country, it is apparent that different national origin groups experience
being Latino differently in an economic sense (in addition to a more collective
experience of ethnic/racial discrimination).

Astrada & Astrada, supra note 34, at 253 (citing MALAVÉ & GIORDANI, supra, at 86).
87.
Jacobellis v. Ohio, 378 U.S. 184, 200–01 (1964) (Warren, J., dissenting).
88.
See Schuck, supra note 72, at 553, 579–80.
89.
See id. at 571; RUSSELL, supra note 77, at 53.
90.
See Li Tan et al., Analyzing the Impact of Social Media on Social
Movements: A Computational Study on Twitter and the Occupy Wall Street Movement, 2013
IEEE/ACM INT’L CONF. ON ADVANCES IN SOC. NETWORKS ANALYSIS AND MINING 1259,
1259–62 (2013).
91.
See id.
92.
See Mason, supra note 6, at 269; Smith, supra note 1, at 301, 304–05.
93.
See Mason, supra note 6, at 269; Smith, supra note 1, at 301, 304–05.
94.
See Mason, supra note 6, at 272, 274; Astrada, supra note 7, at 20–21.
95.
See Astrada, supra note 7, at 19, 26–27.
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the heart of the emergence of PI as a prevalent and growing policy function,
and can be adumbrated by starting from its most controversial polemic: The
presence of internal resistance to organizing narratives of identity.96
How can the expansion of a PI group, and the meaning it embodies,
influence or distort the metaphysical underpinnings of a PI that bestows
essential meaning to a group, e.g., the terms Latinx or person of color?97
How does expansion and internal fissures or ruptures, and the need to quell
them for the sake of unity, become subject to an authoritarian process of
ablating dissent, difference, for the sake of functional unity in the public
sphere?98 The fluidity and definitional conflict of what it means to be a
group constituent, ensures that ideology and ideals do not become ossified or
stagnant.99 Yet, when this internal conflict is recast as a type of treachery, or
rebellion against a metaphysical conceptualization, such as truth, equity, or
progress, is when the power to classify it is most insidious and establishes its
deepest roots.100 This surreptitious function of power is what makes the
notion of community so antithetical to the civil liberties dimension of a
subject’s individual identity, for example, free speech.101 This dynamic, or
rather potential of the power to classify, must be directly confronted before
there can be an answer for subsequent queries about how identity groups can
potentially drive radical inclusivity while keeping democracy at the heart of
its expansion.102 This is essential because race plays such a central role for
communities of color.103 For example, seventy-five percent of African
Americans view their race as very or extremely important to their identity,
while two-thirds of whites say their race is only a little important.104 This is
not surprising when considering white is the default (or neutral) locus of
perception in a society with roots in discrimination and racism.105
96.

Astrada & Astrada, supra note 34, at 253, 257–58; Knouse, supra note 14,

at 762.

97.
Astrada & Astrada, supra note 34, at 246, 249; Knouse, supra note 14, at
755, 763; see, e.g., Note, supra note 81, at 1301.
98.
See CRISTINA BELTRÁN, THE TROUBLE WITH UNITY: LATINO POLITICS AND
THE CREATION OF IDENTITY 4, 113–14 (2010) (ebook); Knouse, supra note 14, at 752; Mason,
supra note 6, at 269.
99.
See Martha E. Gimenez, Latino/“Hispanic”—Who Needs a Name? The
Case Against Standardized Terminology, 19 INT’L J. HEALTH SERVS. 557, 561 (1989).
100.
See id. at 559, 561, 562.
101.
See Mason, supra note 6, at 265–66; Note, supra note 81, at 1294–95.
102.
See Note, supra note 81, at 1294–95.
103.
See Anna Brown, Key Findings on Americans’ Views of Race in 2019,
PEW RSCH. CTR.: FACT TANK (Apr. 9, 2019), http://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2019/04/09/key-findings-on-americans-views-of-race-in-2019/.
104.
Id.
105.
See Margaret Simms, After 50 Years of Progress and Protest, America Is
Still a Land of Unequal Opportunity, URB. INST.: URB. WIRE (Sept. 19, 2018),
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Here, PI has its strongest potential for ensuring political action (in
the name of a community) seeking redress and remediation because of
political organizing.106 Yet, it is also here where the centrality of identity,
especially one based on race, is vulnerable to being hijacked by ideological
authoritarianism.107 Authoritarianism, described by Jean Baudrillard, is like
hegemony, whereby despite changing a little bit of everything, nothing really
changes:
In its hegemonic function, power is a virtual configuration that
metabolizes any element to serve its own purposes. It could be
made of countless intelligent particles, but its opaque structure
would not change. . . . Soon every molecule of the American
nation will have come from somewhere else, as if by transfusion.
America will be Black, Indian, Hispanic, and Puerto Rican while
remaining America. . . . And all the more bigoted in that it will
have become, in fact, multiracial and multicultural. And all the
more imperialist in that it will be led by the descendants of slaves.
That is the subtle and unassailable logic of power; it cannot be
changed.108

This stark description of power builds upon the notion that a crucial
first step of representation and diversity that PI purports to solidify in a
political arena, is disruptive and radically equitable because it can just as well
serve to reify existing power structures and inequities by simply replacing
which PI (or component of a PI) is in the power position.109 The key
question then becomes: Absent an electoral process of any kind, with a
legitimate claim to representational procedural justice, who gets to decide
the priorities of a PI subgroup (even if the only requisite for entry is selfidentification)?110 Influencers?111 Those with political power or economic

http://www.urban.org/urban-wire/after-50-years-progress-and-protest-america-still-landunequal-opportunity; Danyelle Soloman et al., Systematic Inequality and American
Democracy,
CTR.
FOR
AM.
PROGRESS
(Aug.
7,
2019,
7:00
AM),
http://www.americanprogress.org/issues/race/reports/2019/08/07/473003/systematicinequality-american-democracy/.
106.
Astrada, supra note 7, at 37–38.
107.
See JEAN BAUDRILLARD, THE AGONY OF POWER 65–66 (Ames Hodges
trans., 2010).
108.
Id.
109.
See Ludwig Hurtado, What Happens When Latinx People Gentrify Latinx
Communities, VICE (Jan. 31, 2019, 1:05 PM), http://www.vice.com/en/article/mbynkq/whathappens-when-latinx-people-gentrify-latinx-communities; Astrada, supra note 7, at 37.
110.
See Tan et al., supra note 90, at 1262–66; Astrada, supra note 7, at 37–38.
111.
See Tan et al., supra note 90, at 1262–63.
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clout?112 As with broader concerns for equity, these questions are just as
pertinent within the PI as they are without.113
A major concern that arises is that a PI definitional process is subject
to manipulation and appropriation by the powerful elite of particular groups,
causing a disconnect and a representational deficiency between the PI and
the group it supposedly reflects and serves.114 Or, its political power is
undercut by relying on social media and/or influencers to serve as unofficial
official leaders (this in itself has issues of representational accuracy since
research has shown that a small number of “buzz makers” can have a
disproportionate impact on social network communities).115 Thus, how does
a PI process resistance from within the group and not from an external other
that seeks to infringe or displace the group as an entity (which often is a
rallying cry for sacrifice to the collective)?116 How does a concept remain
pragmatically useful as a political referent, especially when we consider the
ostensible progressive strategy to constantly expand notions of inclusion that
perpetually defer the realities of internal conflict and contradiction?117
To explore the idea of resistance, we must first discard the broader
notion of power as a binary function of voice/voiceless or power/powerless,
but rather, view resistance from within the space of referential meaning.118 A
referential meaning that not only gives voice to the subject, but speaks in
place of its voice, in substitution for the subject’s voice.119 An ulterior PI
voice that translates history, ethos, desire, and culture from the past, into the
future, absent any dialectical synthesis with the lived experience of the
subject.120 In other words, to be a true group member not only means to
identify with a PI group, but to define the world through its logic, and accept
and promulgate its truth as a purported realism (rather than as a gospel).121
Yet, there is always a remainder, a resistance to total inculcation of rational
subjects within any social concept that they are emplaced in—resistance that
is not in the name of another truth, but rather a refusal to lose the entirety of
oneself within external classifications.122 This is not an unfamiliar notion in

112.
113.
114.

See Astrada, supra note 7, at 37–38.
See Tan et al., supra note 90, at 1259–60.
See Astrada & Astrada, supra note 34, at 271; Astrada, supra note 7, at

115.
116.
117.
118.
119.
120.
121.
122.

See Tan et al., supra note 90, at 1262.
See Astrada & Astrada, supra note 34, at 271–72.
See id. at 257–58.
See id. at 259.
See id. at 259, 262–63.
See id. at 258–59.
See Astrada & Astrada, supra note 34, at 271.
See id. at 258.

37–38.
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the law, i.e., where the individual subject is forced into a larger classification
for the sake of pragmatic administration of justice.123
This notion of resistance by the individual is illuminated by Jacques
Derrida’s notion of resistance in the context of psychoanalysis.124 For
Derrida, in the context of curing a patient, “[a]n analytic solution untangles,
resolves, even absolves; it undoes the symptomatic or etiological knot . . . .
And the reason Freud reproaches [his patient] Irma . . . is that she has not
accepted his solution.”125 Derrida goes on to explain: “In other words, I [as
the figure of authority] am responsible for the analytic solution (Lösung) but
not for the resistance of the patient, who can refuse it and who is thus alone
responsible, culpable, accountable for his resistance.”126 Here is the shift of
the burden of legitimacy.127 Once the true solution or definition is revealed
by an authority, the individual who is on the receiving end of the narrative is
accountable to accept the truth offered—one can either accept truth or reject
it, but one cannot respond otherwise.128 When truth is presented in such a
manner, the burden is no longer upon the authority figure to justify his
solution, but instead on the receiver of the narrative to recognize its validity
and accept it.129 Here is where the asymmetrical power imbalance is at its
most dangerous, especially when we tread into the territory of PI and its
power to define who is, and who isn’t, authentic to their true identity.130
What if there is an answer to the narrative of power other than solely
accepting or rejecting truth?131 Here is where identity elites in power seek to
translate their interpretation of a PI into law, to concretize it into policy
spaces.132 Freud thus gives the example of this dynamic:
123.
See, e.g., Astrada & Astrada, supra note 84, at 196 (“[T]hat the
Reasonable Person does not adequately reflect reasonableness and the average Everyman in
an increasingly diverse population, especially as it relates to the profound demographic
changes taking place on the national landscape.”).
124.
JACQUES DERRIDA, RESISTANCES OF PSYCHOANALYSIS 1 (Peggy Kamuf et
al. trans., Editions Galilée 1996) (1998).
125.
Id. at 7.
126.
Id. at 8.
127.
See id.
128.
See id. at 9.
129.
DERRIDA, supra note 124, at 7.
130.
See Astrada, supra note 7, at 32; DERRIDA, supra note 124, at 7–8.
131.
See DERRIDA, supra note 124, at 9.
132.
See Marvin L. Astrada & Scott B. Astrada, Reexamining the Integrity of
the Binary: Politics, Identity, and Law, 17 U. MD. L.J. RACE, RELIGION, GENDER & CLASS
173, 193 (2017).
[T]hat the law’s use of the binary-based identity signifier is premised on
antiquated assumptions and simplified schemata that, to better recognize rights and
apply judicial remedies and protections of individuals and groups that fall outside
the binary, will perhaps require the courts to adopt a more flexible approach to
identity.
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The one that in general commands one to interpret as resistance to
analysis, to the solution, to the resolution (Lösung), the reservation
of anyone who does not accept your solution. . . . To analyze
anything whatsoever, anyone whatsoever, . . . would mean saying
to the other: [C]hoose my solution, prefer my solution, take my
solution, love my solution; you will be in the truth if you do not
resist my solution.133

Here, dissent is recast as a disavowal of truth.134 This is the
undulating concept behind the veneer of PI.135 When PI is not a
representational touchstone anchoring self-effacing contradictory notions
tethered to shared lived experiences of group members, but instead is a
gospel of truth that recasts resistance and dissent as treachery and treason, is
when PI is at its most non-representational and authoritarian.136 Contrary to
this problematic notion of PI, there are two countervailing concepts of
community that can provide a comprehensive understanding of the power
dynamics occurring at the heart of PI.137 One such approach, following a
theme of deconstruction, is the ultimate primacy of dialogue.138 This is more
radical than the ostensible notion of civic participation; it is a commitment to
the internal self-effacement of truth, a commitment to remain constantly in
flux in how (and by whom) a community is defined:
When we accept that every consensus exists as a
temporary result of a provisional hegemony, as a stabilization of
power, and that it always entails some form of exclusion, we can
begin to envisage democratic politics in a different way. A
democratic approach which, thanks to the insights of
deconstruction, is able to acknowledge the real nature of its
frontiers and recognizes the forms of exclusion that they embody,
instead of trying to disguise them under the veil of rationality or
morality, can help us . . . fight against the dangers of complacency.
Since it is aware of the fact that difference is the condition of
possibility of constituting unity and totality at the same time that it
Id. at 173.
133.
DERRIDA, supra note 124, at 9.
134.
Id.
135.
See id.; Astrada & Astrada, supra note 34, at 252.
136.
See Astrada & Astrada, supra note 34, at 252.
137.
See Chantal Mouffe, Deconstruction, Pragmatism and the Politics of
Democracy, in DECONSTRUCTION AND PRAGMATISM 1, 9 (Chantal Mouffe ed., Routledge
2005) (1996) (ebook); Audre Lorde, The Master’s Tools Will Never Dismantle the Master’s
House, in SISTER OUTSIDER: ESSAYS AND SPEECHES 110, 111–12 (Ten Speed Press 2007)
(1984).
138.
See Mouffe, supra note 137, at 1.
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provides its essential limits, such an approach can contribute to
subverting the ever-present temptation that exists in democratic
societies to naturalize their frontiers and essentialize their
identities.139

Here, there is an inverse connotation of consensus—one that requires
a constant reformulation of its definitional integrity as a counterpoint to the
hegemonic notion of ideological ossification.140 To view consensus as an
obstacle rather than a goal ensures the classifications that emplace residents
of PI groups are never captives to the drivers of the collective ideology.141
Yet another notion of community that contests the authoritarian
notion of PI community is creating a perpetual imbalance of power among
From an
individuals within a group, namely, interdependence.142
organizational and political action perspective, Audre Lorde develops the
notion of a community—in this case for women—based on interdependence,
and it is this notion that counteracts against authoritarianism:
Without community there is no liberation, only the most
vulnerable and temporary armistice between an individual and her
oppression. But community must not mean a shedding of our
differences, [not] the pathetic pretense that these differences do not
exist. Those of us who stand outside the circle of this society’s
definition of acceptable women; those of us who have been forged
in the crucibles of difference—those of us who are poor, who are
lesbians, who are Black, who are older—know that survival is not
an academic skill.143

Here is the circumlocution of power, never resting in a single locus,
but always shifting as power dynamics are continuously broken down and
reformed:
Interdependency between women is the way to a freedom
which allows the I to be, not in order to be used, but in order to be
creative. This is the difference between the passive be and the
active being.
Advocating the mere tolerance of difference between
women is the grossest reformism. It is a total denial of the creative
function of difference[s] in our lives. Difference must be not
139.
140.
141.
142.
143.

Id. at 11.
See id.
See id. at 8.
See Lorde, supra note 137, at 111–12.
Id. at 112.
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merely tolerated, but seen as a fund of necessary polarities
between which our creativity can spark like a dialectic. Only then
does the necessity for interdependency become unthreatening.
Only within that interdependency of different strengths,
acknowledged and equal, can the power to seek new ways of being
in the world generate . . . .144

Here, there is empowerment for dialectic, fostering difference for
conflict within a community rather than a move for uniformity or a stagnant
inclusiveness that smooths over key internal contradictions and differences
among PI constituents.145 This is poignantly disruptive for authoritarianism
and recasts the notion of resistance.146
III.

POLITICAL IDENTITY: IDENTARIAN-BASED POLITICAL
COMMUNITIES & SUBCOMMUNITIES

The analytic and thematic notions of Identarian-Based Political
Communities (“IBPCs”) and sundry Identarian-Based Political
Subcommunities (“IBPSCs”) seem to be counter to those of an American
National Community (“ANC”) and American National Identity (“ANI”).147
An ANC and ANI in the conduct of actual or genuine representative politics,
and the role of PI and IBFs in either enhancing/facilitating or negatively
impacting representative capacity is one that merits critical examination.148
At the outset, it is important to note the tensions between the foregoing states
of affairs and the potential for some type of resolution in fostering an ANC
and identity—irrespective of the prominence of IBPCs and IBFs as the
dominant form of political organization and action.149 Promoting a national
identity as a baseline for an ANC is viewed by some as essential for a polity
that is characterized by what are termed “liberal” values, viz., liberty (in its
comprehensive, variegated forms, such as freedom of speech and travel,
individualism, and property), to perpetuate and bolster liberty in a society
premised on the rule of law and democratic political representation via
universal suffrage.150
Cultural diversity, which is a basis for legitimating PI and IBFs as
the expositors of identarian-based interests and policy objectives, is viewed
by others as working against an ANC based on a shared national identity
144.
145.
146.
147.
148.
149.
150.

Id. at 111.
See id. at 111–12.
See id. at 112.
See Astrada, supra note 7, at 37, 42; Mason, supra note 6, at 261.
See Mason, supra note 6 at 261.
See id.
See id. at 261–62.
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based, in turn, on liberty and the rule of law.151 This is supposedly the case
because an ANC based on “a shared national identity in the face of cultural
diversity would require assimilating minority cultures, which can only be
achieved (if it can be achieved at all) by oppression.”152 Each of the
foregoing perspectives seem to assume that any potential ANC in the context
of identarian politics as exposited by IBFs is discordant as far as providing a
stable basis for genuinely representative democratic politics and policy
spaces.153 Liberty, in its various forms, does not necessarily have to be
hostile toward the diverse IBPCs premised on equality as the overarching
mantra that is part and parcel constitutive of the American polity.154 Can
liberty and the rule of law be reconciled with the diversity of IBPCs and the
perpetuation of PI via IBFs?155 Perhaps if legal classifications and signifiers,
such as Rule of Law and representation, can provide “a sense of belonging to
their polity, even when they lack a shared national identity . . . a belief
among them that there is some special reason why they should associate
together which appeals to something other than, say, that they happen to live
in the same polity.”156
A sense of belonging to a polity entails, or rather, is characterized by
Andrew Mason as indicating that a subject possesses a sense of belonging to
a polity if and only if a subject genuinely identifies with and accepts major
institutions and central sociocultural, political, and economic practices.157
When it identifies with the foregoing institutions and practices, it must be
able to identify with something outside itself, must be able to perceive it as
valuable, at least on balance, and see its concerns reflected in the polity.158
151.
See id. at 261.
152.
Id.; see also IRIS MARION YOUNG, JUSTICE AND THE POLITICS OF
DIFFERENCE 165 (1990) (arguing that assimilationist practices in most forms, coercive or noncoercive, constitute oppression).
153.
Astrada, supra note 7, at 37.
154.
See id. at 34.
155.
See id. at 31–32.
156.
Mason, supra note 6, at 261, 263.
Why should it be supposed that a sense of belonging together is a
necessary condition in practice for the realization of liberal values? There are at
least four claims which are relevant here. First, it has been argued that a shared
national identity is required in order for the citizens of a state to avoid alienation
from their political institutions. Second, it has been maintained that liberal
institutions cannot be, or are unlikely to be, stable or enduring unless citizens share
a national identity. Third, that a shared national identity is a precondition for the
existence of the kind of trust which makes compromise possible in the face of
conflicting interests. Fourth, that a shared national identity is a necessary condition
for a politics of the common good and widespread support for redistribution on
grounds of social justice.

Id. at 263.
157.
158.

Id. at 272.
Id.
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When one feels at home in a practice or institution, and experiences
participation in it as natural, one has a genuine sense of belonging.159 “In
order to be able to feel this way, [one] must not be excluded from the
practice or institution or be marginalized in relation to it.”160 When
considering the notions of belonging and relatability, the Rule of Law has
functioned as the lodestar in positing, maintaining, and perpetuating an
inside/outside framework as far as what identity emanates from the politics
of identity.161 The United States Supreme Court has noted the indispensable
nature of the Rule of Law as the fundamental basis for an ANC, as well as
IBPCs when it comes to PI and IBFs.162
Perhaps no characteristic of an organized and cohesive
society is more fundamental than its erection and enforcement of a
system of rules defining the various rights and duties of its
members, enabling them to govern their affairs and definitively
settle their differences in an orderly, predictable manner. Without
such a “legal system,” social organization and cohesion are
virtually impossible; with the ability to seek regularized resolution
of conflicts, individuals are capable of interdependent action that
enables them to strive for achievements without the anxieties that
would beset them in a disorganized society. Put more succinctly,
it is this injection of the rule of law that allows society to reap the
benefits of rejecting what political theorists call the “state of
nature.”
American society, of course, bottoms its systematic
definition of individual rights and duties, as well as its machinery
for dispute settlement, not on custom or the will of strategically
placed individuals, but on the common-law model. It is to courts,
or other quasi-judicial official bodies, that we ultimately look for
the implementation of a regularized, orderly process of dispute
settlement. Within this framework, those who wrote our original
Constitution, in the Fifth Amendment, and later those who drafted
the Fourteenth Amendment, recognized the centrality of the
concept of due process in the operation of this system. Without
this guarantee that one may not be deprived of his rights, neither
liberty nor property, without due process of law, the State’s
monopoly over techniques for binding conflict resolution could
hardly be said to be acceptable under our scheme of things. Only
159.
160.

Id.
Mason, supra note 6, at 272; see also HORACE M. KALLEN, CULTURE AND
DEMOCRACY IN THE UNITED STATES: STUDIES IN THE GROUP PSYCHOLOGY OF THE AMERICAN
PEOPLES 79–80, 92, 164, 308 (1924).
161.
See Boddie v. Connecticut, 401 U.S. 371, 374–75 (1971).
162.
See id.
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by providing that the social enforcement mechanism must function
strictly within these bounds can we hope to maintain an ordered
society that is also just. It is upon this premise that this Court has,
through years of adjudication, put flesh upon the due process
principle.163

What is the apperceived value in having an ANC premised on an
ANI rather than on (fragmented) IBPCs?164 J.S. Mill’s observations
pertaining to federalism seem applicable when examining the tension
between ANC and PI in the form of IBF-based IBPCs.165 According to Mill,
A portion of mankind may be said to constitute a
Nationality if they are united among themselves by common
sympathies which do not exist between them and any others—
which make them co-operate with each other more willingly than
with other people, desire to be under the same government, and
desire that it should be government by themselves or a portion of
themselves exclusively. This feeling of nationality may have been
generated by various causes. Sometimes it is the effect of identity
of race and descent. Community of language, and community of
religion, greatly contribute to it. Geographical limits are one of its
causes. But the strongest of all is identity of political antecedents;
the possession of a national history, and consequent community of
recollections; collective pride and humiliation, pleasure and regret,
connected with the same incidents in the past. None of these
circumstances, however, are either indispensable, or necessarily
sufficient by themselves.166

Can identity-based political interest(s) be channeled into an ANC
and identity paradigm?167 Is PI, as articulated by IBFs, discordant with
having a representative political system based on an ANI that fosters an
ANC?168 How does ROL factor into this possibility exactly?169 The tension,
dissonance between an ANC and identity and IBPCs as articulated through
IBFs, which, in turn, perpetuate themselves through PI-based legal and
political discourse, is readily observed in the factional-nature of law and the
policy spaces it produces.170
163.
Id. (emphasis added).
164.
See JOHN STUART MILL, REPRESENTATIVE GOVERNMENT 188 (Batoche
Books 2001) (1861).
165.
See id. at 181.
166.
Id.
167.
See Mason, supra note 6, at 264–65; MILL, supra note 164, at 182–83.
168.
See Mason, supra note 6, at 264–65; MILL, supra note 164, at 182–83.
169.
See Mason, supra note 6, at 264–65; MILL, supra note 164, at 182–83.
170.
See Mason, supra note 6, at 264–65.
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The complex and difficult nature of identity in the conduct of politics
as expressed in law and the legal process seems to be in line with an overall
factional—and thus a conceptual space of engagement premised on
contestation and confrontation—mitigating against the fostering of unity
among IBFs “united among themselves by common sympathies . . . .”171 In
Griggs172, for example, the Court noted that,
Congress did not intend by Title VII, however, to guarantee a job
to every person regardless of qualifications. In short, the Act does
not command that any person be hired simply because he was
formerly the subject of discrimination, or because he is a member
of a minority group. Discriminatory preference for any group,
minority or majority, is precisely and only what Congress has
proscribed. What is required by Congress is the removal of
artificial, arbitrary, and unnecessary barriers to employment when
the barriers operate invidiously to discriminate on the basis of
racial or other impermissible classification.173

The Court’s opinion in Griggs, in the context of race discrimination
in the workplace, is hard to reconcile with Mill’s general admonition that,
[t]o render a federation advisable, several conditions are necessary.
The first is that there should be a sufficient amount of mutual
sympathy among the populations. The federation binds them
always to fight on the same side; and if they have such feelings
towards one another, or such diversity of feeling towards their
neighbours, that they would generally prefer to fight on opposite
sides, the federal tie is neither likely to be of long duration, not to
be well observed while it subsists. The sympathies available for
the purpose are those of race, language, religion, and, above all, of
political institutions, as conducing most to a feeling of identity of
political interest.174

In seeming support of IBFs and PI, however, sympathies have been
far and few in between when it comes to relations between different types of
identity-based groups, race being one of many, to include socioeconomic
class.175 In the case of need-based welfare, for instance, the Court has
declared that,
171.
MILL, supra note 164, at 181.
172.
Griggs v. Duke Power Co., 401 U.S. 424 (1971).
173.
Id. at 430–31.
174.
Id.; MILL, supra note 164, at 188.
175.
MILL, supra note 164 at 188; see, e.g., Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S.
471, 480–81 (1970) (upholding the State’s right to determine what constitutes proper
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[i]n the area of economics and social welfare, a State does not
violate the Equal Protection Clause merely because the
classifications made by its laws are imperfect. If the classification
has some “reasonable basis,” it does not offend the Constitution
simply because the classification “is not made with mathematical
nicety or because in practice it results in some inequality.” “The
problems of government are practical ones and may justify, if they
do not require, rough accommodations—illogical, it may be, and
unscientific.” “A statutory discrimination will not be set aside if
any state of facts reasonably may be conceived to justify it.”176

In other words, the focus of law is on formal principles and
reasoning rather than on the substantive content that is—at least initially—
the stimulus for a PI to materialize, and an IBF to champion it.177 Through
the legal and the political process, IBFs are (arguably) able to interject
substance into resultant policy postures and spaces.178
Although PI has, in some form or other, been a hallmark of
American politics, the notion of an ANC, based on a national identity which,
in turn, is based on ordering concepts such as Liberty, ROL, and political
representation, has been a staple of American political culture since before,
and during the founding of the United States as a political unit.179 An
exposition on the role of key ordering concepts and principles, viz., ROL,
assistance in determining need not tethered to family size, the Court stated that, “[a]s we have
noted, the practical effect of the Maryland regulation is that all children, even in very large
families, do receive some aid. We find nothing . . . that requires more than this. So long as
some aid is provided to all eligible families and all eligible children, the statute itself is not
violated.”); Lindsey v. Normet, 405 U.S. 56, 74 (1972) (“We do not denigrate the importance
of decent, safe, and sanitary housing. But the Constitution does not provide judicial remedies
for every social and economic ill. We are unable to perceive in that document any
constitutional guarantee of access to dwellings of a particular quality, or any recognition of the
right of a tenant to occupy the real property of his landlord beyond the term of his lease
without the payment of rent or otherwise contrary to the terms of the relevant agreement.
Absent constitutional mandate, the assurance of adequate housing, and the definition of
landlord-tenant relationships are legislative, not judicial, functions. Nor should we forget that
the Constitution expressly protects against confiscation of private property or the income
therefrom.”).
176.
Dandridge, 397 U.S. at 485 (citations omitted) (first quoting Lindsley v.
Nat. Carbonic Gas Co., 220 U.S. 61, 78 (1911); then quoting Metropolis Theatre Co. v. City
of Chicago, 228 U.S. 61, 69–70 (1913); and then quoting McGowan v. Maryland, 366 U.S.
420, 426 (1961)).
177.
See id.; Astrada, supra note 7, at 20.
178.
See Astrada, supra note 7, at 57.
179.
See BENJAMIN FRANKLIN, TWO TRACTS: INFORMATION TO THOSE WHO
WOULD REMOVE TO AMERICA AND REMARKS CONCERNING THE SAVAGES OF NORTH AMERICA
10 (Burlington-House 1784) (discussing the role of “good laws and liberty” in defining an
American NC/NI).
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Individualism, Assimilation, and Liberty, as the basis for a traditional notion
of an American NC/NI is succinctly articulated by St. Jean De Crevecoeur
(1782), in which the immigrant, analytically, is seen as being fodder for the
constitution of an American race—one that is comprised of a melding of
peoples, in which difference is surrendered and sameness embraced as far as
an ANC.180 Traditionally, it seems that identity has been subject to a
politicized binary opposition in which there is little room for accommodating
the identity that one brings to American society from without.181 This is
especially the case with the notion of assimilation which has buttressed how
an American is defined when the immigrant seeks admission to the American
polity.182 Identity thus metamorphizes, so to speak—within the context of
and in light of ROL, Individualism, Assimilation, and Liberty—wherein the
subject sheds substantial attachments to the identity of origin and adopts a
“new” identity in line with an American NI and NC:
[Americans] are a people . . . united by the silken bands of mild
government, all respecting the laws, without dreading their power,
because they are equitable. . . . [From] whence came all these
people [that have immigrated here]? [T]hey are a mixture of
English, Scot[tis]h, Irish, French, Dutch, Germans, and Swedes.
From this promiscuous breed, that race now called Americans
have arisen. . . . [H]ere they came. Everything has tended to
regenerate them; new laws, a new mode of living, a new social
system; here they are become men . . . . The laws, the indulgent
laws, protect them as they arrive, stamping on them the symbol of
adoption . . . . From whence proceed these laws? From our
government. Whence the government? It is derived from the
original genius and strong desire of the people . . . . What then is
the American . . . ? He is either a[] European, or the descendant of
a[] European, hence that strange mixture of blood, which you will
find in no other country. . . . He is an American, who, leaving
behind him all his ancient prejudices and manners, receives new
ones from the new mode of life he has embraced, the new
government he obeys, and the new rank he holds. He becomes an
American by being received in the broad lap of our great Alma
Mater [(Dear Mother)]. Here individuals of all nations are melted
into a new race of men . . . . The American ought therefore to love
this country much better than that wherein either he or his
forefathers were born. . . . The American is a new man, who acts

180.
J. HECTOR ST. JEAN CREVECOEUR, LETTERS FROM AN AMERICAN FARMER
51, 54–55 (Fox, Duffield 1904) (1782).
181.
See Astrada & Astrada, supra note 132, at 181.
182.
See Mason, supra note 6, at 269.
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upon new principles; he must therefore entertain new ideas, and
from new opinions.183

The notion of a community is one that has found expression in legal
and political thought and practice.184 Yet, it is very important to note that in
examining
“the claims of community”—whether in law or moral and
political theory—is to recognize that, as the phrase itself suggests,
more than one claim is involved. . . . Any assumption that
supporters of “community” are coworkers in one and the same
enterprise must therefore be firmly rejected. . . . [C]laims of
community are several and arise in a number of different contexts
relevant to legal scholarship. There is no single communitarian
position or debate.185

Hence, positing an ANC or ANI may be a very problematic
exercise.186 Assimilation has been touted by proponents of a traditional
understanding of American identity and community as a means of bypassing
the aforementioned difficulty.187
Is it possible to employ ROL and liberty to bypass the pitfalls of PI
and the IBFs that promote them in law and policy spaces?188 “[T]he citizens
of a state might in principle have a sense of belonging to a polity without
thinking that there is any real sense in which they belonged together.”189 A
sense of belonging can be premised on legal concepts or other political
formulas based on variegated formulae of citizenship rooted in ROL and
legality that are less tinctured with PI, perhaps resulting in a more
representative politics that revolves around liberty, and yet, accommodates
equality better.190 In the case of the United States Constitution and ROL,
“[b]y establishing authoritative limits, by proclaiming, with the backing of
the coercive power of the state, what is forbidden, what is permitted, and
183.
CREVECOEUR, supra note 180, at 49–56; see also A Farmer, AntiFederalist No. 3: New Constitution Creates a National Government; Will Not Abate Foreign
Influence; Danger of Civil War and Despotism (1788), in THE ANTI-FEDERALIST PAPERS 14,
16 (Bill Bailey ed., n.d.), http://perma.cc/XM7Q-XV4B [hereinafter Anti-Federalist No. 3].
184.
Stephen A. Gardbaum, Law, Politics, and the Claims of Community, 90
MICH. L. REV. 685, 686 (1992).
185.
Id. at 688.
186.
See id.; Astrada, supra note 7, at 37.
187.
See Gardbaum, supra note 184, at 713; Mason, supra note 6, at 269.
188.
See Mason, supra note 6, at 272; Kreiss, supra note 3, at 95; Smith, supra
note 1, at 302–03.
189.
Mason, supra note 6, at 272.
190.
See id.

2021]

POLITICS, POWER & COMMUNITY

195

what is required, it creates comprehensive background conditions for, and
sets a tone that reverberates throughout, all spheres of our lives.”191
Mason notes that, in the United States, generally speaking,
what matters is not shared values, but a shared identity. . . . People
decide who [sic] they want to share a country with by asking who
[sic] they identify with, who [sic] they feel solidarity with. What
holds Americans together, despite their disagreements over the
nature of the good life, is the fact that they share an identity as
Americans.192

Furthermore, it has been contended:
[T]hat what holds the United States together is a shared sense of
belonging to the American polity, expressed, in part, by the way in
which American citizens identify with various symbols, practices,
and institutions such as “the flag, the Pledge, the Fourth, the
Constitution.” Or, less ambitiously, it might be maintained that
even though American citizens do possess a sense of belonging
together in the relevant sense, the most important factor in holding
the United States together is a sense of belonging to the American
polity.193

“Indeed, a sense of belonging to a polity can provide the basis for
patriotism, understood simply as a love of its central institutions and
practices.”194
[A] sense of belonging to a polity is needed to underpin a politics
of the common good, but a shared national identity is often
unnecessary. If there is a widespread sense of belonging of this
kind, then citizens will feel part of the polity of which they are
members, and as a result, they are likely to have a sense of sharing
a fate with others who are also part of it. That sense of sharing a
common fate may often be enough to motivate support for policies
which [sic] aim at the common good without there needing to be a

191.
Peter Berkowitz, The Court, the Constitution, and the Culture of Freedom,
POL’Y REV., Aug.–Sept. 2005, at 3, 4.
192.
Mason, supra note 6, at 273 (emphasis omitted) (quoting Will Kymlicka,
Social Unity in a Liberal State, SOC. PHIL. & POL’Y, Winter 1996, at 105, 131).
193.
Mason, supra note 6, at 274 (quoting Michael Walzer, What Does it Mean
to be an “American”?, 57 SOC. RSCH. 591, 602–03 (1990)).
194.
Id. at 278.
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deeper sense of belonging together, which a shared national
identity would minimally involve.195

Perhaps this is a more effective basis for fostering and bolstering a
unified political unit rather than balkanized PI camps perpetuated through
IBFs, in that premising politics on ANC may be preferable to having an ANI
or other forms of PI.196
An IBF is, in essence, a vehicle for promoting an imagined political
community.197
It is imagined because the members of even the smallest
nation will never know most of their fellow-members, meet them, or
even hear of them, yet in the minds of each, lives the image of their
communion . . . . In fact, all communities larger than primordial
villages of face-to-face contact . . . are imagined. Communities are
to be distinguished . . . by the style in which they are imagined.198

The style of elitist IBFs is one that may not necessarily enhance
representation in the fullest sense of the term, nor may it facilitate
accountability.199 How exactly is an identity group, independent of its
individual constituent parts, held empirically accountable exactly?200 IBFs
and the PI that emerges have “finite, if elastic, boundaries . . . regardless of
the actual inequality and exploitation that may prevail in each [political
community], the nation is always conceived as a deep, horizontal
comradeship.”201
195.
Id. at 278–79.
196.
See id. at 279.
197.
BENEDICT ANDERSON, IMAGINED COMMUNITIES: REFLECTIONS ON THE
ORIGIN AND SPREAD OF NATIONALISM 6 (Verso rev. ed. 2006).
198.
Id.
199.
See id.
200.
See id. at 3–4.
201.
Id. at 7. The Court, for instance, when considering “the ‘totality of
circumstances’ to determine whether members of a racial group have less opportunity than do
other members of the electorate” to participate in the political process — crucial to fomenting
a sense of community through the political process — has declared that courts look at:
[T]he history of voting-related discrimination in the State or political subdivision;
the extent to which voting in the elections of the State or political subdivision is
racially polarized; the extent to which the State or political subdivision has used
voting practices or procedures that tend to enhance the opportunity for
discrimination against the minority group . . . ; the extent to which minority group
members bear the effects of past discrimination in areas such as education,
employment, and health, which hinder their ability to participate effectively in the
political process; the use of overt or subtle racial appeals in political campaigns; and
the extent to which members of the minority group have been elected to public
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IBFs perpetuate an IBM-based PI that is not only premised on
sameness, reductionist notions of experiential or traits-based criteria, and
selective norms, values, and ideological benchmarks, but also assumes that
there is a simultaneity group-based identity that persists in space/time across
and above the temporal nature and ever-changing social contexts that give
rise to experience and interpretations of identity.202 “[S]imultaneity
[encompasses the] past and [the] future in an instantaneous present . . . .
[A]n idea of ‘homogenous, empty time,’ in which simultaneity is, as it were,
transverse, cross-time, marked not by prefiguring and fulfillment, but by
temporal coincidence, and measured by clock and calendar.”203 IBFs and PI
are embedded in PCs that, if they are stationary in space/time, can become
rigid, dogmatic constructs rather than fluid and adaptive constructs that
accommodate the intricacy that undergirds social contexts.204 Identities can
reflect complex adaptive systemic changes that are transpiring, or can retreat
into the safe confines of a knowable space that is invested in a power
dynamic in which a PI is perpetuated in simultaneous space/time.205 As the
Court notes in its election law jurisprudence,
[t]he recognition of nonracial communities of interest reflects the
principle that a State may not “assum[e] from a group of voters’
race that they ‘think alike, share the same political interests, and
will prefer the same candidates at the polls. ’” . . . “The purpose of
the Voting Rights Act is to prevent discrimination in the exercise
of the electoral franchise and to foster our transformation to a
society that is no longer fixated on race.” We do a disservice to
these important goals by failing to account for the differences
between people of the same race.206

IBFs perpetuate identarian-based ideological frameworks for
incorporation into the field of politics.207 PI becomes operationalized by
IBFs.208 The means by which PI materializes is based, in part, on what C.
office in the jurisdiction. The Report notes also that evidence demonstrating that
elected officials are unresponsive to the particularized needs of the members of the
minority group and that the policy underlying the State’s or the political
subdivision’s use of the contested practice or structure is tenuous may have
probative value.

League of United Latin Am. Citizens v. Perry, 548 U.S. 399, 425–26 (2006).
202.
See Note, supra note 81, at 1292 n.1.
203.
ANDERSON, supra note 196, at 24.
204.
See id. at 25–26.
205.
See id. at 26.
206.
League of United Latin Am. Citizens, 548 U.S. at 433–34 (citations
omitted) (alteration in original) (emphasis added).
207.
See Astrada, supra note 7, at 37.
208.
See id.; ANDERSON, supra note 197, at 205.
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Wright Mills has termed Master Symbols of Legitimization (“MSL”).209
MSLs are part of a general and recognizable nomenclature that has the effect
of generating and reifying the self-contained paradigmatic parameters of a
particular modality of thought, order, through the use and examination of
MSLs.210 Particular constellations of order deploy a specific lexis—one that
embodies distinct ordering assumptions and principles—that utilizes MSL to
manufacture and deploy the means by which actuality is conceptualized.211
PI and its constituent components and expositors are exemplars of MSL that
function within a larger superstructure of ideational matrices of
signification/meaning pervaded with networks of power.212 The power of
MSLs resides in their ability to authoritatively designate and fix
signification; MSLs justify, explain, and reify subject matter without having
to rely upon external sources of justification.213 The legitimacy of the MSL
that constitutes identity is “supported, partly independently, by its entrenched
status and by the contribution that it makes to the justice and workability of”
an IBF and the PI it manufactures and disseminates.214 It is erroneous to
contend, however, that the continuous operation of a particular
practice/MSLs confers legitimacy on that which is practiced.215 Such
reasoning is tautological; simply because a particular construct/practice is
entrenched does not necessarily mean that it is desirable and/or appropriate
to retain it.216 Context, it seems, determines correctness rather than the
intrinsic worth of a particular MSL.217 A construct is not inherently correct,
true, proper, in and of itself, simply because it adequately addresses
pragmatic concerns.218 Objects of knowledge, however, do not await being
discovered made visible in an objective sense; they do not pre-exist
themselves, but function within a complex combine of mutualist discursive
relations of power.219

209.
See A. JAVIER TREVIÑO, THE SOCIAL THOUGHT OF C. WRIGHT MILLS 134–
35 (2012).
210.
Id. at 134–35.
211.
Id. at 135.
212.
Id.
213.
Id.
214.
Richard H. Fallon, Jr., Stare Decisis and the Constitution: An Essay on
Constitutional Methodology, 76 N.Y.U. L. REV. 570, 570 (2001).
215.
See, e.g., Astrada & Astrada, supra note 34, at 245–46; but see Fallon,
supra note 213, at 570.
216.
See, e.g., Astrada, supra note 7, at 26; but see Fallon, supra note 214, at
591.
217.
See TREVIÑO, supra note 209, at 134–35.
218.
See Astrada, supra note 7, at 20; but cf. Fallon, supra note 214, at 570.
219.
MICHEL FOUCAULT, THE ARCHAEOLOGY OF KNOWLEDGE 45 (A.M.
Sheridan Smith trans., Pantheon Books 1972) (1969).
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MSLs can have the effect of collapsing distinctions between signs
and signifiers, of being seduced by the notion that analytic constructs can be
reflective and/or constitutive of an actual, tangible real that is conducive to
an authoritatively and qualitatively proper state of affairs.220 Through acts of
naming the constituent elements of the actual via MSLs, elites can produce a
discourse that establishes the basis for proper ordering principles that are
either bestowed upon objects and/or discovered.221 Objective and reasoned
judgment is based upon the generation of a field of perceptual effects that
have their basis in MSL.222 IBFs rely upon a “community of settled acts
which, through their objectifications in the present act, establish the
conditions to which that act must conform.”223 Identity-based MSLs, such as
IBMs, are the conceptual tools that subjects employ to make judgments
about the content of an identity, the basis for identity-based politics, and the
inclusion/exclusion binary that a PI will embrace.224 “Every political
judgment . . . modif[ies] the facts on which it is passed.”225 Judgment, while
devoid of objective criteria per se, is a form of political thought that “is itself
a form of political action.”226 The political dimension of judgment is less
about particular categorizations, such as left and right, than about the
shifting, layered and relative bases upon which the true and the real are
premised.227 The lexis, i.e., mode of representation, of PI via IBFs and its
logos, i.e., the content of its lexis,228 is revealed to be operating on a relative,
as opposed to objective, plane.229 Judgment is, therefore, an act of
imagination; imagination enables the power to invent criteria for an objective
settled act of judgment and classification.230
A.
Exploring the Political Function of Memory Within IBFs, PI &
Community
An essential consideration for settled acts is the role of cultural
memory in conflating authenticity and signification, in particular when PI is
220.
See TREVIÑO, supra note 209, at 134–35.
221.
See id. at 135.
222.
ALFRED NORTH WHITEHEAD, SYMBOLISM: ITS MEANING AND EFFECT 37–
38 (1927).
223.
See id. at 36.
224.
See TREVIÑO, supra note 209, at 134–35.
225.
See CARR, supra note 55, at 5.
226.
See id.
227.
See Morawetz, supra note 81, at 391.
228.
JEAN-FRANÇOIS LYOTARD & JEAN-LOUP THÉBAUD, JUST GAMING 5 (Wlad
Godzich trans., Univ. of Minn. Press 1985) (1979).
229.
Astrada & Astrada, supra note 34, at 255; Astrada, supra note 7, at 67.
230.
See Astrada, supra note 7, at 58.
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used as an organizational driver of identity.231
The metaphysical
essentialism of identity, what it means, e.g., to be Latinx, or AfricanAmerican, or Intersectional, relies on a metaphysical notion of an idealized
origin—a history that is devoid of the accusation it makes of the present:
Oppression of difference, exclusivity, and the inability to tolerate radical
diversity.232 On the one hand, memory acts as a fissure that provides an
anchor for history and morality, which is crucial to fostering social equity.233
This is Ariel Dorfman’s notion of memory in the context of reconciliation
and accountability for the crimes of dictatorship against a (Chilean) society
that is trying to move forward from a traumatic identity-based collective
(societal) experience:
Memory matters. One of the primary reasons behind the
extraordinary crisis [of] humanity finds itself in is due to the
exclusion of billions of human beings and what they remember,
men and women who are not even a faraway flicker on the nightly
news, on the screen of reality. One of the ways out of our
predicament is to multiply the areas of participation, to create
veritable oceans of participation . . . . A nation that does not take
into account the multitude of suppressed memories of the
majority of its people will always be weak, basing its survival on
the exclusion of dissent and otherness.234

The memory of a culture, of ancestry, is disruptive to concentrated
power because it refuses the status of a relic—an ossified referent that
regulates the bestowal of meaning and authenticity—but is receptive to be
subject to the same dialectic forces of conflict and progress as civilizations
that will proceed and have preceded it.235
For PI, cultural memory serves as an unambiguous origin of identity,
complete with a metaphysical essence that removes it from historical
dialectics, and instead enshrines it outside of history.236 Memory unseats
power when we remember all of it.237 Memory is a function of selective
interpretations put forth by the power elite when it excludes nuance, and the
dialectical relationship historical subjects had with their culture.238 To avoid
231.
See id. at 62–63.
232.
See id. at 21, 61–62.
233.
See id. at 62–63.
234.
ARIEL DORFMAN, HOMELAND SECURITY ATE MY SPEECH: MESSAGES
FROM THE END OF THE WORLD 59, 72 (2017).
235.
See id. at 72.
236.
See id. at 81.
237.
Astrada, supra note 7, at 62–63.
238.
See id. at 37–38, 66.
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a history that subjugates group constituents, cultural history must engage
contradiction and conflict within the heart of ancestry; otherwise, in
fetishizing the past, PI does almost as much violence as colonialism to the
cultures of antiquity by expelling the dialectical collision of culture and
subjects.239 In the movement of the subject away from their history as an
ideal or archetype—even intersectional and completely individualized—to
ground PI, there is a movement toward radical diversity that recognizes a
subject struggling to grasp the synthesis between abstraction with
empiricism.240 This is aligned with Homi K. Bhabba’s contention that “[t]he
question of identification is never the affirmation of a pre-given identity,
never a self-fulfilling prophecy—it is always the production of an image of
identity and the transformation of the subject in assuming that image.”241
The subject, even within the origin culture of a PI group, must struggle with
and collide with the culture that surrounds them to exist as a social subject.242
In other words, to embrace the essence of being Incan means struggling to
exist as a subject under Incan culture, with all its contradictions, offenses,
mysticism and doctrines of knowledge and not to embrace the cultural
artifacts of relics and known customs of the tribe.243 To remember, within
political memory, is a function to combat authoritarianism, and opens the lid
of history, to disrupt a culturally archived social narrative.244 PI, in an
opposite movement, draws upon memory as a driver of recasting ideology as
the beginning of history—i.e., claims of cultural appropriation rely on the
implicit assumption that one’s culture is the quintessential Adam, the true
origin point of all that appears within.245
IV.

CONCLUSION

IBFs are able to control the character and content PI in determining
whose experience qualifies as the controlling standard by which identity is
articulated in politics, law, and policy spaces.246 It can be said that “the
239.
See BELTRÀN, supra note 98, at 4, 5; Gimenez, supra note 99, at 564, 566;
Ana Gonzalez-Barrera & Mark Hugo Lopez, Is Being Hispanic a Matter of Race, Ethnicity or
Both?, PEW RSCH CTR.: FACT TANK (June 15, 2015), http://www.pewresearch.org/facttank/2015/06/15/is-being-hispanic-a-matter-of-race-ethnicity-or-both/.
240.
See BELTRÀN, supra note 98, at 62, 109; Gonzalez-Barrera & Lopez,
supra note 238.
241.
HOMI K. BHABBA, THE LOCATION OF CULTURE 45 (1994).
242.
See BELTRÀN, supra note 98, at 6–7, 160; Gonzalez-Barrera & Lopez,
supra note 238.
243.
See BELTRÀN, supra note 98, at 111.
244.
See id. at 157–58.
245.
See id. at 164–65.
246.
BHABBA, supra note 241, at 64.
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distribution of all that circulates in a given society is just if it conforms to
something defined . . . as justice itself, that is, as the essence, or the idea, of
justice.”247 Justice will therefore manifest itself in conformity with the
significations established in discourse that has a monopoly on positing PI.248
Symbolic signification possesses a protean capacity; symbols can have
different meanings for different people under different circumstances.249
IBFs perpetuate PI through denotative statements.250 “A just practice will
have to conform to denotative statements (statements that denote justice)
that are themselves true. This is where the pathos of the conviction is
involved: [I]t admits that the statement . . . is true” in and of itself.251
Herein, then, lies the problem of positing PI, i.e., the articulation of
subjective, relative, positional opinions being tendered as objective, unbiased (essentialist) pronouncements that ignore the fact that the “truth of
certain . . . propositions belongs to our frame of reference.”252 A critical
analysis of denotative statements provides a degree of understanding and
explanation regarding the internal, as well as external constraints within
which power is exercised.253
[T]he vast machine of political thought that justifies itself, or
believes itself to be justified, by what it wants to decree in the realm
of practice so that a society be just, so that distribution of what there
is to distribute is well carried out, on the basis of a model (e.g. Court
ratiocination), all this thought is actually futile, inasmuch as a
command cannot find its justification in a denotative statement.254

Denotative statements of the true require that the lexis of PI be “definite,
manageable, reproducible, and also to be charged with . . . emotional
efficacity.”255
The meta-language provided by IBFs to conceptualize and
communicate PI in law and policy spaces is a basis for the exercise of power;
an IBF turns to itself, it looks inward, for the very means to perpetuate itself

247.
LYOTARD & THÉBAUD, supra note 228, at 19.
248.
Id.
249.
WHITEHEAD, supra note 222, at 63.
250.
Id.; Astrada, supra note 7, at 34.
251.
LYOTARD & THÉBAUD, supra note 228, at 20.
252.
LUDWIG WITTGENSTEIN, ON CERTAINTY 12e (Geork Henrik Von Wright
ed., G.E.M. Anscombe & Denis Paul trans., Harper & Row 1972) (1969).
253.
See LYOTARD & THÉBAUD, supra note 228, at 22.
254.
Id.
255.
WHITEHEAD, supra note 222, at 62–63.
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in space and time.256 In all configurations of order, however, there is “no
meta-language . . . that [can] ground political and ethical decisions that will
be taken as the basis of its statements. There is no meta-language; there are
only genres of language, genres of discourse.”257 “All testing, all
confirmation and disconfirmation of a hypothesis takes place already within
a system.”258 As Lyotard and Thebaud observe:
[N]o maker of statements, no utterer, is ever autonomous. On the
contrary an utterer is always someone who is first of all an
addressee . . . he is someone who, before he is the utterer of a
prescription, has been the recipient of a prescription, and that he is
merely a relay; he has also been the object of a prescription.259

IBFs produce identarian discourse that constitutes, in part, the
parameters and contours of law, policy, and politics.260 This has the effect of
producing a base of critique and knowledge that centers around IBF
256.
See Astrada, supra note 7, at 20–24; discussion supra Part II. As
Wittgenstein notes, “[i]f a thought were correct a priori, it would be a thought whose
possibility ensured its truth. A priori knowledge that a thought was true would be possible
only if its truth were recognizable from the thought itself (without anything to compare it
with).” WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 52, at 13.
257.
LYOTARD & THEBAUD, supra note 228, at 28.
258.
WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 252, at 16e.
259.
LYOTARD & THEBAUD, supra note 228, at 31; see also, e.g., Veronica
Rocha & Brandon Tensley, CNN’s LGBTQ Town Hall, CNN: POL.,
http://www.cnn.com/politics/live-news/lgbtq-town-hall-2019/index.html (last updated Oct. 11,
2019, 12:37 AM). The following are examples of how an IBF has managed to make PI an
operative basis of political thought and behavior. Rocha & Tensley, supra. Whether one
agrees or disagrees, it is very important to note the power of PI to set the parameters and affect
the character and content of political rhetoric at the highest levels. Id. The Lesbian, Gay,
Bisexual, Transgender, and Queer (“LGBTQ”) Town Hall is an exemplar of the power of
IBFs to, in essence, set the terms of engagement for politics, which at one time were
dominated by ideological as opposed to identarian based platforms. Id. Examples of the
aforementioned are: Violence against the LGBTQ community beings classified as a “national
emergency” — as opposed to other identity-based groups such as the homeless and
homelessness (Cory Booker); “the impact that a country’s approach to gay people should have
on American foreign policy” (Joe Biden); removing any restrictions on the donation of blood
as a top priority for the federal government (Pete Buttigieg); privileging the use of public
funds for payment of gender affirming surgery for transgender people over other equally
needy groups such as the very poor (Elizabeth Warren); selectively tackling homelessness
among LGBTQ youth (Kamala Harris); recognizing “a third gender marker option on a
federal level” (Amy Klobuchar); making “foreign aid contingent on how the rights that other
nations afford to the LGBTQ community” (forcibly imposing an American-based identity
classification — along with the normative —, ideologically-infused trappings of said PI —
onto the global community) (Julián Castro); selective “increase oversight over health care
access to LGBTQ asylum seekers” (Tom Steyer). Id.
260.
See Astrada, supra note 7, at 45; discussion supra Part II.
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concepts, systematically perpetuating and reifying the internally produced
discourse of right and authority that emanates from the exercise of power to
posit an identity.261 Concepts can be analogized to analytic nets that are
placed over a particular subject.262 That is:
[D]ifferent nets correspond to different systems for describing the
world. Mechanics determines one form of description of the world
by saying that all propositions used in the description of the world
must be obtained in a given way from a given set of
propositions—the axiom of mechanics. It thus supplies the bricks
for building the edifice of [knowledge], and it says, “Any building
that you want to erect, whatever it may be, must somehow be
constructed with these bricks, and with these alone.”263
PI may not, therefore, be the most conducive platform for efficiently effectuating
representational politics in the present and going forward.264 Yet, it may also prove
indispensable in any attempt to reconcile the variegated tensions, problems, and
contradictions immanent in posting and bolstering an American national community
and identity.265

261.
262.
263.
264.

See Astrada, supra note 7, at 46; discussion supra Section III.A.
See WITTGENSTEIN, supra note 52, at 82.
Id.; see also discussion supra Part III.
See Vieth v. Jubelirer, 541 U.S. 267, 307–08 (2004); Astrada, supra note
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See Astrada, supra note 7, at 43–44.
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INTRODUCTION

During the age of King Minos, there lived an inventor, Daedalus,
and his young son, Icarus. Daedalus lived happily with his son in a cave
high above the sea, where he spent his time working and creating inventions
for King Minos. Worried over his son’s happiness, Daedalus fashioned them
a set of wings from candle wax and feathers so they could fly away from the
island. As they stood over the ocean, Daedalus warned Icarus: “Fly too
close to the sun and the wax will melt and you will lose feathers. Follow my
path closely and you’ll be fine.”
Daedalus and Icarus took to the skies with their new wings.
Ignoring the shouts from his father to be careful, Icarus soared up towards
the sun. Higher and higher Icarus flew, ignoring his father’s desperate pleas
to return. But Icarus, lost in his newfound freedom, had flown too high. The
wax began dripping down his arms and feathers began to quickly fall around

*

The author wishes to acknowledge her appreciation to Professor Heather Baxter, Richard
Sena, and the entire Nova Law Review for their tireless assistance and dedication to making
this publication a success.
*
As this Article went to publication, President Joe Biden took office as the 46th President of
the United States.

206

NOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

him. When Icarus finally realized his mistake, it was too late. By the time he
hit the water, there wasn’t a feather left.1
A migratory bird is a “bird that travels from one place to another at
regular times, often over long distances.”2 Because of their nature, migratory
birds are seen as some of the most beautiful, “innocent, and highly regarded
creatures on the planet.”3 Their migratory nature is not a voluntary choice,
but a requirement for survival.4 And, the journey for many of these birds is
often perilous.5
Because of the vast distances migratory birds travel, the need to
preserve their habitats is essential to their survival and requires international
cooperation to conserve them.6 But, the benefits of conserving these
migratory birds are far-reaching.7 In addition to the pollination of plants,
pest control, and serving as food sources for other wildlife, migratory birds
also provide a source of recreation for “millions of bird watchers and
enthusiasts who provide food and design backyard habitats [that] attract a
variety of species throughout the year.”8

1.
See EDITH HAMILTON, MYTHOLOGY 139–40 (1953).
2.
Migratory Birds & Habitat Program, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV.,
http://www.fws.gov/pacific/migratorybirds/definition.html (last updated Oct. 28, 2015).
3.
Brittany E. Barbee, Comment, To Kill A Migratory Bird: How Incidental
Takes by Commercial Industry Activity Should Be Regulated by a New Civil Penalty Regime,
Not the Current MBTA, 25 BUFF. ENV’T L.J. 91, 94 (2016–2018).
4.
Yudhijit Bhattacharjee, The Epic Journeys of Migratory Birds, NAT’L
GEOGRAPHIC,
http://www.nationalgeographic.com/magazine/2018/03/bird-migrationalbatross-climate-change (last visited May 12, 2021). Today, it is understood that these birds
migrate to avoid declining food supplies and harsh climactic conditions brought about by the
seasons. Id. For example:
When winter arrives in North America, the flowers that the ruby-throated
hummingbird drinks nectar from and the insects it thrives on vanish. The bird has
no choice but to travel to a place where food is plentiful. Upon the return of
warmer weather in Canada and the United States, the northern home is attractive
once again because its resources have been replenished.

Id.

5.
International Cooperation, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV.,
http://www.fws.gov/birds/about-us/international.php (last updated Nov. 20, 2017). As one
researcher explained, a migratory bird’s journey is comparable to a human walking for eight
days straight. See Bhattacharjee, supra note 4.
6.
International Cooperation, supra note 5.
7.
Robert H. Diehl et al., The Ecology, Behavior, and Conservation of
GEOLOGICAL
SURV.,
Migratory
Birds,
U.S.
http://www.usgs.gov/centers/norock/science/ecology-behavior-and-conservation-migratorybirds?qt-science_center_objects=0#qt-science_center_objects (last visited May 12, 2021).
8.
Id.
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Because of their many environmental and economical contributions,
countries have long sought to preserve migratory birds and their habitats.9
Over a century ago, the United States set forth on its own path of
strengthening and protecting these incredible species.10 The beginning of
this path was marked with the passage of the landmark Migratory Bird
Treaty Act (the “Act”), which served as a catalyst for many of the
environmental regulations in place today.11 In its current form, the Act
boasts protection of over one thousand migratory bird species.12
Since its enactment, every branch of government has acted in concert
to ensure the protection of these birds.13 When first enacted, the Act was
used to prosecute only those individuals that had killed or taken a bird
through direct acts, such as hunting, poaching, and trapping.14 In the 1970s,
however, the interpretation of taking grew with the industrial stresses placed
on our environment.15 Bird population sizes were once again seeing slashes,
but not because of the overbearing hunting habits that first gave rise to the
Act.16
In response to the substantial drop in bird population numbers,
federal prosecutors began prosecuting companies under the takings clause of
the Act for indirect bird killings.17 In the wake of these prosecutions, a
circuit split emerged over whether a “taking” included the unintentional
killing of wildlife, such as migratory bird deaths caused by pollution.18 In an
effort to resolve the circuit split, the Clinton and Obama Administrations
established policies mandating a broad interpretation of the “takings”
clause.19

9.
International Cooperation, supra note 5.
10.
Id.
11.
16 U.S.C. §§ 703–712; see also Paul Schmidt, The Migratory Bird Treaty
Centennial, DUCKS UNLIMITED, http://www.ducks.org/conservation/public-policy/themigratory-bird-treaty-centennial (last visited May 12, 2021).
12.
16 U.S.C. § 703(a); Barbee, supra note 3, at 95.
13.
See Barbee, supra note 3, at 105, 108; discussion infra Parts II–IV.
14.
See Jesse Greenspan, The History and Evolution of the Migratory Bird
Treaty Act, AUDUBON: NEWS (May 22, 2015), http://www.audubon.org/news/the-history-andevolution-migratory-bird-treaty-act; Barbee, supra note 3, at 104.
15.
See Greenspan, supra note 14.
16.
See United States v. FMC Corp., 572 F.2d 902, 905 (2d Cir. 1978);
Barbee, supra note 3, at 94.
17.
See Greenspan, supra note 14.
18.
See infra text accompanying notes 91–92; discussion infra section III.A;
FMC Corp., 572 F.2d at 908; Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Evans, 952 F.2d 297, 303 (9th Cir.
1991); Newton Cnty. Wildlife Ass’n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 113 F.3d 110, 115 (8th Cir. 1997);
United States v. CITGO Petrol. Corp., 801 F.3d 477, 494 (5th Cir. 2015).
19.
See discussion infra Parts II–IV; Greenspan, supra note 14.
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In 2017, however, the Trump administration began a series of
attempts to clip the Act’s wings.20 In stark contrast to a century’s worth of
precedent, the Trump Administration released a memorandum prohibiting
the prosecution of indirect killings under the “takings” clause of the Act,
effectively giving companies the freedom to pollute the air, waters, and
wildlife habitats without facing criminal prosecution under the Act.21
This Article examines the scope of the Act’s protections and the
consequences stemming from the Trump Administration’s divergence from
the established path preserving these species.22 In Part II, the history of the
wildlife regulations that made way for the Migratory Bird Act is examined.23
In Part III, the scope, constitutional challenges, and subsequent conservation
efforts following the Act’s passage are examined.24 In Part IV, the Trump
Administration’s recent acts to unravel the Act are examined.25 And finally,
in Part V, the expected results from the Trump Administration’s actions are
examined in detail.26
II.

THE RISE OF WILDLIFE REGULATION

Prior to the Act, there were virtually no regulations in place to
protect flying animals.27 In the 1800s, hunters would “decimate [United
States] bird populations, in part so that well-to-do women [could] wear hats
adorned with ornamental feathers.”28 The rampant hunting eventually took
its toll on the bird population; the 1800s closed with the extinction of the
Labrador Ducks and Great Auks, soon followed by the “Passenger Pigeons,
Carolina Parakeets, and Heath Hens.”29 The disappearance “of the passenger
20.
See discussion infra Part IV; Greenspan, supra note 14; President Clinton
Issues Executive Order on Migratory Birds, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV. (Jan. 1, 2001),
http://www.fws.gov/news/ShowNews.cfm?ID=F41A0B75-C574-11D4A17B009027B6B5D3.
21.
See Memorandum from Daniel H. Jorjani, Principal Deputy Solicitor, U.S.
Dep’t of Interior, to the Sec'y, Dep’t of Interior et al. 2 (Dec. 22, 2017),
http://www.doi.gov/sites/doi.gov/files/uploads/m-37050.pdf.; Jacques Leslie, Op-Ed: Another
Trump Victim:
Migratory Birds, L.A. TIMES: OP. (Feb. 14, 2018, 4:05 AM),
http://www.latimes.com/opinion/op-ed/la-oe-leslie-migratory-bird-act-trump-administration20180214-story.html.
22.
See Memorandum from Daniel H. Jorjani, U.S. Dep’t of Interior, to Sec’y,
Dep’t of Interior et. al., supra note 21, at 1; Greenspan, supra note 14.
23.
See discussion infra Part II.
24.
See discussion infra Part III.
25.
See discussion infra Part IV.
26.
See discussion infra Part V.
27.
See Greenspan, supra note 14.
28.
Id.
29.
Id.
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pigeon embodied the destructive outcome that commercial hunting had on
many bird populations,” which had once “darken[ed] the sky for many
hours” while in flight.30
The impact on bird populations led to public demands for stronger
wildlife protection measures.31 An avid hunter and naturalist, President
Theodore Roosevelt “launched an effort to end the careless exploitation of
wildlife and to preserve migratory birds and their habitats.”32 His efforts
bore the establishment of the first federal bird reservation, Pelican Island,
followed by fifty-five other bird reservations.33 Calling for legislative action,
President Roosevelt explained, “[i]t is evident that natural resources are not
limited by the boundary lines which separate nations and that the need for
conserving them upon this continent is as wide as the area upon which they
exist.”34
Public coalitions soon formed, seeking to save the declining bird
populations.35 Their efforts led to the passage of the first wildlife protection
regulation: the Lacey Act.36
A.

The Lacey and Black Bass Acts

The Lacey Act was introduced in early 1900 with the intent of
“enlarg[ing] the powers of the Department of Agriculture” to ensure the
preservation of various wild birds and commonly hunted animals.37 The
Lacey Act was Congress’ attempt to make a “very cautious first step [into]
the field of federal wildlife regulation.”38 At its conception, the Lacey Act
“gave the [United States] Department of Agriculture authority to preserve
and restore game birds and other birds; barred the import of birds and
wildlife without a permit; forbade the introduction of certain ‘injurious’
30.
Barbee, supra note 3, at 101.
31.
Schmidt, supra note 11.
32.
Id.
33.
Bird Conservation Timeline, U.S. FISH & WILDLIFE SERV.,
http://www.fws.gov/birds/about-us/timeline.php (last updated Aug. 22, 2018).
34.
Schmidt, supra note 11.
35.
Id.
36.
Id.; The Lacey Act, 16 U.S.C. §§ 3371–3378; see also Martha G.
Vazquez, Note, Clipping the Wings of Industry: Uncertainty in Interpretation and
Enforcement of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, 74 WASH. & LEE L. REV. ONLINE 281, 288
(2017–2018).
37.
Robert S. Anderson, The Lacey Act: America’s Premier Weapon in the
Fight Against Unlawful Wildlife Trafficking, 16 PUB. LAND L. REV. 27, 36–37 (1995).
38.
Kristina Rozan, Detailed Discussion on the Migratory Bird Treaty Act,
ANIMAL LEGAL & HIST. CTR., http://www.animallaw.info/article/detailed-discussionmigratory-bird-treaty-act (last visited May 12, 2021) (citing MICHAEL J. BEAN & MELANIE J.
ROWLAND, THE EVOLUTION OF NATIONAL WILDLIFE LAW 15 (3d ed. 1997)).
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species; and most importantly, prohibited interstate commerce in game
illegally taken and required labeling of game shipments.”39 While the Lacey
Act included protection for a variety of animals, it was primarily enacted to
preserve bird populations that faced serious decline due to overhunting, the
introduction of exotic species in non-native habitats, the millinery industry,
and agricultural damage.40
The Lacey Act also targeted states’ inability to address the rampant
wildlife poaching that was decimating the animal and bird populations
drastically.41 At the time, poaching posed two problems for states:
First, it was common at that time for large numbers of game to be
killed by poachers . . . in one state, fraudulently mismarked to
avoid detection, and shipped to another state for sale to the public.
Once the pothunter had removed the game from its state of origin,
that state lacked the jurisdiction necessary to prosecute him . . . A
second common problem involved local game killed during a
state’s closed season and sold under the guise of having been
brought into the state from elsewhere.42

In response to these issues, the Lacey Act sought to prohibit the
importation, exportation, and transportation in interstate commerce of any
container of wildlife or fish that was not properly marked, labeled, or tagged
as required by state and regulatory law.43 Violations of its sections was a
strict liability offense for the shipper of the game, who faced up to a $200
fine.44
Following in Congressman Lacey’s footsteps, Congress later enacted
the Black Bass Act in 1926 to address the overfishing of small and
largemouth bass fish that state regulations could not properly remedy.45 As a
sister-statute to the Lacey Act, the Black Bass Act expanded the Lacey Act’s
protections to include the regulation and prohibition of interstate shipments
39.
C. Parks Gilbert, III, The Lacey Act: A Vintage Conservation Tool Still
Vital in Today’s Global Economy, 29 NAT. RES. & ENV’T, Winter 2015, at 3, 3.
40.
See id.; Anderson, supra note 37, at 37–38.
To highlight the
environmental impact on bird populations, Congressman Lacey, who first introduced the
Lacey Act, cited to “the extinction of the carrier pigeon, the serious depletion of grouse,
prairie chicken, and buffalo populations, and the problems created by foreign species such as
the English sparrow and the French pink flower.” Anderson, supra note 37, at 37.
41.
Anderson, supra note 37, at 37–38.
42.
Id. at 38.
43.
Id. at 39–40; 16 U.S.C. § 3371.
44.
Anderson, supra note 37, at 40.
45.
Id. at 44; Black Bass Act of 1926, Pub. L. No. 69-256, § 346, 44 Stat. 576,
576, repealed by Lacey Act Amendments of 1981, Pub. L. No. 97-79, § 9(b)(1), 95 Stat. 1073,
1079.
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of bass and extended penalties to companies, partnerships, corporations,
associations, and common carriers.46 Despite strong opposition from the
National Rifle Association and Safari Club International, Congress did not
deviate from its goal of eradicating hunting operations that risked “grim
environmental consequences.”47 Rather, “Congress was convinced that
federal action was necessary to prevent the extinction of these species.”48
Over the years, the Lacey and Black Bass Acts were continuously
amended to expand protections to all types of game, fish, and animals.49 The
amendments authorized federal wildlife enforcement officers to make
warrantless arrests, increased penalties, and combined the Black Bass Act
and Lacey Act to create a single, all-encompassing Lacey Act.50
In its current form, the Lacey Act protects the widest array of
wildlife than any other regulation.51 “However, in the early [twentieth]
century, the [Lacey] Act was ineffective in stopping interstate shipments,
largely because of the huge profits enjoyed by the market hunters and the
lack of officers to enforce the law.”52 The Lacey Act’s early failures led to
the enactment of the Weeks-McLean Law.53
B.

The Weeks-McLean Law

The Weeks-McLean Law sought to “stop commercial market
hunting and the illegal shipment of migratory birds from one state to
another.”54 Like the Lacey Act, the Weeks-McLean Law prohibited the
shipment of migratory birds across state lines, but also placed all birds under
federal regulation.55 It provided:
All wild geese, wild swans, brant, wild ducks, snipe, plover,
woodcock, rail, wild pigeons, and all other migratory game and
46.
Anderson, supra note 37, at 44–45.
47.
Id. at 49–50.
48.
Id. at 44.
49.
See id. at 45, 46, 49, 51–53.
50.
See id. at 53; 16 U.S.C. § 3371.
51.
Anderson, supra note 37, at 36.
52.
Other
Relevant
Laws,
U.S.
FISH
& WILDLIFE
SERV.,
http://www.fws.gov/birds/policies-and-regulations/laws-legislations/other-relevant-laws.php
(last updated Apr. 11, 2019).
53.
Id.; Weeks-McLean Act of 1913, Pub. L. No. 62-430, ch. 145, 37 Stat.
828, repealed by Migratory Bird Act of 1918, §9, ch. 128, 40 Stat. 755, 755.
54.
Other Relevant Laws, supra note 52.
55.
Ashley R. Fiest, Defining the Wingspan of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act,
47 AKRON L. REV. 587, 591 (2014); Alexander K. Obrecht, Migrating Towards an Incidental
Take Permit Program: Overhauling the Migratory Bird Treaty Act to Comport with Modern
Industrial Operations, 54 NAT. RES. J. 107, 112 (2014).
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insectivorous birds which in their northern and southern
migrations pass through or do not remain permanently the entire
year within the borders of any State or Territory, shall hereafter be
deemed to be within the custody and protection of the Government
of the United States, and shall not be destroyed or taken contrary
to regulations hereinafter provided therefor.56

Decimated by constitutional challenges and a strong state ownership
doctrine that encompassed much of the legal landscape during the early
twentieth century, the Weeks-McLean Law was struck down as
unconstitutional in United States v. Shauver57 and United States v.
McCullagh.58
The Shauver Court explained that although Congress frequently
exercised its power to regulate matters under the states’ general police
power, “every one of [those prior] acts [were] upheld under some provision
of the Constitution.”59 As it related to the Weeks-McLean Law, however,
the Shauver Court reasoned it was “unable to find any provision in the
Constitution authorizing Congress, either expressly or by necessary
implication, to protect or regulate the shooting of migratory wild game when
in a state” and therefore was “forced to the conclusion that the [A]ct is
unconstitutional.”60
Adopting the Shauver rationale, the McCullagh Court also held the
Weeks-McLean Law was an infringement on states’ rights under the Tenth
Amendment and the state ownership doctrine, which provided states had the
right to preserve “a food supply which belongs in common to all the people
of the [s]tate, which can only become the subject of ownership in a qualified
way, and which can never be the object of commerce except with the consent
of the [s]tate.”61 Committed to ensuring the protection of migratory birds,
Congress quickly replaced the Weeks-McLean Law with the landmark
Migratory Bird Treaty Act of 1918.62

56.
Obrecht, supra note 55, at 112 n.37 (quoting Weeks-McLean Act of 1913,
§9, 83 Stat. at 847).
57.
214 F. 154 (E.D. Ark. 1914).
58.
221 F. 288 (D. Kan. 1915).
59.
Shauver, 214 F. at 159.
60.
Id. at 160.
61.
See McCullagh, 221 F. at 294–96; Geer v. Connecticut, 161 U.S. 519, 535
(1896), overruled by Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322 (1979).
62.
Other Relevant Laws, supra note 52; Migratory Bird Treaty, 16 U.S.C. §§
703–712.
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THE MIGRATORY BIRD TREATY ACT

In 1916, the United States signed a treaty with Great Britain seeking
to preserve the species of birds considered beneficial or harmless to
humans.63 The treaty prohibited hunting of insectivorous birds and
established specific hunting seasons for specified game birds.64
To memorialize this new treaty, the Wilson Administration passed
the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, which criminalized the hunting of migratory
birds.65 It provides:
Unless and except as permitted by regulations made as hereinafter
provided in this subchapter, it shall be unlawful at any time, by
any means or in any manner, to pursue, hunt, take, capture, kill,
attempt to take, capture, or kill, possess, offer for sale, sell, offer to
barter, barter, offer to purchase, purchase, deliver for shipment,
ship, export, import, cause to be shipped, exported, or imported,
deliver for transportation, transport or cause to be transported,
carry or cause to be carried, or receive for shipment,
transportation, carriage, or export, any migratory bird, any part,
nest, or egg of any such bird, or any product, whether or not
manufactured, which consists, or is composed in whole or part, of
any such bird or any part, nest, or egg thereof, included in the
terms of the conventions between the United States and Great
Britain for the protection of migratory birds concluded August 16,
1916, [and subsequent treaties] . . . .66

The Act’s passage demonstrated a uniform, zero-tolerance federal
policy for the unnecessary poaching and hunting of these defenseless
animals.67 Like its predecessors, however, the Act was not without
challenge.68 Although the state ownership doctrine no longer controlled,
states still sought to strike down the Act as an infringement on their Tenth

63.
Greenspan, supra note 14. At the time, “Great Britain [was] acting on
behalf of Canada, then part of the British Empire.” Id.
64.
Id.; see also Insectivorous Birds, THE ENCYC. OF BIRDCARE,
http://www.birdcare.com/birdon/encyclopedia/insectivorous+birds.html (last visited May 12,
2021). Insectivorous birds are defined as a “[s]pecies which feed mainly on insects, spiders,
and other invertebrates.” Insectivorous Birds, supra.
65.
Insectivorous Birds, supra note 64; Schmidt, supra note 11; see also 16
U.S.C. § 703(a).
66.
16 U.S.C. § 703(a).
67.
See Greenspan, supra note 14.
68.
See, e.g., United States v. Rockefeller, 260 F. 346, 346 (D. Mont. 1919);
United States v. Samples, 258 F. 479, 480 (W.D. Mo. 1919).
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Amendment rights.69 In light of these challenges, the Supreme Court held in
Missouri v. Holland:70
Here, a national interest of very nearly the first magnitude
is involved. It can be protected only by national action in concert
with that of another power. The subject matter is only transitorily
within the State and has no permanent habitat therein. . . . We see
nothing in the Constitution that compels the Government to sit by
while a food supply is cut off and the protectors of our forests and
our crops are destroyed. It is not sufficient to rely upon the States.
The reliance is [in] vain, and were it otherwise, the question is
whether the United States is forbidden to act. We are of opinion
that the treaty and statute must be upheld.71

As the Holland decision makes clear: “But for the treaty and the
statute, there soon might be no birds for any powers to deal with.”72 Since its
enactment, the Act has successfully combated overhunting and extermination
and is even credited with helping the Snowy Egret rebound from nearextinction.73
On the heels of the Act’s initial success, the United States entered
into a cascade of similar treaties with Mexico, Japan, and the Soviet Union in
a collective effort to protect a greater number of birds.74 The subsequent
treaties included provisions encouraging habitat conservation and pollution
abatement.75 The Act later adopted the treaties to expand its list of protected
migratory bird species.76 Today, the Act protects a total of 1,026 birds under
its wings, including native, non-migratory birds.77
On a path to expand conservation efforts, legislation was later
enacted over the years to protect migratory bird habitats, establish
administrative councils tasked with overseeing established flyways, and
provide funding to state agencies to develop and implement wildlife
conservation plans.78 The Harding Administration spearheaded several
amendments to the Act that limited the means by which birds may be hunted
69.
See Hughes v. Oklahoma, 441 U.S. 322, 323 (1979).
70.
252 U.S. 416 (1920).
71.
Id. at 435 (citation omitted).
72.
Id.
73.
See Other Relevant Laws, supra note 52; Congresswoman Liz Cheney
Introduces
Bird-Killer
Amendment,
AUDUBON
(Nov.
08,
2017),
http://www.audubon.org/news/congresswoman-liz-cheney-introduces-bird-killer-amendment.
74.
Greenspan, supra note 14.
75.
See id.
76.
Bird Conservation Timeline, supra note 33.
77.
See Greenspan, supra note 14.
78.
See id.
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during open season and established specific time frames for states’ open
seasons.79 And, in 2001, President Clinton issued an executive order
expressly requiring federal agencies to “take reasonable steps that include
restoring and enhancing habitat, preventing or abating pollution affecting
birds, and incorporating migratory bird conservation into agency planning
processes whenever possible,” and directed federal agencies to collaborate
with the United States Fish and Wildlife Service to develop an agreement to
preserve the bird species enumerated in the Act.80
Despite the extensive efforts to conserve bird populations, in the
early 1970s, bird populations were again facing decimation in large numbers
due to industrial pressures on the environment.81 In response, the
Department of Justice released a letter warning energy and industrial
companies that if they chose to “ignore, deny, or refuse to comply” with
infrastructure modifications that could prevent the deaths of these birds, the
“matter may be referred for prosecution.”82
Under this direction, prosecutors began to prosecute oil, gas, wind,
and other energy companies under the Act’s provisions.83 Where previously
only hunters and poachers were prosecuted under the Act for the direct and
intentional deaths of migratory birds, companies now faced criminal liability
for the indirect death of migratory birds caused by industry operations.84
A.

The Takings Clause Split

In the landmark decision of United States v. FMC Corp.,85 the
United States Court of Appeals for the Second Circuit held an energy
company strictly liable for unintentional bird deaths resulting from discharge
of wastewater from the company’s pesticide manufacturing process.86 As an
issue of first impression, the Second Circuit relied on “[the] rule of reason, or
even better, common sense” in construing the Act’s provisions.87 The court
reasoned:

79.
Warren Harding, Proclamation—Amendments of the Migratory Bird
Treaty
Act
Regulations,
THE
AM.
PRESIDENCY
PROJECT:
DOCUMENTS,
http://www.presidency.ucsb.edu/ws/index.php?pid=126369 (last visited May 12, 2021).
80.
President Clinton Issues Executive Order on Migratory Birds, supra note
20.
81.
See Greenspan, supra note 14.
82.
Id.
83.
Id.
84.
Id.; see also Rozan, supra note 38.
85.
572 F.2d 902 (2d Cir. 1978).
86.
Id. at 908.
87.
Id. at 905.
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Imposing strict liability on FMC in this case does not dictate that
every death of a bird will result in imposing strict criminal liability
on some party. However, here the statute does not include as an
element of the offense ‘willfully, knowingly, recklessly, or
negligently’ . . . Congress recognized the important public policy
behind protecting migratory birds; FMC engaged in an activity
involving the manufacture of a highly toxic chemical; and FMC
failed to prevent this chemical from escaping into the pond and
killing birds. This is sufficient to impose strict liability on FMC.88

“Although FMC was not aware [that the water quality was] lethal-tobirds, [the court found it was nevertheless] aware of the danger of carbofuran
to humans . . . which [it knowingly] pumped . . . into the pond.”89 The
Second Circuit warned, “as science, with its technological achievements,
produces an ever widening array of poisonous pesticides . . . so the
manufacturers of such products will have to be ever on guard lest the waste
created in the manufacturing process[es] cause[] damage.”90
Currently, almost every circuit does not require a scienter element to
hold a defendant criminally liable for misdemeanor violations under the
Act.91 Although most circuits have only addressed the issue of prosecuting
defendants that intended to hunt, sell, or capture migratory birds, their
rationales do not limit the imposition of strict liability only to hunters and
poachers.92 Rather, only three circuits interpret the Act so narrowly—the
Fifth, Eighth, and Ninth.93
In Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Evans,94 the Ninth Circuit held the
selling and logging of timber from lands within areas that serve as habitats
for the northern spotted owl was “harm[ful]” conduct, but did not rise to the
88.
Id. at 908.
89.
Id.
90.
FMC Corp., 572 F.2d at 907–08.
91.
United States v. Pitrone, 115 F.3d 1, 5 (1st Cir. 1997); United States v.
Engler, 806 F.2d 425, 431 (3d Cir. 1986); United States v. Boynton, 63 F.3d 337, 343 (4th
Cir. 1995); United States v. Morgan, 311 F.3d 611, 615–16 (5th Cir. 2002); United States v.
Catlett, 747 F.2d 1102, 1105 (6th Cir. 1984) (per curiam); United States v. Hogan, 89 F.3d
403, 404 (7th Cir. 1996); Rogers v. United States, 367 F.2d 998, 1001 (8th Cir. 1966); United
States v. Corrow, 119 F.3d 796, 805 (10th Cir. 1997). The Eleventh Circuit, District of
Columbia, and the Federal Circuit have not addressed the issue. See Pitrone, 115 F.3d at 5;
Engler, 806 F.2d at 431; Boynton, 63 F.3d at 343; Morgan, 311 F.3d at 615–16; Catlett, 747
F.2d at 1105; Hogan, 89 F.3d at 404; Rogers, 367 F.2d at 1001; Corrow, 119 F.3d at 805.
92.
Corrow, 119 F.3d at 806; but see United States v. CITGO Petrol. Corp.,
801 F.3d 477, 489–90 (5th Cir. 2015).
93.
CITGO Petrol. Corp., 801 F.3d at 494; Newton Cnty. Wildlife Ass’n v.
U.S. Forest Serv., 113 F.3d 110, 115 (8th Cir. 1997); Seattle Audubon Soc’y v. Evans, 952
F.2d 297, 302–03 (9th Cir. 1991).
94.
952 F.2d 297 (9th Cir. 1991).
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level of a “tak[ing]” under the language of the Act.95 The Ninth Circuit
reasoned that the Second Circuit’s FMC Corp. decision did not “suggest that
habitat destruction, leading indirectly to bird deaths, amounts to the ‘taking’
of migratory birds within the meaning of the [Act],” but rather, imposed
liability based on principles of strict tort liability because of the severity of
the conduct, which “involved the manufacture of a highly toxic pesticide.”96
In interpreting the language of the Act, the Ninth Circuit explained
the Act’s definition of a “taking” describes “physical conduct of the sort
engaged in by hunters and poachers, . . . which was undoubtedly a concern at
the time of the statute’s enactment in 1918.”97 The court reasoned that since
its enactment, however, Congress had not amended the Act to define a
“taking” as “harm” to bird habitats.98 Comparing the language of the
Endangered Species Act (“ESA”), which explicitly defined “take” to include
“harass” and “harm,” to the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, the Ninth Circuit
concluded:
[T]he differences in the proscribed conduct under [the] ESA and
the [Act] are “distinct and purposeful.” The ESA was enacted in
1973. Congress amended the [Act] the following year, but did not
modify its [provisions] to include “harm.” . . . We are not free to
give words a different meaning than that which Congress and the
Agencies charged with implementing congressional directives
have historically given them under the [Act] and the [ESA].99

The Eighth Circuit followed suit, unilaterally adopting the Ninth
Circuit’s rationale and defining the Act’s “ambiguous terms ‘take’ and ‘kill’ .
. . [to] mean ‘physical conduct of the sort engaged in by hunters and
poachers . . . .’”100 It determined that the strict liability approach would only
“be appropriate when dealing with hunters and poachers.”101 And, in United
States v. CITGO Petroleum Corp.,102 the Fifth Circuit also held a “taking”
could not include unintentional killings.103 After analyzing the circuit split
issue, the Fifth Circuit aligned itself with the Eighth and Ninth Circuits,
reasoning that the Second and Tenth Circuits’ interpretations of the Act were
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
Cir. 1997).
101.
1978).
102.
103.

Id. at 302–03.
Id. at 303.
Id. at 302.
Id. at 303.
Evans, 952 F.2d at 303.
Newton Cnty. Wildlife Ass’n v. U.S. Forest Serv., 113 F.3d 110, 115 (8th
Id.; see also United States v. FMC Corp., 572 F.2d 902, 908 (2d Cir.
801 F.3d 477 (5th Cir. 2015).
Id. at 492.
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“broad, counter-textual reading[s]” that failed to “explore[] the meaning of
‘take.’”104 Employing the common law definition of a “taking,” which
defines “taking” as an act to “reduce those animals, by killing or capturing,
to human control,” the court concluded that the Act does not prohibit
unintentional bird deaths because “[o]ne does not reduce an animal to human
control accidentally or by omission; he does so affirmatively.”105
When read in conjunction with the Fifth and Eighth Circuits’ prior
decisions, the CITGO and Newton decisions essentially create a narrow
exception in the Act’s jurisprudence for the imposition of strict liability only
for hunters and poachers.106 Not only do the decisions seem to misinterpret
the holdings of other circuits, they also fail to address the language of their
own past precedent.107 In fact, the Tenth Circuit explained in United States
v. Apollo Energies, Inc.,108 that “[n]othing in the structure or logic” of its
prior opinion imposing strict liability to hunters “lends itself to carving out
an exception for different types of conduct, . . . . [n]or is there any reason to
find that capturing or collecting birds implies a higher mens rea than
detaining or controlling them.”109 Rather, the Tenth Circuit reasons that the
Act’s “plain language” and the 1986 congressional amendment adding the
word “knowingly” to the felony offense of selling migratory birds evinces a
legislative intent to “invoke[] a lesser mental state for misdemeanor
violations.”110 While the court noted that the Act “can test the far reaches in
application,” it was nonetheless “obvious” that “unprotected oil field
equipment can take or kill migratory birds” under the Act’s provisions.111
B.

The Tompkins Memorandum

In response to the circuit split, the Obama Administration issued
Memorandum M-37041 (“Tompkins Memorandum”), which explicitly
provided the Act broadly prohibits the taking or killing of migratory birds,

104.
Id.
105.
Id. at 489; see also Babbitt v. Sweet Home Chapter of Cmtys. for a Great
Or., 515 U.S. 687, 717 (1995) (Scalia, J., dissenting).
106.
See United States v. Morgan, 311 F.3d 611, 616 (5th Cir. 2002) (holding a
defendant strictly liable under the Act for violating the daily bag limit provisions); Rogers v.
United States, 367 F.2d 998, 1001 (8th Cir. 1966) (holding “under the [Act], it is not
necessary that the government prove that a defendant violated its provisions with guilty
knowledge or specific intent to commit the violation”).
107.
See Morgan, 311 F.3d at 616; Rogers, 367 F.2d at 1001.
108.
611 F.3d 679 (10th Cir. 2010).
109.
Id. at 685.
110.
Id. at 686.
111.
Id.
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including incidental deaths.112 The Tompkins Memorandum “provided indepth research and analysis into the international conventions the [Act]
implements, text of the [Act] and legislative history, relevant case law, and
standard practices of the [United States] Fish and Wildlife Service.”113
The Tompkins Memorandum found that the conventions, legislative
history, and amendments to the Act “broadly support the regulation of the
taking and killing of migratory birds by any means, including by industrial or
commercial activities unrelated to hunting.”114 And, “for over [forty] years
in a variety of contexts, the government has consistently applied the
misdemeanor provision of the [Act] to incidental take.”115 It reasoned the
United States Fish and Wildlife Service’s interpretation of the Act as a strict
liability statute was consistent with the Act’s text and legislative history
because the text of the Act itself does not require a mental state, and the
legislative history “refers not only to overhunting as a cause of population
decline, but also habitat loss, including the need to protect ‘birds for aesthetic
and practical reasons unrelated to hunting and poaching.’”116
At the close of President Obama’s tenure in 2017, the Act had
survived a century’s worth of failed challenges that attempted to limit or
altogether obliterate the scope of its provisions, and a precedent encouraging
the expansion and preservation of its protections had emerged in their
place.117 That is, until the Trump Administration took office.118
IV.

FLYING AWAY FROM A CENTURY OF PRESERVATION

In 2017, the Trump Administration introduced the Cheney
Amendment, which sought to codify the prohibition of liability under the Act
112.
Memorandum from Hilary C. Tompkins, Solicitor, U.S. Dep’t of Interior,
to
Dir.,
Fish
&
Wildlife
Serv.
1–2
(Jan.
10,
2017),
http://www.eenews.net/assets/2017/02/21/document_ew_01.pdf; compare Apollo Energies,
Inc., 611 F.3d at 686 (holding that “the take provision of the Act does not contain a scienter
requirement”), with United States v. CITGO Petrol. Corp., 801 F.3d 477, 494 (5th Cir. 2015)
(stating “the MBTA’s ban on ‘takings’ only prohibits intentional acts . . . .”).
113.
John K. Powell, The Migratory Bird Treaty Act: On the Wings of an
Executive Branch Reinterpretation, FLA. B.J., Nov.–Dec. 2018, at 45, 46; see also
Memorandum from Hilary C. Tompkins, Solicitor, U.S. Dep’t of Interior, to Dir., Fish &
Wildlife Serv., supra note 112, at 2.
114.
Memorandum from Hilary C. Tompkins, Solicitor, U.S. Dep’t of Interior,
to Dir., Fish & Wildlife Serv., supra note 112, at 4; Powell, supra note 113, at 46.
115.
Memorandum from Hilary C. Tompkins, Solicitor, U.S. Dep’t of Interior,
to Dir., Fish & Wildlife Serv., supra note 112, at 24.
116.
Powell, supra note 113, at 46; Memorandum from Hilary C. Tompkins,
Solicitor, U.S. Dep’t of Interior, to Dir., Fish & Wildlife Serv., supra note 112, at 6.
117.
See Powell, supra note 113, at 47–48.
118.
See id.
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for incidental takings.119 Disguised as an amendment to H.R. 4239, a bill
which facilitated oil and gas drilling,120 the Cheney Amendment would have
added the following to the Act’s liability provisions: “This Act shall not be
construed to prohibit any activity proscribed by section [two] of this Act that
is accidental or incidental to the presence or operation of an otherwise lawful
activity.”121
When the Cheney Amendment failed, the Trump Administration
quietly released memorandum M-37050 (“Jorjani Memorandum”), which
permanently replaced the Tompkins Memorandum less than a year after its
issuance, reversing “decades of agency practice.”122 In the limited lens in
which the Jorjani Memorandum interprets the Act’s language, the Jorjani
Memorandum concludes that “consistent with the text, history, and purpose
of the [Act], the statute’s prohibitions on pursuing, hunting, taking,
capturing, killing, or attempting to do the same apply only to affirmative
actions that have as their purpose the taking or killing of migratory birds,
their nests, or their eggs.”123 The Jorjani Memorandum makes clear liability
will not be imposed in situations where defendants do not intend to kill,
capture, or otherwise subject migratory birds to human control.124
Not only does the Jorjani Memorandum “expressly recogniz[e] . . .
its interpretation was contrary to the historical practices of the [United
States] Fish and Wildlife Service,” but it also erroneously argues the Act’s
legislative history was never intended to protect bird habitats or control any
action that might have an incidental impact on migratory birds.125 According
to the Jorjani interpretation, the Act was only intended to regulate
overhunting.126 While discussing the extensive legislative, executive, and
judicial history that sought to strengthen the environmental protections of the
Act, the Jorjani Memorandum instead concludes such actions were never an
attempt to expand the scope of the Act.127 For example, it explained:
119.
See H.R. REP. NO. 115-1000, at 15 (2017); Congresswoman Liz Cheney
Introduces Bird-Killer Amendment, supra note 73.
120.
See H.R. REP. NO. 115-1000, at 1.
121.
Id. at 15.
122.
Christine A. Fazio & Ethan I. Strell, Abrupt Policy Change on CenturyOld Migratory Bird Treaty Act, CARTER LEDYARD & MILBURN LLP (Feb. 22, 2018),
http://www.clm.com/publication.cfm?ID=5613; see also Memorandum from Daniel H.
Jorjani, U.S. Dep’t of Interior, to Sec’y Dep’t of Interior et al., supra note 21, at 12.
123.
Memorandum from Daniel H. Jorjani, U.S. Dep’t of Interior, to Sec’y,
Dep’t of Interior et al., supra note 21, at 2.
124.
Id. at 41.
125.
Powell, supra note 113, at 47; Memorandum from Daniel H. Jorjani, U.S.
Dep’t of Interior, to Sec’y, Dep’t of Interior et al., supra note 21, at 2 n.4.
126.
Memorandum from Daniel H. Jorjani, U.S. Dep’t of Interior, to Sec’y,
Dep’t of Interior et al., supra note 21, at 24.
127.
Id. at 32 n.172.
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[A] 2001 Executive Order from President Clinton, which expanded
the definition of “take” to include incidental take, was only part of
a direction as to how agencies should focus their energies, not an
attempt to expand the scope of the [Act] itself (nor could an
executive order change the text of a Congressional law.)128

Further, the Jorjani Memorandum’s rationale centers on the Fifth
Circuit’s decision in United States v. CITGO Petroleum Corp., which the
Thompkins Memorandum found was “technically inaccurate and
substantively wrong.”129 As the Thompkins Memorandum explained, “the
CITGO court . . . failed to recognize the distinction between the existence of
a commonly understood meaning of a term, and the assertion that that
meaning is exclusive of other possible meanings.”130 Under the Jorjani
Memorandum,
if a state pressure washes barn swallow nests off a bridge in order
to prepare the structure for painting, this would constitute an
affirmative act whose purpose it was to remove the nests, and
consequently a permit would be required. However, if the intent
was simply to paint the bridge and nests were accidentally
destroyed incidental to that overall process, a permit would not be
required.131

Thus, “[e]ven if there was a general intent to kill wildlife, [] liability would
still depend on the specific facts of the situation.”132
The Jorjani Memorandum cannot repeal the Act; however, it
effectively strips federal agencies under the Department of the Interior from
threatening or imposing criminal liability for activity that unintentionally or
incidentally impacts migratory birds.133 As a written opinion issued by the
Solicitor for the Department of the Interior, the Jorjani Memorandum is
“binding on all other offices and divisions within the Department of the
128.
Jason L. Cassidy, Bye, Bye Birdie: Summary and Analysis of the Trump
Administration’s Recent Policy Change of the Migratory Bird Treaty Act, RYLEY CARLOCK &
APPLEWHITE (Jan. 29, 2018), http://www.rcalaw.com/bye-bye-birdie-summary-and-analysisof-the-trump-administrations-recent-policy-change-of-the-migratory-bird-treaty-act.
129.
Memorandum from Hilary C. Tompkins, U.S. Dep’t of Interior, to Dir.,
Fish & Wildlife Serv., supra note 112, at 26; Memorandum from Daniel H. Jorjani, Principal
Deputy Solicitor, U.S. Dep’t of Interior, to Sec’y, Dep’t of Interior et al., supra note 21, at 32
n.172; 801 F.3d 477.
130.
Memorandum from Hilary C. Tompkins, U.S. Dep’t of Interior, to Dir.,
Fish & Wildlife Serv., supra note 112 at 25.
131.
Powell, supra note 113, at 47.
132.
Id.
133.
See Memorandum from Daniel H. Jorjani, U.S. Dep’t of Interior, to Sec’y,
Dep’t of Interior et al., supra note 21, at 24.
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Interior.”134 As a result, “[it] can only be withdrawn, overruled, or modified
by the Solicitor, the Secretary of the Interior, or the Deputy Secretary.”135
Although a district court later vacated the Jorjani Memorandum,
finding it did not warrant any deference because it was “arbitrary, capricious,
an abuse of discretion, or otherwise not in accordance with law,”136 the
Trump Administration circumvented these issues with the proposal of a
federal regulation seeking to codify the Jorjani Memorandum.137
Spearheaded by the Trump Administration’s newly appointed director for the
United States Fish and Wildlife Service, the proposed regulation argues the
Jorjani Memorandum should be adopted as a matter of policy, even if its
interpretations of the Act’s provisions are wrong.138 It calls for a limited
interpretation of the Act “as a matter of law and policy,” despite its
concession that “some entities that currently employ mitigation measures or
reduce or eliminate incidental migratory bird take would reduce or curtail
these activities given the legal certainty provided by this proposed
regulation.”139 Like the Jorjani Memorandum, the proposed regulation
contradicts decades of agency practice “consistently interpret[ing] the [Act]
to apply to incidentally take, as first expressly manifested in enforcement
cases.”140
The Trump Administration’s actions establish a clear pattern to
dismantle the protection of migratory birds in favor of energy and industrial
companies—a gross divergence from the path of preservation the United
While the Biden
States embarked on almost a century prior.141
Administration is expected to take office in 2021 and dismantle much of
President Trump’s environmentally unfriendly policies, the codification of
the Jorjani Memorandum poses a threat to countless migratory birds until it
is repealed.142

134.
Cassidy, supra note 128.
135.
Id.
136.
Nat. Res. Def. Council, Inc. v. U.S. Dep’t of the Interior, 397 F. Supp. 3d
430, 437 (S.D.N.Y. 2019).
137.
See Regulations Governing Take of Migratory Birds, 85 Fed. Reg. 5903,
5923 (proposed Feb. 3, 2020) (to be codified at 50 C.F.R. pt. 10).
138.
Id.
139.
Id.
140.
Id. at 5915; Memorandum from Hilary C. Tompkins, U.S. Dep’t of
Interior, to Dir., Fish & Wildlife Serv., supra note 112, at 12.
141.
See Bird Conservation Timeline, supra note 33; Andy McGlashen, What
Biden’s Presidential Win Means for Birds and the Environment, AUDUBON: NEWS (Nov. 9,
2020),
http://www.audubon.org/news/what-bidens-presidential-win-means-birds-andenvironment.
142.
McGlashen, supra note 141.
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EVERY FEATHER LOST

In their regular course of business, companies are responsible for
even more deaths per year than hunters or poachers.143 In fact, industries
“incidentally” kill as many as 1.1 billion birds per year.144
[P]ower lines kill up to 175 million birds per year in the [United
States], communications towers kill up to 50 million, oil waste pits
trap up to one million and though data on gas flare-related deaths
has not been reliably tracked, at least one incident in Canada
attracted and roasted 7,500 birds in 2013.145

Most of these deaths are preventable through inexpensive
infrastructure changes.146 For example, power lines that are placed far
enough apart would help save about 900,000 to 11.6 million deaths per year
for long-winged birds that electrocute themselves by touching two lines at
the same time.147 Covering oil pits would help save about 500,000 to 1
million migratory birds per year.148 Placing wind turbines away from
common migratory bird routes could help save about 140,000 to 500,000
birds per year.149
Faced with the threat of criminal prosecutions, several industries
worked in conjunction with the United States Fish and Wildlife Service to
create environmentally friendly protections.150 Fishing companies started
attaching weights to their fishing lines to prevent the dragging of various
albatross, petrel, and other seabirds that would often get caught in the nets.151
Communication towers switched from red lights to flashing lights to prevent
airplane and songbird collisions.152 And, oil and gas companies stored waste

143.
See Memorandum from Daniel H. Jorjani, U.S. Dep’t of Interior, to the
Sec’y, Dep’t of Interior et al., supra note 21, at 13; Leslie, supra note 21.
144.
Leslie, supra note 21.
145.
Jason Daley, Five Things to Know About the Recently Changed Migratory
Bird Act, SMITHSONIAN MAG. (Dec. 27, 2017), http://www.smithsonianmag.com/smartnews/five-things-know-about-recently-changes-migratory-bird-act-180967646/.
146.
Leslie, supra note 21.
147.
Id.
148.
Id.
149.
Id.
150.
Elizabeth Shogren, Trump Administration Rolls Back Protections for
Migratory Birds, Drawing Bipartisan Condemnation, GRIST (Jan. 26, 2018),
http://grist.org/article/trump-administration-rolls-back-protections-for-migratory-birdsdrawing-bipartisan-condemnation/.
151.
Id.
152.
Id.
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in closed tanks or place nets over its waste pits to prevent thousands of birds
from being trapped in deadly, toxic waste.153
Notwithstanding, many of these companies still failed to take the
necessary steps to ensure the protection of these birds.154 Recent years have
seen some of the most disastrous and negligent environmental catastrophes,
such as the Exxon Valdez oil spill in 1989—which caused almost 36,000
bird deaths, and the Deepwater Horizon oil spill of 2010—which killed
another 102,000 birds.155 Under the Act’s penalties, the oil companies
responsible for these deaths paid a total of almost $225 million in fines.156
Stripped of their ability to criminally penalize these companies for
the billions of deaths they cause per year, agencies are now left with only the
ability to encourage companies to change their infrastructures to
accommodate these quickly dwindling bird populations.157 Without the
ability to prosecute companies whose operations “unintentionally” result in
bird deaths, the same emaciation of bird population numbers that incited the
Treaty in 1918 will quickly return.158
VI.

CONCLUSION

For almost a century, our country has taken a firm stance on the
protection of wild bird life.159 In response to the devastating drop in bird
populations in the early 1900s, Congress began initiating a series of laws that
eventually gave way to the Act.160 With hundreds of classified bird species
protected, the Act was the final, and most monumental, step in a series of
legislation enacted to prevent the further destruction of bird and wildlife
population numbers.161
Since the 1970s, this Act has been used to prosecute industries for
indirectly killing these animals.162 However, barring major environmental
and wildlife catastrophes, the United States Fish and Wildlife industry has
153.
Id.
154.
Id. “Duke Energy and PacifiCorp Energy were both prosecuted during the
Obama administration for failing to take steps to protect birds at their Wyoming wind farms,
despite the U.S. Fish and Wildlife Service’s efforts to get them to do so.” Shogren, supra note
150.
155.
Leslie, supra note 21.
156.
Id.
157.
Cassidy, supra note 128.
158.
Id.
159.
See discussion supra Parts II–IV; Bird Conservation Timeline, supra note
33.
160.
See discussion supra Part I; Bird Conservation Timeline, supra note 33.
161.
16 U.S.C. §§ 703–712; see also discussion supra Part I; Barbee, supra
note 3, at 95.
162.
Greenspan, supra note 14.
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only used the threat of criminal prosecutions in response to companies that
are unwilling, and able, to adjust their infrastructure to include wildlifefriendly practices.163
Contrary to a century of precedent, the Trump Administration began
an overhaul of these environmental protections.164 With the release of the
Jorjani Memorandum, agencies under the Department of the Interior have
been stripped of their ability to threaten criminal prosecutions under the
Act.165 The results of this Memorandum are potentially long-reaching,
especially when considering the little recourse available to repeal or amend
it.166 While the Memorandum does not explicitly repeal the Act, it prevents
agencies from threatening criminal prosecutions against stubborn industries
that do not comply with wildlife-friendly practices and regulations.167 Even
industries that are responsible for catastrophic events that decimate millions
of birds per year cannot be criminally fined and penalized under the Jorjani
interpretation of the “takings” clause of the Act.168
On a fast track to extinction, many of these bird species are now left
defenseless against industry practices—which cause almost 1.1 billion
indirect bird killings per year.169 As the story of Icarus teaches, the unbridled
abuse of newfound power is deadly.170 Unlike young Icarus, however,
President Trump’s divergence from the established path threatens thousands
of bird lives fleeing their current habitats.171 Upon taking office, the Biden
Administration should repeal the Jorjani Memorandum and return the United
States to its path of conservation, lest we have to wait until every single
feather has dropped.*

163.
164.

See Shogren, supra note 150.
See discussion supra Part V; Greenspan, supra note 14; McGlashen, supra

note 141.

165.
Memorandum from Daniel H. Jorjani, U.S. Dep’t of Interior, to Sec’y,
Dep’t of Interior et al., supra note 21, at 1.
166.
Id.; see also Cassidy, supra note 128.
167.
See Memorandum from Daniel H. Jorjani, U.S. Dep’t of Interior, to Sec’y,
Dep’t of Interior et al., supra note 21, at 1, 41.
168.
Id.; see also Cassidy, supra note 128.
169.
See Leslie, supra note 21.
170.
HAMILTON, supra note 1, at 139–40.
171.
See id. at 139.
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INTRODUCTION

“[C]ollege sports are big business, and business is booming.”1 The
National Collegiate Athletic Association (“NCAA”) is the governing body
for all college sports.2 It “generates nearly three billion dollars [a] year in
revenue,” thanks mainly to massive television contracts, marketing fees, and,
most of all, the athletes who play for the college teams.3 Its purpose is to
fairly govern college athletics while protecting student-athletes from
dangerous, exploitative practices comparable to the big leagues.4 To achieve
this purpose, the NCAA has distinguished college athletics from professional
sports by way of its amateur model; with it, sports remain integral to the
college experience while student-athletes remain “an integral part of the
student body.”5
“[A]mateurism is characterized by nostalgia for a time” when
athletes played purely for the love of the game and is a significant part of the
NCAA’s rules and bylaws.6 Founders of the NCAA sought to highlight
college sports as a way to access higher education.7 They enforce this model
by labeling players amateurs, restricting them from receiving compensation
for their performances.8 Thus, any student-athlete paid in exchange for
athletic participation is disqualified from playing at the collegiate level.9
Proponents of amateurism argue that “compensation for play would tarnish
1.
Andrew B. Carrabis, Strange Bedfellows: How the NCAA and EA Sports
May Have Violated Antitrust and Right of Publicity Laws to Make a Profit at the Exploitation
of Intercollegiate Amateurism, 15 BARRY L. REV. 17, 17 (2010).
2.
Id. at 22.
3.
Id. at 17; Brakkton Booker, College Athletes Are Now Closer to Getting
Paid After NCAA Board OKs Plan, NPR (Apr. 29, 2020, 12:00 PM),
http://www.npr.org/2020/04/29/847781624/college-players-are-now-closer-to-getting-paidafter-ncaa-board-oks-plan.
4.
History,
NCAA,http://web.archive.org/web/20110807060521/http://www.ncaa.org:80/wps/wcm/conne
ct/public/ncaa/about+the+ncaa/who+we+are/about+the+ncaa+history (last updated Nov. 8,
2010).
5.
Amy Christian McCormick & Robert A. McCormick, The Emperor’s New
Clothes: Lifting the NCAA’s Veil of Amateurism, 45 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 495, 507–08 (2008);
see also discussion infra Part II.
6.
Virginia A. Fitt, The NCAA’s Lost Cause and the Legal Ease of
Redefining Amateurism, 59 DUKE L.J. 555, 559 (2009).
7.
See Rodney K. Smith, A Brief History of the National Collegiate Athletic
Association’s Role in Regulating Intercollegiate Athletics, 11 MARQ. SPORTS L. REV. 9, 13
(2000).
8.
See Fitt, supra note 6, at 559, 565.
9.
Taylor Renk, The Difference Between Collegiate and Professional
Athletes, CAMPUS: OP. (Jan. 31, 2019), http://alleghenycampus.com/17148/opinion/17148; see
also discussion infra Part III.
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the integrity of the game.”10 Critics contend the experience is more akin to
“indentured servitude,” given the long hours and work-like contracts many
student-athletes perform under.11 The notion that college athletics is
“amateur” is a legal fiction that has sheltered the NCAA from adhering to a
variety of laws and allowed it to avoid paying student-athletes—who lend
their name.12
In recent years, the NCAA has come under immense pressure to
drop the ruse and recognize that college sports promote anything but
amateurism.13 As recent as March 2020, Florida and California passed
legislation overriding archaic NCAA bylaws—which previously restricted a
student-athlete from profiting off their name, image, and likeness—“lifting
the veil of amateurism in which the NCAA seeks to [conceal] itself.”14 It is
of no surprise NCAA president, Mark Emmert, and other college sport
stakeholders strongly oppose individual state laws that threaten the rules of
profit.15 “Given the collective power of those whose interests” the “amateur”
model advances, it is no wonder it continues to endure.16 “Whether players .
. . should [receive compensation] is [a] seemingly [] age-old question and has
been the subject of fierce debate” among student-athletes, coaches,
universities, and state legislators.17 After two FBI investigations into college
10.
Will Katcher, The Dilemma of Amateurism and College Athletics, MASS.
DAILY COLLEGIAN: SPORTS (Mar. 19, 2018), http://dailycollegian.com/2018/03/the-dilemmaof-amateurism-and-college-athletics/.
11.
Darren Heitner, National Letter of Indenture: Why College Athletes are
Similar to Indentured Servants of Colonial Times, FORBES (July 25, 2020, 8:52 AM),
http://www.forbes.com/sites/darrenheitner/2012/07/25/national-letter-of-indenture-whycollege-athletes-are-similar-to-indentured-servants-of-colonial-times/#547bd82b69d9;
Maureen A. Weston, Gamechanger: NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing
Litigation and the Future of College Sports, 3 MISS. SPORTS L. REV. 77, 79 (2013).
12.
McCormick & McCormick, supra note 5, at 497.
13.
See Paying College Athletes: NCAA Takes First Step in Allowing Players
to Cash In, PITT. POST-GAZETTE (May 6, 2020, 4:53 AM), http://www.postgazette.com/opinion/editorials/2020/05/06/Paying-college-athletes-NCAA-takes-first-step-inallowing-players-to-cash-in/stories/202005050014.
14.
McCormick & McCormick, supra note 5, at 498; Michael Smith, Biggest
Turning Point:
California’s NIL Law, SPORTS BUS. J. (Dec. 16, 2019),
http://www.sportsbusinessdaily.com/Journal/Issues/2019/12/16/Year-End-Awards/TurningPoint.aspx.; Adam Wells, Florida to Be 1st State with NIL Rights for NCAA Athletes to Profit
Off
Likeness,
BLEACHER
REP.:
CFB
(June
12,
2020),
http://bleacherreport.com/articles/2895927-florida-to-be-1st-state-with-nil-rights-for-ncaaathletes-to-profit-off-likeness.
15.
See H.R. 1804:
Student-Athlete Equity Act, GOVTRACK.US,
http://www.govtrack.us/congress/bills/116/hr1804/summary (last updated June 5, 2019);
discussion infra Part V.
16.
McCormick & McCormick, supra note 5, at 497.
17.
Weston, supra note 11, at 78–79.
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basketball corruption, where high-profile programs were vulnerable to
charges of bribery, in late April, the NCAA finally took steps toward
revising its current pay-for-play scheme.18
As an industry that churns out nearly sixty billion dollars a year and
affords its coaches multimillion-dollar salaries, the proliferation of college
sports is decidedly no longer an amateur enterprise.19 Almost every party
involved in college athletics—other than student-athletes—relish a financial
gain.20 This article examines the implications of state legislation on the
NCAA’s amateurism model, allowing student-athletes to profit from their
name, image, and likeness.21 Part II supplies a history of the NCAA’s
formation, how the need for a regulatory body in intercollegiate athletics has
ultimately given the NCAA a stronghold over the college sports market.22
Part III chronicles a string of violations by member institutions and former
student-athletes who threatened the NCAA’s pay-for-play model.23 Part IV
considers the growth of commercialism in college sports, while Part V
discusses the practical impact state law has on the NCAA’s compensation
rules.24
II.

FORMATION AND REGULATORY AUTHORITY OF THE NCAA

Intercollegiate sports began in the second half of the nineteenth
century.25 At the time, academics were concerned with whether college
sports were compatible with colleges’ and universities’ educational values.26
Traditionally, athletic programs were student-run and operated without any
clear safety guidelines.27 Eventually, the cruel nature of early-day sports
resulted in numerous injuries and fatalities—college football was initially
played without helmets or pads in an almost “anything goes” fashion—
prompting colleges and universities to suspend athletics.28 Safety was not

18.
Paying College Athletes: NCAA Takes First Step in Allowing Players to
Cash In, supra note 13; see also discussion infra Part III.
19.
McCormick & McCormick, supra note 5, at 496–97; see also discussion
infra Part IV.
20.
McCormick & McCormick, supra note 5, at 509.
21.
See discussion infra Parts V, VI.
22.
See discussion infra Part II.
23.
See discussion infra Part III.
24.
See discussion infra Parts IV, V.
25.
See Robert Litan, The NCAA’s ‘Amateurism’ Rules: What’s in a Name?,
MILKEN INST. REV. (Oct. 28, 2019), http://www.milkenreview.org/articles/the-ncaasamateurism-rules.
26.
Smith, supra note 7, at 11.
27.
History, supra note 4; see also Litan, supra note 25.
28.
See History, supra note 4; Litan, supra note 25.
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the only concern.29 Leading university presidents voiced their fears that the
commercialization of college sports was out of control.30 The then-president
of Harvard stated, “[C]ollege athletics had turned amateur contests into
major commercial spectacles.”31 Massachusetts Institute of Technology
(“MIT”) President felt the academic pillars of higher education were
crumbling.32 He opined that if the growth of college sports continued at the
rate it was headed, it would not be long before it was a question of “whether
the letters B.A. [stood] more for Bachelor of Arts or Bachelor of Athletics.”33
By the early twentieth century, the steady demand among programs
called for a national organization to regulate the game and ensure it remained
compatible with collegiate values.34 In response, President Roosevelt
summoned leaders of athletic programs to the White House to consider
adopting rules to regulate college sports.35 In 1905, sixty-two academic
institutions founded the NCAA (called the Intercollegiate Athletic
Association, initially) to address the industry’s difficulties.36 From the
outset, the NCAA established amateurism as the core function of college
sports.37 Amateur athletes were supposed to play purely for the love of the
game and focus on developing mental, physical, moral, and social skills.38
Its founders emphasized that college sports were a channel to higher
education, which was of principal priority.39 As interest in college sports
grew, so too did the NCAA’s regulating authority.40
“In 1948, the NCAA enacted [a] . . . ‘Sanity Code,’ [a committee] . .
. designed to ‘alleviate the proliferation of exploitative practices in the
recruitment of student-athletes.’”41 “[T]he ‘Sanity Code’ [sought to provide]
a set of rules that prohibited schools from giving [student]-athletes financial
aid . . . based on athletic ability, [which was] . . . not available to ordinary

29.
See Smith, supra note 7, at 11.
30.
Id.
31.
Id.
32.
Id.
33.
Id.
34.
Smith, supra note 7, at 12.
35.
See id.
36.
Id.
37.
Audrey C. Sheetz, Student-Athletes vs. NCAA: Preserving Amateurism in
College Sports Amidst the Fight for Player Compensation, 81 BROOK. L. REV. 865, 865
(2016).
38.
McCormick & McCormick, supra note 5, at 508.
39.
See Sheetz, supra note 37, at 865.
40.
Smith, supra note 7, at 14.
41.
Id.
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students.”42 However, the Sanity Code was not successful in enforcing rules
or investigating violations.43 The only penalty it could impose was
expulsion—except member schools would vote against expelling a school—
rendering the committee ineffective and its rules impotent.44 The Sanity
Code was dismantled and replaced by the Committee on Infractions, which
was given much broader authority.45 As more colleges and universities
joined the ranks and formed athletic programs, the NCAA created more
regulatory rules, expanding its governing power.46 In time, popular schools
challenged the NCAA’s regulatory structure.47 In NCAA v. Board of Regents
of University of Oklahoma48 (“Board of Regents”), major football-playing
schools banded together against the NCAA, alleging it violated antitrust laws
when it monopolized college sports television by restricting the number of
televised games.49 While the NCAA’s founding principle is to regulate
college sports, too much regulatory authority has proven undesirable.50
A.

The Enterprise Strikes Back: Board of Regents

“Litigation aimed at providing [student]-athletes with pay or . . .
[other] benefits . . . has relied on various causes of action” over the decades,
most notably, antitrust laws.51 After World War II, the NCAA faced a
crossroads.52 Radio was no longer the only medium to reach fans, and
television became a significant part of the American entertainment model.53
The advent of television elevated college sports and, with it, its commercial
value.54 As football games were multiplying, member schools grew
42.
O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1054 (9th Cir. 2015); see also Daniel
E. Lazaroff, The NCAA in Its Second Century: Defender of Amateurism or Antitrust
Recidivist?, 85 OR. L. REV. 329, 333 (2007).
43.
Smith, supra note 7, at 14–15.
44.
Id. at 15.
45.
Id.
46.
Id. at 15–16.
47.
See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 127 n.2
(1984) (White, J., dissenting) (explaining that the College Football Association brought
litigation against the NCAA for antitrust violation, warning the CFA’s own developments may
have antitrust violations of its own); Smith, supra note 7, at 19.
48.
468 U.S. 85 (1984).
49.
Id. at 88, 112.
50.
See Smith, supra note 7, at 16.
51.
Jayma Meyer & Andrew Zimbalist, A Win Win: College Athletes Get
Paid for Their Name, Image, and Likeness and Colleges Maintain the Primacy of Academics,
11 HARV. J. SPORTS & ENT. L. 247, 267 (2020).
52.
See Smith, supra note 7, at 14; History, supra note 4.
53.
See Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 90; Smith, supra note 7, at 14.
54.
Smith, supra note 7, at 14, 19.
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concerned about how television would affect in-person attendance.55 A
decrease in attendance meant a reduction in ticket sales and, ultimately, a
drop in revenue.56 In response, the NCAA commissioned a study by the
National Opinion Research Center (“NORC”) to determine the effect
televised games had on live audiences.57 The NORC studies indicated that
television coverage significantly decreased in-person attendance.58
To address these concerns, the NCAA developed a program of
controls.59 These controls included provisions that television exposure
would be limited to one televised football game every Saturday.60 No
football team would appear more than twice per season, sponsors would
select the teams for broadcast, and any revenue earned would be divided
among the selected schools and the NCAA.61 These controls were first
approved by a vote of all NCAA members, including those who did not have
football programs.62
The NCAA then commissioned a Television
Committee, which periodically circulated questionnaires to obtain
suggestions from members about the current broadcast regulations.63 Based
on their responses, a plan of action was developed.64 This plan helped form
the basis of negotiation with the various telecast networks.65 Typically,
television contracts were between one of the two major networks at any
given time, and each deal was for a period of one to two years.66 In 1977,
things changed when the NCAA contracted with American Broadcasting
Company (“ABC”) for an exclusive four-year contract to cover the 1978 to
1981 college football seasons.67
Out of dissatisfaction with the different aspects of the ABC contract
and regulatory scheme, several major college football conferences and
independent schools banded together to form the College Football
Association (“CFA”).68 CFA members resented that schools without football
programs had an equal vote on broadcasting controls governing televised

55.
56.
57.
58.
59.
60.
61.
62.
63.
64.
65.
66.
67.
68.

See id.; History, supra note 4.
See Smith, supra note 7, at 19.
Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 90.
Id.
See id.
See id.
See id. at 94.
See Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 90.
Id.
Id. at 90–91.
Id. at 90.
Id. at 91, 94.
Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 91.
See id. at 89.
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football games.69 Thus, the CFA’s founding purpose was to lobby and
promote the interest of major football-playing schools.70 This faction
intended to give a louder voice to those schools, especially during the
network negotiation process.71 Eventually, the CFA took it upon itself to
explore possible contracts of its own with television networks for the
broadcasting rights to football games.72 Soon after, the CFA received an
offer from the National Broadcasting Company (“NBC”) despite the
NCAA’s ongoing four-year contract with ABC.73 In response, the NCAA
issued an official statement on the matter, affirming that member institutions
would be subject to the NCAA’s Football Television Plan despite
committing to other contracts, indicating that the NCAA held the right to act
as the exclusive vehicle for marketing football games.74
Nevertheless, the CFA did not yield; instead, it moved forward with
negotiating a separate television contract.75 On August 8, 1981, the CFA
negotiated with NBC the television rights of member schools for the 1982
through 1985 football seasons.76 While the CFA-NBC contract had much of
the same provisions found in NCAA-network agreements, the NBC contract
was more lucrative and team appearances were more frequent.77 The new
agreement, ultimately, was more desirable.78 It seemed the NCAA was
facing a mutiny, prompting its leaders to speak out.79 Then-president James
Frank made it clear that if CFA members chose to be bound by the NBC
contract, they would violate NCAA legislation and face penalties against
their football programs.80 These threats ultimately deterred the CFA from
committing to NBC.81
1.

Rule of Reason

In response to threats of retaliation, the University of Oklahoma and
the University of Georgia brought suit against the NCAA, alleging the
69.
See id.
70.
Id. at 89.
71.
Id. at 94.
72.
Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 94–95.
73.
Id. at 95.
74.
Id.
75.
See id.
76.
Id.; Bd. of Regents of Univ. of Okla. v. NCAA, 546 F. Supp. 1276, 1286
(W.D. Okla. 1982), aff'd, 468 U.S. 85 (1984).
77.
Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 95.
78.
See id.
79.
See id.
80.
Id.
81.
Id.
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organization violated the Sherman Antitrust Act through its monopolistic
control over televised college football.82 Antitrust laws are creatures of case
law and are not easy to apply to college sports but have proven useful for
dismantling the NCAA’s amateurism rules.83 “[T]he Sherman Antitrust Act
is a federal antitrust statute [that] prohibits [conduct] that restrict[s] interstate
commerce and competition.”84 The purpose of the Act is to ensure that no
company has a monopoly over an entire market, prohibiting “contracts,
combinations, or conspiracies” which place an unreasonable restraint on
trade.85 If a court finds a particular activity is “commercial,” the next
question is whether the rule governing the activity unreasonably curbs
trade.86
For the NCAA, a court would need to apply a “rule of reason
analysis to determine whether the rule [in question was] unreasonably
anticompetitive.”87 The rule of reason “involves three burden-shifting
steps.”88 “First, the plaintiff has the burden of proving . . . the restraint
creates anti-competitive effects.”89 If the plaintiff can successfully argue this
point, the second step is for the defendant to prove the rule fosters
procompetitive benefits from the restraint.90 If the defendant has sufficiently
pled, “the burden shifts back to the plaintiff . . . to show that the challenged
conduct is not reasonably necessary to achieve” the defendant’s alleged
benefits or that there are available, less restrictive alternatives that are just as
effective and economically sufficient.91 The courts are charged with
weighing the legitimacy of the pro and anticompetitive effects, and must
determine whether the virtue of the conduct justifies its adverse impact.92
2.

NCAA Violates Antitrust

The Supreme Court in Board of Regents issued its first and only
antitrust decision relating to college sports in 1984.93 In applying the rule of
82.
83.
84.
85.

Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 88.
Meyer & Zimbalist, supra note 51, at 268.
Id. at 268 n.93; see also 15 U.S.C. §§ 1–38.
See Meyer & Zimbalist, supra note 51, at 268; Carrabis, supra note 1, at

86.
87.
88.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.

Meyer & Zimbalist, supra note 51, at 268.
Id.
Id.
Id.
Id. at 268–69.
Meyer & Zimbalist, supra note 51, at 269.
Id.
See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 120

26.

(1984).
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reason analysis, the Court found that the NCAA’s control on how many
football games a college could broadcast, and the price for such broadcasts,
were an illegal restraint on trade and illustrative of the type of conduct the
Sherman Act was intended to prevent.94 While member schools mutually
accept the vast majority of NCAA policies to preserve competition, this
particular NCAA policy was not mutually agreed upon.95 The NCAA argued
that its television plan, like its other regulations, was procompetitive with a
seemingly anticompetitive effect.96 The problem was that the restrictions on
the number of televised football games created an exclusive market with
limited buyers.97 Based on the laws of supply and demand, the NCAA could
essentially ask for any amount of money to broadcast football games because
the product it sells—college sports—is only available through its
organization.98 The fact that no other entity was permitted to offer this
product drove up the price, as broadcasting companies competed for the right
to televise the games.99 In a nutshell, the NCAA was price-fixing without a
seemingly good reason for doing so.100 The core of the analysis came to
whether the restraints (fixed prices) were unreasonable.101 The NCAA
argued these restraints were reasonable because they sought to promote a
“competitive balance” among its member schools, yet not all member
schools “competed” with each other, because not all schools had football
programs.102 The schools with football programs were bound by the
collective decision of the non-football member schools.103 In essence, the
NCAA imposed restrictions on a source of revenue, more critical to some
colleges than to others, without evidence that those restrictions promoted any
greater balance than its other policies.104 The Court held that there were
more effective policies in place that promoted a “competitive balance” to
maintain amateurism in college sports than the television contract rule.105
Ultimately, the Court affirmed that the NCAA restrictions on
television contracts violated the Sherman Antitrust Act as an unreasonable
restraint on competition.106 While the ruling was straightforward, the Court
94.
95.
96.
97.
98.
99.
100.
101.
102.
103.
104.
105.
106.

Id. at 107–08.
Id. at 99.
Id. at 104.
See id. at 106, 111; Meyer & Zimbalist, supra note 51, at 269.
See Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 113.
See id.
See id. at 126 (White, J., dissenting).
See id. at 98.
Id. at 96, 118.
See Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 128 (White, J., dissenting).
See id.
See id. at 119–20.
Id. at 120.
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added that the NCAA plays a critical role in maintaining the tradition of
amateurism in college sports and that the organization should be afforded
“ample latitude” to continue in that role—feeding the NCAA a litany of
arguments that it has since relied on to justify its refusal to pay athletes.107
Justice Stevens further stated that, despite this case’s incongruence with
antitrust, the policies enacted to maintain the integrity of the student-athlete
“adds richness and diversity to intercollegiate athletics and is entirely
consistent with the goals of the Sherman Act.”108 Although the Court’s focus
was on the antitrust violations, Justice Stevens went further by stating “[i]n
order to preserve the character and quality of the [NCAA’s] ‘product,’
athletes must not be paid, must be required to attend class, and the like.”109
While the battle for television rights has settled, the war in antitrust
endures.110 Because the Court never addressed the question whether pay-forplay rules would be a violation of antitrust under the Sherman Act—because
payments to athletes was not at issue, rather the legitimacy of the television
contracts—the NCAA continued to prohibit student-athletes from receiving
compensation for the use of their name, image, and likeness (“NIL”).111
B.

NIL and Void: Name, Image, and Likeness Litigation

Before Board of Regents, “very few antitrust claims had been
asserted against the NCAA.”112 In those cases, the NCAA argued that even
if its rules are anticompetitive, they were “necessary to preserve amateurism .
. . [and] protect the uniqueness of college sports,” its product, and maintain
the “demand for [its] brand.”113 Courts tend to be dismissive of antitrust
challenges to NCAA regulations and often focus on the organization’s
alleged “noncommercial objectives.”114 Federal courts hesitate to interfere
with the NCAA’s portrayal of “a legitimate effort to promote amateurism

107.
See id.; Meyer & Zimbalist, supra note 51, at 270.
108.
See Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 120.
109.
Id. at 102; Weston, supra note 11, at 80.
110.
See Litan, supra note 25; Bd. Of Regents, 468 U.S. at 120; Dan Murphy,
Florida Name, Image, Likeness Bill Now a Law; State Athletes Can Profit From
Endorsements Next Summer, ESPN (June 12, 2020), http://www.espn.com/collegesports/story/_/id/29302748/florida-name-image-likeness-bill-now-law-meaning-state-athletesprofit-endorsements-next-summer.
111.
Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 88; cf. O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049,
1079 (9th Cir. 2015) (holding that the NCAA’s prohibitions against pay for name, image, and
likeness was a violation of the Sherman Antitrust Act); Meyer & Zimbalist, supra note 51, at
270.
112.
Lazaroff, supra note 42, at 337.
113.
Meyer & Zimbalist, supra note 51, at 267.
114.
Carrabis, supra note 1, at 24.

238

NOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

and fair competition in [college] athletics.”115 But some objectives cannot be
Whether the NCAA’s rules prohibiting student-athlete
ignored.116
compensation violated the Sherman Act was the center of the Ninth Circuit’s
decision in O’Bannon v. National Collegiate Athletic Ass’n (“O’Bannon”).117
1.

The NCAA’s Digital Duplicates

In 2008, Ed O’Bannon, a former All-American basketball star at
UCLA, discovered he was featured in a college basketball video game.118 To
his shock, when a friend’s son played the video game for him, O’Bannon
saw an avatar of himself—a virtual athlete who also played for UCLA, who
wore the same jersey number, and who was recognizably Ed O’Bannon.119
Nearly a year later, O’Bannon filed suit against the NCAA for selling his
likeness to video game developer Electronic Arts (“EA”).120 The core of
O’Bannon’s argument was that the NCAA’s amateurism rules, insofar as
they prevented student-athletes from being compensated for the use of their
name, image, and likeness, were an illegal restraint of trade under the
Sherman Act.121
“Around the same time, Sam Keller, the former starting quarterback
for the Arizona State University,” brought a class-action lawsuit against the
NCAA and EA games.122 In the 2005 edition of the NCAA Football video
game, the virtual starting quarterback from Arizona State wore a number
nine jersey—the same as Keller.123 The avatar was the same height, weight,
and skin tone; he featured the same hairstyle cut and color; he was from the
same home state as Keller, sported the same facial features, and was,
coincidentally, in the same year in school.124 Keller alleged that EA Sports
had impermissibly used student-athletes’ image and likeness in video games,
115.
Lazaroff, supra note 42, at 337.
116.
See O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1064–65.
117.
802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2015).
118.
Id. at 1055.
119.
Id.
120.
See id.; Patrick Vint, Ed O’Bannon vs. the NCAA: Explaining the Major
Decision Coming June 20, SB NATION (May 6, 2013, 10:00 AM),
http://www.sbnation.com/college-football/2013/5/6/4291666/ed-obannon-ncaa-lawsuit-nextclass-certification; Keller Sues EA Sports Over Images, ESPN: NCAAF (May 8, 2009),
http://www.espn.com/college-football/news/story?id=4151071.
121.
O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1055.
122.
Id.
123.
In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 724 F.3d
1268, 1272 (9th Cir. 2013) (holding EA video game developer’s use of the likenesses of
college athletes was not protected under the First Amendment and thus former athletes right of
publicity claims were not barred by California’s anti-SLAPP statute).
124.
Id.

2021]

GAME CHANGING LEGISLATION

239

and that the NCAA had wrongfully, some would argue willfully, turned a
blind eye to EA’s digital duplicates.125 The principal complaint was that EA
violated the rights of publicity under California law.126 The two cases were
merged and consolidated during pre-trial proceedings.127 The issue brought
under the Sherman Act “was whether the agreement to prevent such
payments to athletes for their [name, image, and likeness] was an
unreasonable restraint of trade.”128
The “NCAA bylaws [explicitly] prohibit[ed] the use of . . . names
and likenesses of athletes for commercial purposes.”129 The NCAA
defended its contract with EA Sports, claiming, “[o]ur agreement with EA
Sports clearly prohibits the use of names and pictures of current studentathletes in their electronic games . . . [w]e are confident that no such use has
occurred.”130 Nevertheless, upon review of the video game, sources were
struck by the uncanny similarities.131 “Of the 126 [digital] players surveyed,
124 play[ed] the same position as the[ir] real-life [counterparts.]”132 Onehundred and twenty-two players had an identical height to what was listed on
real-life rosters.133 Only eighty digital players had an identical weight, but
most were within a ten-pound variance.134 All 126 video game characters
had the same home state as corresponding real-life players, though not the
same hometown.135 EA went so far as to match the player’s skin tones, hair
color, and hairstyle.136 To further ensure that the digital players matched
their living, breathing counterparts, EA sent detailed questionnaires to the
NCAA team equipment managers to recreate a particular player’s
idiosyncratic aesthetic.137 The only meaningful details that EA left out were
125.
126.

O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1055.
In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 724 F.3d

at 1272.

127.
O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1055.
128.
Id. at 1055–56; Meyer & Zimbalist, supra note 51, at 271.
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Keller Sues EA Sports Over Images, supra note 120.
130.
Id.
131.
Patrick Vint, 126 Top NCAA Football 14 Players Nearly Match Their
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(June
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2013,
11:21
AM),
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SB
http://www.sbnation.com/college-football/2013/6/20/4433024/ea-sports-ed-obannon-ncaafootball-14-players.
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Id.
133.
Id.
134.
Id.
135.
Id.
136.
Plaintiff-Appellees’ Opposition Brief in Response to Nat’l Collegiate
Athletic Ass’n Opening Appellate Brief at 15 n.6, O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049 (9th
Cir. 2015) (Nos. 14-16601) [hereinafter Brief for Appellee].
137.
In re NCAA Student-Athlete Name & Likeness Licensing Litig., 724 F.3d
1268, 1271 (9th Cir. 2013).
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the real-life names on the jerseys.138 However, users were permitted to
upload team rosters so that a real-life player’s name could attach to his
recognizable digital avatar.139 Sam Keller’s attorney expressed his concern,
“given that the NCAA says you can’t profit from your likeness . . . [then]
they do the wink and the nod when EA Sports presents them with the game,
which has the likeness of the player.”140
Admittedly, EA Sports’ video games are among its most lucrative
product lines.141 EA has produced successful games such as Madden
National Football League (“NFL”) Football, Fédération Internationale de
Football Association (“FIFA”) Soccer, and even has certain licensing rights
to Harry Potter.142 The success of the Madden franchise comes down to
consumer demand.143 The realistic and life-like simulations allow EA Sports
to “capture the nuances” of major sporting events “to the fullest extent
technology allows.”144
By creating a vividly authentic experience,
companies can differentiate sports simulations in the video game market.145
However, to achieve heightened realism, EA Sports “negotiates with the
NFL and [National Basketball Association (“NBA”)] players’ unions for the
right to use their members’ [names, images, and likeness]” in their video
games.146 Perhaps the most considerable difference between college and
professional sports is where the money for the exclusive rights to market and
manufacture these video games goes.147 EA Sports reportedly pays the NFL
and its Player Association nearly fifty million dollars to be the exclusive
video game licensee.148 The company pays an additional two million dollars
to use John Madden’s name.149 Presumably, EA Sports held a contract with
138.
139.
140.
141.

Id.
Id.
Keller Sues EA Sports Over Images, supra note 120.
See John Gaudiosi, Madden: The $4 Billion Video Game Franchise,
CNN:
BUS.
(Sept.
5,
2013,
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AM),
http://money.cnn.com/2013/09/05/technology/innovation/madden-25/index.html.
142.
Brief for Elec. Arts Inc. as Amicus Curiae Supporting the NFL
Respondents at 1, 2, Am. Needles, Inc. v. NFL, 560 U.S. 183 (2010) (No. 08-661) [hereinafter
Brief for Respondent]; Florentine Lefty, How EA’s FIFA Changed the Game, TECH. &
OPERATIONS
MGMT.:
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STUDENT
PERSPS.,
http://digital.hbs.edu/platformrctom/submission/how-eas-fifa-changed-the-game/ (last updated Nov. 17, 2016).
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Brief for Respondent, supra note 142, at 2; see also Gaudiosi, supra note
141.
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Brief for Respondent, supra note 142, at 2.
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Id.
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O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1067 (9th Cir. 2015); see also
Gaudiosi, supra note 141.
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O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1055, 1069.
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Gaudiosi, supra note 141.
149.
Id.

2021]

GAME CHANGING LEGISLATION

241

the NCAA to create a college sports video game and paid for the right to do
so.150 Nevertheless, neither O’Bannon, Keller, or any other athlete featured
in the video game saw a dime—not right away, at least.151
In 2005, EA Sports’ representatives explained that their inability to
use collegiate players’ names, images, and likeness, to the extent legally
permissible, was the “number one factor holding back NCAA video game
growth.”152 At worst, the NCAA permitted EA Sports to make recognizable
character avatars to circumvent having to compensate players or violate its
internal rules; at best, it acquiesced.153 The NCAA maintained that it did not
permit EA Sports to create look-alike avatars but merely gave it the license
to use stadiums, team names, and identifying trademarks.154 The NCAA
defended its position, pointing out that a real-life athlete’s name did not
automatically appear on a digital jersey.155 Allowing EA Sports to use a
player’s image and likeness without compensation or notice would have been
outright exploitation and a far cry from the NCAA’s ad hoc beginnings to
combat intercollegiate abuses.156
The NCAA settled claims against itself and EA Sports over the
college-themed video games to the tune of about twenty million dollars.157 It
came as no surprise when the NCAA reported it would not be entering into a
new contract with EA Sports, making “NCAA Football 2014” the last edition
of the popular video game franchise.158 The NCAA stated its participation in
EA’s college football video game is not in its best interest, hoping to
foreclose the market for student-athletes to profit from the enterprise.159

150.
See Dan Lee Rogers, Ninth Circuit Rules Against EA in Keller v.
Electronic Arts, L. OFF. DAN LEE ROGERS: WRITINGS & PUBS (Aug. 1, 2013), http://dlrlaw.com/writings--pubs/countdown-the-5-most-influential-video-game-lawsuits-of-2012-4-of5-keller-v-electronic-arts; Carrabis, supra note 1, at 22–23.
151.
See O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1067, 1079; Rogers, supra note 150.
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O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1067; see also Alex Kirshner, Blame the NCAA,
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Ed
O’Bannon,
BANNER
SOC’Y
(July
13,
2018,
8:00
AM),
http://www.bannersociety.com/2019/8/15/20708592/ed-obannon-ncaa-football-video-games.
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Rogers, supra note 150.
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Id.
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Id.; O’Bannon v. NCAA, 7 F. Supp. 3d 955, 970 (N.D. Cal. 2014), aff’d in
part, rev’d in part, 802 F.3d 1049 (9th Cir. 2015).
156.
See McCormick & McCormick, supra note 5, at 508.
157.
NCAA Reaches Settlement in EA Video Game Lawsuit, NCAA (June 9,
2014, 10:53 AM), http://www.ncaa.org/about/resources/media-center/press-releases/ncaareaches-settlement-ea-video-game-lawsuit.
158.
NCAA to End Deal with EA Sports, ESPN: NCAAF (July 17, 2013),
http://www.espn.com/college-football/story/_/id/9486048/ncaa-not-renewing-contract-easports-video-games.
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See id.
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Less Restrictive Alternatives

In 2014, Judge Claudia Wilken handed down an opinion finding that
NCAA’s NIL rules were commercial—answering the threshold question—
and that the NCAA’s compensation rules were unlawful.160 In applying the
rule of reason analysis, Judge Wilken found that the prohibitions on
compensation were an anticompetitive restraint of trade and, similar to Board
of Regents, constituted a “price-fixing agreement.”161 This time, however, all
member schools had agreed to abide by these rules.162 To overcome its
anticompetitive restraint, the NCAA provided a few justifications for its
rules: that integrating athletics and academics served to increase the quality
of an athlete’s education and “amateurism played a ‘limited’ role in
maximizing consumer demand.”163 However, Judge Wilken held that two
less restrictive alternatives to fulfill the NCAA’s twin goals existed, which
include: increasing scholarships to include up to the full cost of attendance
or equal payments of up to five thousand dollars a year to be held in a trust
and later redeemed after an athlete graduates from college.164
3.

Ninth Circuit Takes a Step Back

On appeal, the Ninth Circuit affirmed in part and reversed in part.165
Judge Bybee explained, “[t]he difference between offering student-athletes
education-related compensation and offering them cash sums untethered to
educational expenses is not minor; it is a quantum leap.”166 Judge Bybee
explained that once the NCAA crossed that line, there would be no turning
back and that college sports would mature to “minor league status.”167
However, the Ninth Circuit did agree with the lower court that the NCAA’s
amateurism rules are not automatically exempt from antitrust scrutiny.168
The Ninth Circuit clarified that Board of Regents did not approve of
amateurism “as categorically consistent with the Sherman [Antitrust] Act.”169
160.
O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 963, 975; Meyer & Zimbalist, supra note 51,
at 271–72.
161.
See NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 105–06
(1984); Meyer & Zimbalist, supra note 51, at 271.
162.
See O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d at 973.
163.
Id. at 999, 1001; Meyer & Zimbalist, supra note 51, at 272.
164.
O’Bannon, 7 F. Supp. 3d. at 1008.
165.
O’Bannon v. NCAA, 802 F.3d 1049, 1053 (9th Cir. 2015).
166.
Id. at 1078.
167.
Id. at 1078–79.
168.
Id. at 1053; see also Carrabis, supra note 1, at 25.
169.
O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1063; see also NCAA v. Bd. of Regents of the
Univ. of Okla., 468 U.S. 85, 102 (1984).
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Thus, the High Court’s nod to amateurism, “though impressive-sounding,”
was merely dicta.170
Moreover, while dicta has its place in every analysis, courts are not
bound by it.171 Thus, the Ninth Circuit was not bound nor persuaded by the
language of Justice Stevens in Board of Regents.172 The Court held not every
rule in which the NCAA “somehow relates to amateurism is automatically
valid.”173 The Court essentially told the NCAA it could not hide behind its
amateur model as a method of restricting trade.174 Additionally, the NCAA
tried to cut the NIL conversation short by announcing it was not renewing its
contract with EA Sports during litigation.175 It appeared that the organization
would rather cut ties with EA and remove itself from the video game market
entirely, rather than share the wealth in a foreseeably lucrative franchise with
the players who, in essence, are the reason for its success.176 The Ninth
Circuit found that conduct unpersuasive “[g]iven the NCAA’s previous,
lengthy relationship with EA [Sports] . . . .”177 The Court determined that,
despite cutting ties with EA, the NCAA could work with another video game
developer in the future and would once again need to address its restriction
on the use of an athlete’s name, image, and likeness.178 As the Court put it,
“[t]here is real money at issue here,” and if the NCAA stepped aside,
student-athletes could see some of it.179 In affirming Judge Wilken, the
Court suggested the NCAA either change its policy barring the use of NIL or
stop enforcing it.180
Just when the Ninth Circuit seemed to rebuke the NCAA amateurism
model—noting that compensation rules are not mere “eligibility”
requirements but rather “substantive restrictions” on trade—it vacated the
district court’s proposed remedy allowing student-athletes to accept
monetary compensation.181 The Court found that money in a trust violated
principles of amateurism as they were untethered to academics.182
“O’Bannon . . . made it clear that NCAA [rules are] subject to anti-trust laws,
and the judicial system will provide a remedy for athletes who are exploited
170.
171.
172.
173.
174.
175.
176.
177.
178.
179.
180.
181.
182.

O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1063.
See id.
Id.; see also Bd. of Regents, 468 U.S. at 102.
O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1063.
See id.
See id. at 1057 n.7.
See Kirshner, supra note 152.
O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1067–68.
See id. at 1068.
Id. at 1065; see also Kirshner, supra note 152.
O’Bannon, 802 F.3d at 1068.
Id. at 1065, 1079.
Id. at 1076.
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for profit by others,” but not at the expense of obtaining “minor league
status.”183
III.

ARTIFICIAL AMATEURISM: PENALTIES FOR PAY

Amateurism is problematic and at the heart of the NCAA’s industry
model.184 Student-athletes agree to play for a college or university as part of
their college experience and are expected to perform for the school in
exchange for scholarships and, of course, the love of the game.185 “The
NCAA has extensive rules and penalties” attached to student eligibility,
furthering its proclamation that “only an amateur student-athlete is eligible
for intercollegiate athletics participation . . . .”186 If a student-athlete is paid
for playing, they are immediately disqualified from participating at the
collegiate level.187
Plenty of athletes and coaches have been caught up in the pay-forplay scheme.188 Arizona basketball coach Sean Miller reportedly offered
“prized prospect” Deandre Ayton nearly ten thousand dollars a month to play
for the Wildcats.189 Running back Reggie Bush famously returned his
Heisman Trophy after he accepted benefits to play for the University of
Southern California (“USC”).190 Perhaps the most famous college basketball
player to turn pro, Zion Williamson, allegedly received financial benefits to
play men’s basketball at Duke University.191 Lastly, the University of
Louisville was blemished by a scandal involving exotic dancers hired to
183.
Id. at 1079; Agota Peterfy & Kevin Carron, Show Me the Money!: NCAA
Considering Paying Student-Athletes, 76 J. MO. B. 68, 97 (2020).
184.
Weston, supra note 11, at 79–80; Katcher, supra note 10.
185.
See Fitt, supra note 6, at 559; Weston, supra note 11, at 79, 84.
186.
Weston, supra note 11, at 79–80.
187.
Renk, supra note 9.
188.
Katcher, supra note 10; see also Alec Nathan, Report: Sean Miller
Discussed Paying Deandre Ayton $100K to Commit to Arizona, BLEACHER REP. (Feb. 23,
2018),
http://bleacherreport.com/articles/2761235-report-sean-miller-discussed-payingdeandre-ayton-100k-to-commit-to-arizona; Tom Goldman, Reggie Bush to Give Up Heisman
Trophy,
NPR
(Sept.
14,
2010,
5:25
PM),
http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=129865279; Evan Kolin, Former
Marketing Agent Alleges Zion Williamson Received Benefits to Commit to Duke Men’s
Basketball,
CHRONICLE
(May
10,
2020,
3:47
PM),
http://www.dukechronicle.com/article/2020/05/duke-basketball-zion-williamson-marketingallegations; Colin Dwyer, Louisville Must Vacate its 2013 National Title After NCAA Upholds
Ruling, NPR (Feb. 20, 2018, 2:09 PM), http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwoway/2018/02/20/587219151/louisville-must-vacate-its-2013-national-title-after-ncaa-upholdsruling.
189.
See Nathan, supra note 188.
190.
Goldman, supra note 188.
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persuade recruits.192 While unethical conduct should be punished, the
“illegal” payouts these players received are dwarfed by the money they
earned from their respective institutions.193 Additionally, the penalties
attributed to athletes whose coaches step out of line with NCAA rules punish
the entire team; while coaches continue making million-dollar salaries,
athletes walk away with no money, no honors, and little to show for their
years of committed play.194
A.

Heisman History

Notably, the allegation that Reggie Bush and his family received
money in exchange for playing for USC has been vetted.195 One of the
marketing agents involved in the scandal, Lloyd Lake, sued Bush to recoup
three hundred thousand dollars in cash and gifts.196 “The NCAA cited USC
for lack of institutional control” following a four-year investigation.197 Its
report mentioned numerous improper benefits given to Bush and former
basketball player O.J. Mayo.198 “[USC paid] a hefty price, as the NCAA
handed down [its] toughest [sanctions] since levying Southern Methodist
[University] with the ‘death penalty’ in 1986.”199 The NCAA concluded that
Reggie Bush could not identify as a student-athlete beginning in December
2004 and could not have qualified as an amateur to play college football.200
As a result, USC was placed on probation for four years; its “football
program . . . given a two-year postseason ban and a loss of [thirty] total
scholarships over the 2011, 2012, and 2013 seasons.”201 USC football was
forced to vacate victories from the 2004–2005 season, during which Reggie
192.
Dwyer, supra note 188.
193.
See id.
194.
See id.
195.
Goldman, supra note 188.
196.
Id.
197.
Id.; NCAA Delivers Postseason Football Ban, ESPN (June 11, 2010, 3:03
AM), http://www.espn.com/los-angeles/ncf/news/story?id=5272615 [hereinafter Postseason
Ban].
198.
Goldman, supra note 188.
199.
Nakia Hogan, Reggie Bush Investigation Results in Major Sanctions for
Southern
Cal,
NOLA.COM
(June
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2019,
3:05
PM),
http://www.nola.com/sports/saints/article_433465bb-41bc-5257-915e-c6ff20c2e0c1.html;
Eric Dodds, The ‘Death Penalty’ and How the College Sports Conversation Has Changed,
TIME (Feb. 25, 2015, 6:00 AM), http://time.com/3720498/ncaa-smu-death-penalty/ (stating
that “[t]he death penalty, part of the ‘repeat violators’ rule in official NCAA parlance, wiped
out SMU’s entire 1987 season and forced the Mustangs to cancel their 1988 campaign as
well”).
200.
Postseason Ban, supra note 197; see also Goldman, supra note 188.
201.
Hogan, supra note 199.
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Bush played.202 And as part of its punishment, the NCAA ordered USC to
disassociate itself from Bush.203 While USC suffered for the impropriety,
Reggie Bush suffered a loss too.204 In 2005, he was on top of the world,
rushing over 1700 yards, scoring 18 touchdowns and helping the Trojans
reach the national championship against the number two team in the country,
the University of Texas.205 When the time came for the Heisman award,
Bush won by a landslide as the top player of the 2005 college football
season.206 “He received 784 first-place votes—the third-most [in Heisman
history] . . . .”207 However, one of the guidelines given to Heisman Trophy
voters is that a player must comply with the NCAA rules.208 Bush was
ineligible for the 2005 season because he was no longer an amateur athlete,
due to accepting improper benefits from sports agents.209 Thus, he was
technically barred from receiving the Heisman award.210 While it was
unclear whether the Heisman Trophy Trust was seeking to take away the
honor, in 2010, Bush decided to return the award before he could be stripped
of it.211 It was the first time in college football history that a recipient
returned its top award.212
B.

Tainted Reputations

The University of Louisville was blemished by a scandal involving
exotic dancers.213 In 2015 Katina Powell, a self-described escort, published a
book titled “Breaking Cardinal Rules: Basketball and the Escort Queen,”
where she revealed that Andre McGee, former Louisville Operations
Director, paid her to bring strippers to dorm room parties to secure recruits
from 2010 to 2014. 214 The parties were hosted at an on-campus dorm where
202.
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dancers were hired to strip naked.215 Powell explained that McGee would
arrange the parties and pay her ten thousand dollars to supply dancers and
often paid in cash for “side deals,” which included sex with some recruits,
the guardians who accompanied them, and current players.216 One former
basketball player admitted that he had sex with a dancer after McGee paid
her.217
By October 2016, the NCAA caught wind of the story and delivered
the University a notice of allegations, claiming that Andre McGee provided
impermissible inducement and extra benefits to recruits and studentathletes.218 Following an internal investigation, the University of Louisville
tried to get ahead of the NCAA’s Committee on Infractions by banning itself
from the 2016 NCAA tournament.219 It also imposed its own recruiting and
scholarship sanctions.220 In 2017, the University of Louisville responded to
the allegations, stating that McGee acted alone.221 Rick Pitino, Hall of Fame
basketball coach and former Louisville head coach, denied knowing anything
about the parties.222 Pitino stated, “[n]ot myself, not one player, not one
trainer, not one assistant, not one person knew anything about any of this . . .
[i]f anyone did, it would have been stopped on a dime.”223 However, Powell,
along with Cardinal fans, found it hard to believe that Pitino did not know.224
According to Powell, McGee spoke to her about needing to put Louisville in
a position to sign recruits, often touting that his job was on the line.225
For four years, McGee operated a revolving door of recruits,
dancers, basketball players, loud music, and alcohol before anyone took
action.226 The University’s self-imposed penalties for the whole affair were
http://www.npr.org/sections/thetwo-way/2017/06/15/533061934/ncaa-faults-louisvillebasketball-program-for-ethics-and-oversight-in-sex-scanda.
215.
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just the tip of the iceberg.227 The NCAA required the men’s basketball
program to forfeit its victories from 2011 to 2015, vacating 123 wins.228 The
most notable forfeiture was the 2013 national championship—Louisville’s
only national title in the last three decades.229 The NCAA also required
Louisville to return all tournament revenue.230 Another significant part of the
NCAA’s penalties included stripping the players who competed through the
2011–2015 seasons of several accolades and honors.231 A lawsuit was later
commenced by five former Louisville basketball players, who believed the
NCAA’s accusations and penalties impermissibly tarnished their
reputations.232 While these sanctions were intended to address the improper
recruitment tactics and deter future exploitation, they consequently affected
the students, arguably the victims in this scandal, by stripping them of their
well-earned awards.233 Louisville athletic director Vince Tyra said, in
opposition to the player-penalty, that a player’s accomplishments deserve
recognition.234 Luke Hancock, former player and party to the suit, asked the
NCAA to recognize the students for their accolades, including the honor of
winning the 2013 National Championship title.235 Hancock expressly
referred to the NCAA’s recognition of his honor as the 2013 Final Four’s
Most Outstanding Player.236 While the 2013 title was removed in July 2017,
the asterisk next to Hancock’s name in the NCAA record books as the Most
Outstanding Player of 2013 Final Four in Atlanta was amended to reflect his
achievement, as were the statistics of the other players involved in the
lawsuit.237 The agreement between the NCAA and the former basketball
players affirmed their eligibility as student-athletes, who were in good
standing from 2011 to 2014, and whose awards, honors, and statistics were
valid.238 While these five players got part of what they had hoped for, none
227.
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228.
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230.
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of the vacated wins were restored, and the rest of the team who helped earn
the 2013 championship title suffered.239 The NCAA did not hesitate to
punish an entire athletic program at the expense of the entire team’s
achievement.240 In this case, the entire Louisville men’s basketball team was
punished for several seasons due to the acts of one rogue, Andre McGee.241
Call it the price of doing business.242
C.

The Blame Game

When the Southern District of New York announced its investigation
into the “‘dark underbelly’ of men’s college basketball,” it was a reminder to
colleges from the powers-that-be, “‘[w]e have your playbook.’”243 The
prosecution’s confidence fired up college sports fans, as a change was on the
horizon.244 It was the “big guns” under fire this time—multimillionaire
coaches at high-profile universities were vulnerable.245 Nevertheless, there
was no change in the landscape; archaic NCAA rules did what they always
do, endured.246
On February 23, 2018, ESPN reported that an FBI wiretap revealed
Arizona’s head coach, Sean Miller, discussed paying prospect Deandre
Ayton ten-thousand dollars in exchange for his commitment to the Wildcats,
with Christian Dawkins, a marketing agent.247 It was reported that former
Adidas consultant Merl Code Jr. had paid Ayton’s family an unknown
amount of money through Christian Dawkins to get Ayton to attend Adidas
239.
See id.
240.
See Staples, supra note 218.
241.
See id.
242.
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sponsored programs.248 On May 1, 2019, federal prosecutors revealed a
second recorded conversation between Arizona assistant coach Book
Richardson and Christian Dawkins confirming the ten-thousand-dollar
Miller-Ayton agreement.249 However, when the FBI began handing out
indictments, Sean Miller did not make the cut, despite being caught on
tape.250 Sean Miller also never testified during the trial, nor did he see the
inside of a courtroom.251 In fact, no high-profile programs came under fire
despite being mentioned throughout the prosecution.252 Instead of going for
the named institutions’ head coaches, the FBI went for the low hanging
fruit.253 Arizona’s Sean Miller was not the only coach caught up in the
scandal.254 Three former assistant coaches were charged: Arizona’s assistant
coach Book Richardson; Oklahoma State’s Lamont Evans; and USC’s Tony
Bland—each ultimately pled guilty to the charges.255 The FBI ultimately
charged Code and Dawkins, two low-profile consultants, with funneling
money from Adidas to the families of prominent recruits—to convince them
to commit to Adidas sponsored colleges—and with bribing assistant coaches
to influence student-athletes to hire Dawkins’ sports management agency
before turning pro.256
During the trial, Dawkins defended his position, saying, “[b]y the
time those kids get to college, the deals are usually already done . . . .
[t]here’s no need to pay a college coach because these players are coming to
college with agents. This idea that it’s an amateur world is not real.”257
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Dawkins later testified that, despite the NCAA’s prohibitions on
compensation, “he [did not] see anything wrong with paying college
athletes.”258 He stated that student-athletes “‘are the only kids in college
who can’t get paid legally, . . . [t]here is a need for them to get paid.’”259
Federal Judge Edgardo Ramos, who presided over the case, steered Dawkins
away from the pay-for-play conversation, stating that “[t]here are . . . any
number of reasons why families and players get paid, . . . [n]one of them
good.”260 Dawkins’ attorney Steve Haney claimed, “[t]he only real victims
in any of this continue to be the student-athletes making schools hundreds of
millions of dollars . . . and receiving no monetary [compensation] for their
labor.”261 In the end, Dawkins and Code were sentenced to federal prison for
their role in bribing college basketball coaches and prospects to commit to
certain schools and to sign with Dawkins’ sports management company.262
No word on how the NCAA intends to move forward since the trial revealed
the entanglement of corruption in college basketball.263 The question is not if
the NCAA will act, but rather when.264 For Arizona University, Sean Miller,
and those named in the federal investigation, it is only a matter of time
before the reckoning.265
D.

Clinging to Amateur Status

Considered the best prospect since LeBron James, Zion Williamson
was a powerhouse student-athlete and it came as no surprise to college
basketball fans when he declared for the 2019 NBA draft.266 Nearly a week
before his big announcement, Williamson signed a five-year contract with
Prime Sports Marketing.267 “The contract called for [Gina] Ford to serve as
Williamson’s marketing [agent] . . . .”268 Ford would only represent him
258.
Id.
259.
Id.
260.
Fenno, supra note 251.
261.
Id.
262.
Id.
263.
See id. At the time of writing this Article, no penalties have been brought
against the institutions named in the federal investigation nor have sanctions been levied. Id.
264.
See Clay, supra note 251.
265.
See id.
266.
See Sam Carp, Building the Brand of a Number One Draft Pick: Can
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(Aug.
28,
2019),
http://www.sportspromedia.com/analysis/zion-williamson-brand-marketability-nba-draft-neworleans-pelicans-lebron.
267.
Michael McCann, Analyzing the Latest Developments in the Lawsuit
Against Zion Williamson, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED: NCAAB (May 10, 2020),
http://www.si.com/college/2020/05/10/zion-williamson-lawsuit-developments.
268.
Id.
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during endorsement negotiations, never for prospective professional
employment contracts.269
By the end of May 2019, Williamson no longer wished to continue
with Ford’s company and fired her.270 Williamson replaced Ford’s Prime
Sports Marketing with Creative Artist Agency (“CAA”), a talent agency
positioned to help athletes from draft day to post-career planning.271 Unlike
Ford, the CAA could represent Williamson in both endorsement and
professional employment contracts.272 Williamson alleges that his abrupt
termination with Ford’s company was because the contract “deceived [him]
into consenting to forfeit his college eligibility . . . .”273 Williamson sought
to end the previously agreed upon contract and commenced a lawsuit against
Ford and Prime Sports Marketing in North Carolina.274 Under North
Carolina law, the Uniform Athlete Agent Act (“UAAA”) requires marketing
contracts to alert a student-athlete that by signing the contract, he or she
forfeits any remaining NCAA eligibility, i.e., amateur status.275 Ford also
brought suit against Williamson in Miami-Dade County, Florida, seeking
one-hundred million dollars for his alleged breach of contract.276
Williamson can only be protected under the UAAA if he was
considered a student-athlete when he signed the contract with Ford, to
include not accepting improper, unauthorized benefits.277 Williamson alleges
that the contract violated UAAA requirements from its inception because it
did not properly notify him of his changing status.278 Ford maintains that
Williamson breached the contract when he fired her without just cause.279
She claims Williamson willingly relinquished his amateur status when he
signed with her.280 Moreover, Ford alleges the UAAA is not applicable
because Williamson had previously accepted benefits without NCAA
authorization, in violation of the rules, taking him out of amateur status.281
269.
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270.
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271.
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Duke University spokesman Michael Schoenfeld weighed in, stating “[a]s
soon as Duke was made aware of any allegation that might have affected
Zion Williamson’s eligibility, we conducted a thorough and objective
investigation . . . .”282 Schoenfeld added that the investigation turned up “no
evidence to support any allegation” that Williamson accepted improper
benefits.283 Meanwhile, Ford’s attorney filed a request for admissions as part
of the Miami case, hoping Williamson would admit that his mother and
stepfather received illegal benefits—amounting to about four-hundred
thousand dollars—to ensure he attended Duke University and wore Adidas
shoes; thus he is not owed the protection of the UAAA.284 Of course, if
Williamson, under oath, “admit[s] that he attended Duke while in violation
of NCAA rules or . . . that Duke somehow broke NCAA” recruitment
policies, this lawsuit may invite unwelcomed NCAA attention.285
The allegation that Williamson received improper benefits during his
college career at Duke University, a detail that conveniently never surfaced
while Ford remained under his employment, would effectively take
Williamson out of amateur status during his time at Duke and possibly bring
sanctions against the entire men’s basketball team.286 Unless the case settles
out of court, these accusations could trigger investigations into Zion
Williamson’s entire college career, from recruitment to the 2019 NBA
Draft.287 It appears that anytime a sports contract involving a lucrative
prospect goes awry, the disgruntled party always points to the NCAA’s
amateurism model, hoping to push the prospect into settling the charges
rather than fighting it out in court, revealing his or her violations.288 As the
details of this case continue to unfold, one thing is sure: If the NCAA did
not have a hard and fast rule prohibiting compensation, Zion Williamson—
along with student-athletes, past and present—would not face such legal
pressures, tantamount to extortion.289
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COMMERCIALIZATION IN COLLEGE SPORTS

Considering the college sports payout controversy, it begs the
question: who cares?290 Who cares if Deandre Ayton was paid a hundred
thousand dollars to attend Arizona University?291 He was still the number
one pick of the 2018 NBA draft.292 Who cares if Reggie Bush accepted
benefits to play for the University of Southern California?293 He was still
good enough to win the Heisman Trophy.294 Who cares if Zion Williamson
allegedly accepted benefits to play for Duke?295 He is still arguably the best
basketball prospect since LeBron James.296 Those who care are the NCAA,
the schools, and the coaches who make tons of money and have almost zero
incentive to change the system.297 Nearly every party involved in college
sports, except the student-athletes, makes money off the enterprise.298
A.

Illegal Payout Dwarfed by Player’s Value

Reggie Bush played football at USC for years before it was
discovered his family had accepted money for his commitment to the
team.299 During his college career, he earned the Heisman Trophy and he
helped his team achieve several victories.300 The illegal money did not make
Bush a better football player, but his commitment made USC a better
football team and, in return, solidified a devout fan base.301 While the
sanction against the university sought to deter schools from engaging in
unethical recruitment practices in the future, Reggie Bush was merely
punished for knowing his worth, and the NCAA may have devalued his
professional potential.302 Bush was the second overall pick of the 2006 NFL
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Draft.303 He entered the pros projected to be the NFL’s next big star.304
There were high expectations set for Reggie Bush.305 However, the
devastating news of his college exploits disappointed his fans; eventually, his
professional performance grew inconsistent, and ultimately, everyone just
moved on.306 The all-American running back retired in 2017 and ironically
works for the NCAA, now as a broadcaster.307
Another example is Zion Williamson.308 Williamson is a moneymaking machine.309 When the Blue Devils hit the road for the 2019
basketball season, Duke ticket prices soared.310 The so-called “Zion Effect”
took hold, and sales skyrocketed.311 Thanks to Williamson, ticket prices
were up an average of 178% for online ticket retailers when Duke was the
visiting team.312 Capturing an audience of Lebron James, Jay-Z, and former
president Barack Obama, fans traveled from far and wide to watch Duke
University, i.e., Zion Williamson.313 Despite his fandom, Williamson never
saw a dime.314 He did go on to be the number one pick of the 2019 NBA
Draft and today plays for the New Orleans Pelicans.315 However, for as long
303.
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304.
Id.
305.
Id.
306.
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307.
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as Williamson wore his Duke uniform, he remained the NCAA’s commercial
property.316 Williamson is currently in a legal battle between former
marketing agent Prime Sports Marketing president Gina Ford.317 Ford
alleges Williamson breached their contract, claiming that he fired the agency
without cause and accepted improper benefits—of about four-hundred
thousand dollars—when he played for Duke University.318 Perhaps Ford’s
damages are calculated with all of Williamson’s potential in mind—no one
quite knows market value like a marketing agent.319 What is more insightful
is Ford’s specific request for one-hundred million dollars, demonstrating just
where college sports valued Williamson’s talent; losing him as a client cost
her big money.320 Inspiring a bigger question: what is amateur about a
hundred million dollars?321
B.

Plenty of Money to Spare

If the purpose of amateurism is to play for the love of the game, the
amount of money the NCAA churns out each year threatens this resolve.322
The propagation of corporate sponsorships and marketing agents has heavily
commercialized the industry, moving it away from pure gameplay to games
that pay.323 Today, corporations are intimately involved in promoting major
college sporting events.324 Companies pay various universities, conferences,
and tournaments in exchange for advertising space to market their
products.325 NCAA member schools sell student-athlete jerseys and other
merchandise bearing a favorite name or team number, generating billions in
revenue.326
Nevertheless, student-athletes are not welcome to enjoy the
proceeds.327 They are consequently barred from earning compensation—
despite contributing their name and talent—for fear pay-for-play profits will
316.
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317.
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“tarnish the integrity” of college sports and ruin amateurism as we know
it.328 With so much money to be made, it’s no wonder student-athletes are
dazzled by illegal signing bonuses and lucrative side deals.329
The commercialization of college sports has threatened the NCAA’s
amateurism model for nearly a century.330 In 1929, the Carnegie Foundation
for the Advancement of Education warned, “[c]ommercialism in college
athletics must be diminished and college sport must rise to a point where it is
esteemed primarily and sincerely for the opportunities it affords to mature
youth.”331 Despite the warning, the NCAA continued to further its
commercial enterprise.332 In 2010 the organization secured a ten billion
dollar contract with CBS and Turner Sports—later renewed until 2032—
turning over the broadcasting rights to the March Madness tournaments.333
The NCAA reportedly uses the revenue generated from selling the
broadcasting rights to support its internal operations and administrative
costs.334 According to Kantar Media, March Madness competes with the big
leagues in terms of commercial expenditures.335 The 2018 basketball
tournament attracted more than one billion dollars in T.V. ad spending,
leaving the NBA and MLB playoffs in the dust—further blurring the lines
In fact, men’s college
between professionalism and amateurism.336
basketball is one of the largest sources of NCAA revenue.337 In 2019, the
must-see basketball phenom Zion Williamson took college basketball by
storm.338 According to those in the industry, “if March Madness ha[d] a
face, it belong[ed] to Williamson.”339 CBS sponsored a “Zion Cam” to
exclusively feature the basketball star.340 This type of “single player focus
[was] the first of its kind” and was aimed squarely at exploiting the young
athlete’s mass popularity.341
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In terms of university profits, former Ohio State quarterback Cardale
Jones knows firsthand what it is like to have fans sport his college jersey
number.342 In 2014, Jones debuted in the Big Ten championship, where he
led the Buckeyes to a victory against the Wisconsin Badgers.343 The next
time Jones hit the field, the Buckeyes defeated the number one ranked
Alabama Crimson Tide in the Allstate Sugar Bowl, advancing to the College
Football Playoff National Championship.344 During the championship game,
Jones once again led his team to victory.345 After capturing the national title,
Jones’ popularity grew among fans and peers.346 It was not long before he
saw another classmate wearing a replica of his number twelve jersey.347
Jones told Forbes Magazine that he was flattered, but began to see his role as
a student-athlete “differently.”348 Jones began to realize how much money
the university was making off its football program, while Jones and the
players who helped make the program saw nothing.349 Jones stated, “‘[y]ou
look back and you start to realize what kind of money you were bringing in .
. . look at the size of the stadium [where] people [were] paying top dollar to
come [and] see these kids play.’”350 Jones is among those who support
compensating student-athletes, stating “‘I [do not] think [it is] something you
grasp until you realize how important you were to that team and that
university.’”351 Today, the commercialization of college sports is at an alltime high, and prominent universities continue to sell merchandise marketing
wildly popular athletes.352 Not to worry, student-athletes are still labeled as
“amateurs” despite the flood of income flowing all around them.353 Because
athletes like Williamson and Jones “generate interest among fans who
[would not] necessarily engage [in college sports], it opens . . . the NCAA
market to . . . larger audience[s].”354 “In turn, the more interest that these
athletes produce, the more the NCAA and [the] universities . . . benefit—
342.
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both in terms of marketability and in the money fans [are willing to] pay
either for tickets or merchandise.”355
The college sports industry generates nearly sixty billion dollars in
revenue.356 It affords its coaches’ multimillion-dollar salaries, yet the
antiquated rules governing compensation continue to exclude studentathletes from getting a piece of the pie when they are the core of the NCAA’s
business model.357 With the proliferation of collegiate sporting events, major
NCAA teams have become exceedingly commercial and decidedly, no
longer amateur.358 However, change is on the horizon as several states have
independently addressed the inequities in college sports, starting with
compensation for an athlete’s name, image, and likeness (“NIL”)
accompanied by the introduction of federal legislation.359 Although “[t]he
NCAA has dominated college sports for the last century,” it is aware that
changes are necessary to adapt to the shifting climate.360
V.

GAME CHANGING LEGISLATION

“The NCAA had [its] chance to get . . . in front of [the NIL] issue”
decades ago, to take control of the narrative and allow student-athletes “to
earn what the market [would] pay them.”361 With the passage of state laws
and proposed federal legislation threatening to seize control over NIL—and
perhaps broader compensation issues—the NCAA endeavored to modernize
its enduring internal prohibitions on athlete compensation.362 In early 2020,
the NCAA pled Congress to pass federal legislation that would preempt
pending state law and codify the restrictions paramount to preserving its
amateurism model.363 In fact, the NCAA has launched an extensive lobbying
campaign to convince Congress to roll back certain rights making its way to
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athletes in critical states.364 The NCAA claims governing college sports with
a patchwork of state law would be impossible.365 The organization has also
challenged the integrity of those laws—like the one passed in California last
September—arguing that lack uniformity would burden interstate commerce
and violate the United States Constitution.366 Ramogi Huma, president of the
National Collegiate Players Association, noted several reasons why
compliance with the different state laws would not affect the NCAA’s ability
to conduct business.367 However, the NCAA has recently decided to support
some of its member schools that chose to resume sport activities sooner than
others based on how the individual states chose to lift coronavirus related
restrictions.368 According to the NCAA, whether college sports will return in
2020 is a decision left to the individual states and universities.369
“Businesses navigate different jurisdictional laws all the time,” and the
NCAA is not “above the law.”370
Since April 2019, the NCAA has started engaging in open discourse
to support NIL compensation efforts.371 The caveat being that there will be
some restrictions, or “guardrails,” to distinguish college sports from
professional sports.372 The NCAA assembled an NIL Committee “to
examine the feasibility of NIL payments to student-athletes . . . .”373 The
NIL Committee presented an interim report to the NCAA Board of
Governors, which was unanimously adopted, stating that, “it is the policy of
the Association that NCAA member schools may permit students
participating in athletics the opportunity to benefit from the use of their
name, image, and/or likeness in a manner consistent with the values and
364.
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beliefs of intercollegiate athletics.”374 However, it is not clear how NIL
payments may be “consistent with the values and beliefs of intercollegiate
athletics” since the NCAA has fought hard to convince courts of just the
opposite.375 Instead, the NCAA’s three Divisions are charged with sorting
out the details by January 2021.376 Each Division is tasked with ensuring
NIL payments remain consistent with the NCAA’s concept of amateurism by
only permitting benefits “tethered to education.”377 The report further
acknowledged the patchwork of legislation determined to upend its internal
reform:
The current state and federal legislative efforts are in
conflict with NCAA values and principles and fail to differentiate
the NCAA intercollegiate athletic experience from those of
professional athletes. These efforts also undermine the legal
precedent that the [Supreme Court of the United States] and other
courts have afforded the NCAA to regulate intercollegiate athletics
at a national level. What we are proposing within this document is
a framework by which all student-athletes in all sports across all
three divisions have the opportunity to engage in name, image, and
likeness activities without eroding the priorities of education and
the collegiate experience.378

“While the NCAA may desire to develop [an] NIL rule[]” that
preserves its amateurism model, the deference it was once afforded by courts
and the general public has eroded.379 Until the “NIL policy is released . . .
[for] its 2021 implementation,” there is no way of knowing how free studentathletes will be to capitalize on their own identities.380 To ensure its internal
reforms address the core of state concern, the NCAA needs to remain aware
of the underlying reasons that inspired such legislation.381 States may find
that the NCAA’s proposed changes are insufficient, prompting them to
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pursue further legislation to protect athletes from—what the states may
consider—“exploitation.”382
A.

Proposed Federal Legislation

The fear of patchy state governance appears unlikely as House
Republicans and Democrats come together to overhaul longstanding NCAA
rules.383 While federal law would take precedence, the need to move quickly
cannot be understated.384 There is already one federal bill relating to NIL
rights working its way through Washington.385 In March 2019, U.S.
Representative Mark Walker of North Carolina introduced the StudentAthlete Equity Act, a bi-partisan cosponsored Bill that would create a
uniform payment directive for college athletes.386 The Student-Athlete
Equity Act is designed to “amend the definition of a qualified amateur sports
organization in the tax code,” removing the restriction on student-athlete
compensation for their “name, image, and likeness—forcing the . . . NCAA
to change its current model.”387 Walker believes “[s]igning on with a
university, if you’re a student-athlete, should not be a moratorium on your
rights as an individual.”388 According to Walker, “[t]his is the time and the
moment to be able to push back and defend the rights of these young
adults.”389 The Student-Athlete Equity Act explicitly “proposes that the
Internal Revenue Code of 1986 be amended to condition the NCAA’s status
as a non-profit” organization, on whether student-athletes are permitted to

382.
Id.
383.
Alex Daugherty & Brian Murphy, Marco Rubio Leads Senate Effort to
Compensate
College
Athletes,
TAMPA
BAY
TIMES
(Nov.
8,
2019),
http://www.tampabay.com/florida-politics/buzz/2019/11/09/marco-rubio-leads-charge-tocompensate-college-athletes/.
384.
Dan Murphy, Congressman to Propose Federal Legislation for Paying
College
Athletes,
ESPN
(Oct.
2,
2019),
http://www.espn.com/collegesports/story/_/id/27751454/congressman-propose-federal-legislation-paying-college-athletes.
385.
Id.
386.
Student-Athlete Equity Act, H.R. 1804, 116th Cong. § 2 (1st Sess. 2019);
Press Release, Mark Walker, Congressman, Walker Introduces Student-Athlete Equity Act to
End NCAA Restrictions on Player’s Publicity Rights (Mar. 14, 2019),
http://walker.house.gov/media-center/press-releases/walker-introduces-student-athlete-equityact-end-ncaa-restrictions [hereinafter Walker SAEA]; see also Peterfy & Carron, supra note
183, at 69.
387.
Walker SAEA, supra note 386.
388.
Brian Murphy, NCAA Must Allow Players to Profit from Name and
Image, NC Republican’s New Bill Says, NEWS & OBSERVER: SPORTS (Mar. 7, 2019, 3:45 PM),
http://www.newsobserver.com/sports/article227181209.html; Walker SAEA, supra note 386.
389.
Murphy, supra note 388.
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receive payments for their name, image, and likeness.390 The Act “would
force the NCAA to choose whether to keep [its] tax-exempt status or . . .
alter its definition of amateurism to allow student-athletes to arrange
financial agreements” for themselves.391 Furthermore, the Student-Athlete
Equity Act does not require universities to compensate their athletes; it
grants students the ability to solicit and be bound by contracts.392
Opponents of the Act argue that the NCAA already compensates its
student-athletes through educational scholarships, “where they get to attend
college for free.”393 Mark Emmert, NCAA president, pointed out that
student-athletes are at the heart of intercollegiate athletics, but they are
students first.394 Their scholarships, in addition to “free room and board, are
payment enough.”395 Emmert implored that if payment is what the people
want from college sports, “it’s not collegiate athletics anymore, [i]t’s
professional athletics.”396 However, the Student-Athlete Equity Act has
attracted the attention of two bipartisan cosponsors: Republican John
Ratcliffe of Texas and Democrat Cedric Richmond of Louisiana.397 In
theory, it should gain more momentum as it makes its way through the
House Ways and Means Committee because it tends to jibe with Democrats’
desire to provide a living wage to Americans and Republicans’ stark
opposition to “crony capitalism.”398 Consequently, the Student-Athlete
Equity Act has inspired further discourse regarding federal legislation on the
topic of NIL.399 U.S. Representative Anthony Gonzalez—former Ohio State
receiver—intends to introduce a bill that would allow student-athletes to
make endorsement money while protecting them from those he described as
bad actors.400
Similarly, senators have even introduced NIL bills to the U.S.
401
On June 18, 2020, Marco Rubio presented the Fairness in
Senate.

390.
Michael McCann, California’s New Law Worries the NCAA, but a
Federal Law is What They Should Fear, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED: NCAAF (Oct. 4, 2019),
http://www.si.com/.amp/college/2019/10/04/ncaa-fair-pay-to-play-act-name-likeness-imagelaws.
391.
Kurrass, supra note 366, at 324.
392.
Id.
393.
H.R. 1804: Student-Athlete Equity Act, supra note 15.
394.
See id.
395.
Id.
396.
Id.
397.
Id.
398.
H.R. 1804: Student-Athlete Equity Act, supra note 15.
399.
See McCann, supra note 390; Smith, supra note 14.
400.
Murphy, supra note 110.
401.
Daugherty & Murphy, supra note 383; Ralph D. Russo, Florida Sen.
Rubio Introduces NIL Bill to Push NCAA Changes, STAR TRIB. (June 18, 2020, 3:50 PM),
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Collegiate Athletics Act, requiring the NCAA to establish rules and policies
no later than June 30, 2021, permitting student-athletes to earn compensation
for their name, image, and likeness.402 The Bill gives the Federal Trade
Commission (“FTC”) the authority to enforce the law, and if the NCAA does
not meet the June deadline, the FTC could impose financial penalties.403
Most notably, the Act carves out protections for the NCAA and its member
schools, shielding against future antitrust or NIL litigation.404 The Act also
prohibits any state from adopting or effectuating “law[s] related to
‘permitting or prohibiting’ student athletes from receiving compensation
from the use of their [name, image, and likeness,]” effectively preempting
states who have already taken action.405 “The Fairness in Collegiate
Athletics Act is an effort to ensure the NCAA implements policies for NIL
and even the playing field.”406 Rubio’s Bill has received attention and
support from several conferences including the Atlantic Coast Conference
(“ACC”), the Southeastern Conference (“SEC”), and the Big 12.407
Meanwhile, Ramogi Huma, executive director of the National College
Players Association, stated that Rubio’s Bill “undermines economic freedom,
states’ rights, and gives the NCAA immunity for illegal activities. We
encourage him to change course on this issue.”408
B.

Passed State Legislation

“California was the first state to take action on the [NIL] issue.”409
In September 2019, Governor Gavin Newsom signed a Bill permitting
“California athletes to earn money from . . . their names, images and
http://www.startribune.com/florida-sen-rubio-introduces-nil-bill-to-push-ncaachanges/571346832/.
402.
Fairness in Collegiate Athletics Act, S. 4004, 116th Cong. (2020); Rudy
Hill & Jonathan D. Wohlwend, Florida Law Will Allow College Athletes to Profit from Name,
Image, and Likeness Starting Summer 2021, BRADLEY (June 25, 2020),
http://www.bradley.com/insights/publications/2020/06/florida-law-will-allow-collegeathletes-to-profit-from-name-image-and-likeness-starting-summer-2021; Russo, supra note
401; see also Smith, supra note 14. At the time of writing this article the Bill remains in
session. See S. 4004.
403.
Russo, supra note 401.
404.
Hill & Wohlwend, supra note 402.
405.
Id.
406.
Press Release, Marco Rubio, U.S. Senator for Fla., Rubio Introduces
Legislation to Address Name, Image, Likeness in College Sports (June 18, 2020),
http://www.rubio.senate.gov/public/index.cfm/2020/6/rubio-introduces-legislation-to-addressname-image-likeness-in-college-sports [hereinafter Senate NIL Bill].
407.
Id.; Russo, supra note 401.
408.
Russo, supra note 401.
409.
Peterfy & Carron, supra note 183, at 69; see also Wells, supra note 14.
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likenesses, despite warnings from the [NCAA] that the measure would upend
amateur sports.”410 California’s Fair Pay to Play Act, introduced by Senator
Nancy Skinner, captured a national audience—to include NBA stars LeBron
James and Draymond Green—all applauding California’s “effort to give
college athletes a share of the windfall they help [earn] for their universities
and [the] NCAA.”411 The Act is set to take effect in 2023.412
“The Fair Pay to Play Act . . . allow[s] college athletes in California
to sign endorsement deals; earn compensation based on the usage of their
name, image, and likeness; and sign all types of licensing contracts that
would allow them to earn money.”413 The Act also prohibits the NCAA from
penalizing a university for complying with California law.414 “‘This is the
beginning of the end of the second class citizenship NCAA sports imposes
on college athletes,’ said [Ramogi] Huma, whose group advocates for
college sports reform.”415 Ramogi Huma added that “‘[c]ollege athletes
deserve the same economic rights and freedoms afforded to other students
and citizens.’”416 One of the most vocal opponents of the California law,
former University of Florida quarterback, Tim Tebow, said allowing pay-forplay would make college athletics—much like his own professional career—
ordinary.417 Tebow stated, “I know we live in a selfish culture where it’s all
about us, but we’re just adding and piling it on to that, where it changes
what’s special about college football.”418
In contrast, Ed O’Bannon, the former lead plaintiff in a class-action
antitrust lawsuit against the NCAA, supports California’s new law.419 In an
interview with CNN, O’Bannon stated, “California[] [is] in a really good
position . . . . They are changing the game. And from where we sit, we’re
410.
Melody Gutierrez & Nathan Fenno, California Will Allow College
Athletes to Profit from Endorsements Under Bill Signed by Newsom, NAT’L COLL. PLAYERS
ASS’N (Sept. 30, 2019, 8:31 AM), http://www.ncpanow.org/news/articles/california-willallow-college-athletes-to-profit-from-endorsements-under-bill-signed-by-newsom.
411.
Id.
412.
Id.; Negley, supra note 364.
413.
Harmeet Kaur, Former College Basketball Star Who Sued the NCAA Says
California’s Fair Pay Bill is ‘Changing the Game’, CNN: US (Sept. 14, 2019, 1:19 PM),
http://www.cnn.com/2019/09/14/us/ed-obannon-ncaa-california-bill-trnd/index.html; see also
Kurrass, supra note 366, at 324.
414.
Gutierrez & Fenno, supra note 410.
415.
Id.
416.
Id.
417.
Kaur, supra note 413; see also Jenna West, Tim Tebow on Fair Pay to
Play Act: ‘It Changes What’s Special About College Football’, SPORTS ILLUSTRATED (Sept.
13,
2019),
http://www.si.com/college/2019/09/13/tim-tebow-fair-pay-play-act-playingcollege-players-video.
418.
Kaur, supra note 413.
419.
Id.
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extremely excited about it.”420 In response to California’s positive attention,
the College Players Association is now calling on other states to do the
same.421
While California leads the country in passing NIL legislation,
Florida takes the crown as the first state to have a NIL bill to go into
effect.422 On July 12, 2020, Florida Governor Ron DeSantis signed the
Intercollegiate Athlete Compensation and Rights Bill, permitting studentathletes to profit from their name, image, and likeness beginning as early as
July 2021.423 Florida’s law is substantially similar to the law passed in
California, except it takes effect much sooner.424
Florida’s law includes [additional] restrictions, such as . . .
payments to athletes must be “commensurate with market value” . .
. to “preserve the integrity, quality, character, and amateur nature
of intercollegiate athletics and to maintain a clear separation
between amateur intercollegiate athletics and professional sports.”
The law also states explicitly that colleges and universities are not
allowed to pay athletes directly.425

State Representative Chip LaMarca, who was instrumental in crafting
Florida’s NIL bill, stated, “[f]or far too long, the collegiate athletic system
professionalized [every aspect of] athletics except for the young women and
men who put in all the hard work. Today, we changed that.”426 LaMarca
states that he is not concerned “with any legal challenges the NCAA might
mount in the future.”427 Both LaMarca and DeSantis say they see Florida’s
new law as a win for college athletes.428 Nonetheless, whether state law will
level the playing field for college athletes remains to be seen.429

420.
421.
422.
423.
424.

Id.
Gutierrez & Fenno, supra note 410.
Wells, supra note 14.
Id.; FLA. STAT. § 1006.74 (2020).
Compare FLA. STAT § 1006.74, with CAL. EDUC. CODE § 67456 (West

2020).

425.
Murphy, supra note 110.
426.
Florida Governor Signs Bill Allowing College Athlete NIL Pay!, supra
note 359; Murphy, supra note 110.
427.
Murphy, supra note 110.
428.
Id.
429.
See id.
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CONCLUSION

The NCAA’s hard-pressed infrastructure has slowly dissolved since
O’Bannon, as its rules have grown inconsistent with its amateur model.430
Now that Florida’s law is official, time is of the essence.431 The NCAA has
less than a year to make internal reforms or risk losing control over NIL.432
While the NCAA prefers federal intervention on the issue of NIL, such
oversight brings bureaucracy.433 Admittedly, a regulatory structure is
necessary to ensure that an open market for NIL will not inhibit studentathletes from receiving an education.434 The urgency for a federal regulation
comes when “[Congress’s focus is] elsewhere because of the global
coronavirus pandemic.”435 Even if the House and Senate could pass
bipartisan reform, what matters is how useful its function will be in
preserving the NCAA professed amateur model while promoting financial
fairness in college sports.436 Until federal legislation is passed, states are free
to contemplate NIL legislation of their own, following Florida and
California.437

430.
431.
432.
433.
434.
435.
436.
437.

Doyel, supra note 361.
See Murphy, supra note 110.
Id.
Meyer & Zimbalist, supra note 51, at 303.
Id.
Murphy, supra note 110.
See Meyer & Zimbalist, supra note 51, at 303.
See FLA. STAT. § 1006.74 (2020); CAL. EDUC. CODE § 67456 (West 2020).
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INTRODUCTION

The United States has seen a dramatic shift in the attitudes toward
tobacco use over the past century through an improved understanding of the
vast health risks that tobacco products pose and an unsettling statistic:
Cigarettes are responsible for more than 480,000 preventable deaths per year
in the United States, and more than sixteen million Americans currently live
with a disease caused by smoking.1 However, as the use of cigarettes
continues to sharply decline throughout the United States, the use of
Electronic Nicotine Delivery Systems (“ENDS”)—also known as electronic
cigarettes, e-cigarettes, vaporizers, or vapes—has taken their place almost
overnight and has become a gripping epidemic targeted at the youth of the
Nation.2
Electronic cigarettes were first introduced into the United States in
2007 and have been advertised by large vaping and tobacco companies as an
alternative to cigarettes because of the potentially less harmful side effects.3
While preliminary evidence has suggested e-cigarettes play a role in helping
people who are already addicted to cigarettes wean off their use, like
tobacco-based cigarettes, electronic cigarettes are primarily nicotine delivery
devices that are extremely addictive, and like traditional cigarettes, the
product has been used to target the youth, and in turn, has potentially created
a new generation of life-long nicotine addicts.4 Through the use of enticing
liquid nicotine flavors such as chocolate, cookie dough, cotton candy,
mango, peanut butter, and banana split, to name a few, manufacturers have
successfully targeted middle school and high school students across the
United States; according to the Centers for Disease Control and Prevention
(“CDC”), high school student e-cigarette usage has increased by 78% since
2017, and 48% among middle schoolers.5
1.
Smoking & Tobacco Use: Fast Facts, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
PREVENTION, http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/data_statistics/fact_sheets/fast_facts/index.htm (last
updated May 21, 2020) [hereinafter Smoking & Tobacco Use].
2.
Clark et al., The Vaping Epidemic and Its Implications in Tobacco
Regulation, 13 INTERNET J.L. HEALTHCARE & ETHICS, no. 1, 2019, at 1, 1–2; Kate Keller, Ads
for E-Cigarettes Today Hearken Back to the Banned Tricks of Big Tobacco, SMITHSONIAN
MAG. (Apr. 11, 2018), http://www.smithsonianmag.com/history/electronic-cigarettesmillennial-appeal-ushers-next-generation-nicotine-addicts-180968747/.
3.
Morgan Johnson, Note, Regulatory Response to E-Cigarettes, 45 GA. J.
INT’L & COMP. L. 645, 648 (2017); Keller, supra note 2.
4.
See Keller, supra note 2.
5.
Matti Rose Vagnoni, The Vapes of Wrath: Why the FDA Should Ban
Fruity and Sweet Flavored E-Liquids to Preclude Adolescent Use of E-Cigarettes, 71 ADMIN.
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In 2009, President Barack Obama signed into law the Family
Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act (“Tobacco Control Act”).6
The Tobacco Control Act restricted the marketing of cigarettes and
smokeless tobacco products to children and provided the Food and Drug
Administration (“FDA”) the authority to regulate any products it deemed fell
under the definition of a tobacco product.7 In 2016, the FDA used its
deeming authority and issued a Final Rule that deemed electronic cigarettes,
among other products, a tobacco product and thus allowed the FDA to
regulate the manufacturing of these products, along with implementing rules
that would help combat the rising youth e-cigarette epidemic across the
United States.8
In 2020, amid the youth e-cigarette epidemic and the continued
rising popularity of these products among children, the Trump
Administration set a temporary ban on many candy and fruit-flavored ecigarettes.9 However, the new ban did not extend to menthol-flavored
cartridges or refillable, tank-based vaping systems purchased in most vape
shops, which users can fill with flavored e-liquid.10 These exceptions
represented a major retreat from an earlier White House plan to bar all
flavors other than tobacco.11
This Comment will discuss the rise of electronic cigarettes in the
United States and the political roadblocks that have made it virtually
L. REV. 277, 277 (2019); 2018 NYTS Data: A Startling Rise in Youth E-Cigarette Use, FDA,
http://www.fda.gov/tobacco-products/youth-and-tobacco/2018-nyts-data-startling-rise-youthe-cigarette-use (last visited May 12, 2021) [hereinafter A Startling Rise in Youth E-Cigarette
Use].
6.
TOBACCO CONTROL LEGAL CONSORTIUM, FEDERAL REGULATION OF
TOBACCO: A SUMMARY 1 (2009) [hereinafter A SUMMARY OF THE FEDERAL REGULATION OF
TOBACCO]; Family Smoking Prevention & Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31, 123
Stat. 1776 (2009).
7.
Family Smoking Prevention & Tobacco Control Act - An Overview, FDA,
http://www.fda.gov/tobacco-products/rules-regulations-and-guidance/family-smokingprevention-and-tobacco-control-act-overview (last updated June 3, 2020).
8.
Deeming Tobacco Products to Be Subject to the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act; Restrictions on the Sale and Distribution of Tobacco Products and Required
Warning Statements for Tobacco Products, 81 Fed. Reg. 28,974, 28,974 (May 10, 2016) (to be
codified at 21 C.F.R. pt. 1100, 1140, 1143) [hereinafter Final Rule].
9.
Allison Aubrey, Trump Administration Issues Partial and Temporary ECigarette
Ban,
NPR
(Jan.
2,
2020,
4:10
PM),
http://www.npr.org/2020/01/02/793134344/trump-administration-issues-partial-andtemporary-e-cigarette-ban.
10.
Trump Administration to Ban Most E-Cigarette Flavors, but not Tank4:
INDIANAPOLIS
(Jan.
2,
2020,
1:55
PM),
Based
Products,
CBS
http://cbs4indy.com/news/national-world/trump-administration-plans-to-ban-most-e-cigaretteflavors/.
11.
Id.
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impossible to permanently ban all electronic cigarette flavors, despite an
overwhelming amount of research from the FDA that reveals electronic
cigarette flavors are one of the main reasons children begin using the
products and continue to use the products.12 First, this Comment will explore
how combustible cigarettes first became popular in the United States and
discuss how various litigation efforts and laws were set in place in the late
twentieth century in order to dismantle the large tobacco companies that cost
millions of lives.13 Second, this Comment will discuss the emergence of
electronic cigarettes in the United States and analyze how this relatively new
tobacco product used decades-old tobacco company tactics in order to create
the current epidemic of nicotine youth addiction that continues to grow at an
unprecedented level.14 Third, this Comment will explain the current laws
and regulations placed on electronic cigarettes and how large vaping
companies have managed to find various loopholes in the current laws set
into place.15 Lastly, this Comment will discuss how both President Barack
Obama and President Donald Trump allowed lobbying and politics to
prevent the permanent ban of all flavored electronic cigarettes.16
II.

THE RISE AND FALL OF CIGARETTES IN THE UNITED STATES

The rise of cigarettes in the United States can be attributed to the
significant lack of federal regulation throughout many decades, aggressive
and misleading advertising by large tobacco companies, and the lack of
longitudinal studies that effectively stated the health consequences of

12.
See Press Release, Matthew L. Myers, President, Campaign for TobaccoFree Kids, Obama Administration Takes First Step to Protect Kids from E-Cigarettes, Cigars,
But Must Do More to Stop Kid Friendly Flavors in E-Cigarettes (May 5, 2016),
http://www.tobaccofreekids.org/press-releases/2016_05_05_ecig
[hereinafter
Obama
Administration Takes First Step to Protect Kids From E-Cigarettes]; discussion infra Part V.
13.
See PUB. HEALTH L. CTR., THE MASTER SETTLEMENT AGREEMENT: AN
OVERVIEW 1–2 (2019); discussion infra Part II.
14.
See Keller, supra note 2; discussion infra Part III.
15.
Sheila Kaplan, Savvy Teens Find Loophole in Vaping Ban and Dive
Through for Flavors, N.Y. TIMES, Feb. 1, 2020, at A21; see also discussion infra Part IV.
16.
See Desmond Jenson & Joelle Lester, FDA Overruled by White House on
Removing Flavored Cigars and E-Cigarette Liquids from the Market, PUB. HEALTH L. CTR.
(June 2, 2016), http://www.publichealthlawcenter.org/blogs/2016-06-02/fda-overruled-whitehouse-removing-flavored-cigars-and-e-cigarette-liquids-market; Press Release, Harold
Wimmer, President & CEO, Am. Lung Ass’n, American Lung Association Disappointed by
Reports of Forthcoming White House Announcement to Allow Flavored E-Cigarettes to
Remain on Market (Jan. 1, 2020), http://www.lung.org/media/press-releases/reported-federalguidance-flavored-ecigs; discussion infra Part V.
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smoking.17 While cigarette smoking was thought to be socially acceptable
and relatively harmless for most of the twentieth century, this outlook took a
swift turnaround when thousands of reports were released in 1964 that
revealed this habit directly attributed to disease and death and thus, began the
slow decline of the use of tobacco cigarettes in the United States.18
A.

Rising Up Through Advertisements

In the early part of the twentieth century, cigarette smoking in the
United States grew rapidly following the invention of the automatic cigarette
rolling machine and through the use of an unprecedented amount of
advertising.19 By the early 1950s, forty-seven percent of American adults
and half of all physicians were smoking cigarettes.20 While large tobacco
industries, such as Marlboro and Camel, appealed to women and men alike
by marketing cigarettes as highly desirable and socially acceptable through
the use of celebrity spokespeople, glamorous women, rugged men, and
sponsorship through both sports and music festivals21—released internal
documents give conclusive evidence that it was, in fact, children who were
the main targets of tobacco industries.22 The tobacco industry was well
aware that nearly nine out of ten daily cigarette smokers try their first
cigarette by the age of eighteen.23 In fact, released documents reveal that the
tobacco industry “[e]xamined [children] as young as five” in order to
successfully market to them, as one executive was quoted saying, “they got
lips? we want them” and also “[l]ooked at ways of preventing teenagers from
quitting.”24
During the 1940s and 1950s, as anti-smoking studies began to
emerge throughout the United States, large tobacco industries, in turn, began
17.
See
A
Brief
History
of
Tobacco,
CNN,
http://edition.cnn.com/US/9705/tobacco/history/ (last visited May 12, 2021).
18.
See U.S. DEP’T OF HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., THE HEALTH CONSEQUENCES
OF SMOKING — 50 YEARS OF PROGRESS: A REPORT OF THE SURGEON GENERAL iii (2014)
[hereinafter 2014 Surgeon General’s Report].
19.
K. Michael Cummings & Robert N. Proctor, The Changing Public Image
of Smoking in the United States: 1964–2014, 23 AM. ASS’N CANCER RES. 32, 32 (2014).
20.
Id.
21.
7 Ways E-Cigarette Companies Are Copying Big Tobacco’s Playbook,
CAMPAIGN
FOR
TOBACCO-FREE
KIDS
(Oct.
02,
2013),
http://www.tobaccofreekids.org/blog/2013_10_02_ecigarettes.
22.
See CLIVE BATES & ANDY ROWELL, TOBACCO EXPLAINED THE TRUTH
ABOUT THE TOBACCO INDUSTRY . . . IN ITS OWN WORDS, 32–33 (1999).
23.
Youth & Tobacco Use, CTR. FOR DISEASE CONTROL & PREVENTION,
http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/data_statistics/fact_sheets/youth_data/tobacco_use/index.htm
(last updated Dec. 16, 2020).
24.
BATES & ROWELL, supra note 22, at 24.
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financing their own research in order to question the validity of the antismoking studies results that indicated “the product was a gateway to serious
health problems.”25 What is even more troubling is the fact that in 1962, a
research chemist employed by R.J. Reynolds, the second-largest tobacco
company in the United States, wrote that he and many members of the
research department at R.J. Reynolds were intensely concerned about the
cigarette smoke health problem in the United States—stating that while the
company is publicly denying a link between smoking and cancer, the
company’s research revealed that there was a clear link between the two.26
B.

A Shift in the Public Perspective

A scientist at the British American Tobacco Company (“BAT”) once
said, “[a] demand for scientific proof is always a formula for inaction and
delay and usually the first reaction of the guilty . . . in fact, scientific proof
has never been, is not and should not be the basis for political and legal
action” (S.J. Green, 1980).27 “During the first decades of the twentieth
century, lung cancer was [relatively] rare.”28 However, as cigarette smoking
became increasingly popular, the incidence of lung cancer quickly became an
epidemic.29 As extensive scientific research began to publish information
that shed light on the dangers of smoking, the tobacco industry no longer
rejected that there was a link between cigarettes and cancer—they simply
argued that there was inconclusive evidence about the dangers of smoking
and thus, were unable to reach a “definitive conclusion” during that time.30
While the Federal Trade Commission (“FTC”) was in charge of overseeing
unfair trade practices in the tobacco industry, the tobacco industry went
largely unregulated for most of the twentieth century.31
However, the United States saw a significant shift in the public
attitudes towards cigarettes in 1964 due to the Surgeon General releasing the
first report on the health consequences of smoking.32 “The report reviewed
more than 7000 research articles related to smoking and disease,” and
25.
John D. Blum, Tobacco Product Warnings in the Mist of
Vaping: A Retrospective on the Public Health Cigarette Smoking Act, 23 CHAP. L.
REV., 53, 58 (2020).
26.
BATES & ROWELL, supra note 22, at 6.
27.
Id. at 1.
28.
CDC, Tobacco Use — United States, 1900–1999, 48 MORBIDITY
& MORTALITY WKLY. REP. 985, 986 (1999) [hereinafter Morbidity & Mortality
Weekly Report].
29.
Id.
30.
Blum, supra note 25, at 58.
31.
Id. at 58–59.
32.
2014 Surgeon General’s Report, supra note 18, at iii.
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“concluded that smoking was associated with . . . lung cancer and laryngeal
cancer in men, was a probable cause of lung cancer in women, and was the . .
. [leading] cause of bronchitis” in the United States.33 As smoking slowly
declined after the release of the report, few could have anticipated the longterm impact it would have on the nation’s health.34
Following the Surgeon General’s 1964 report, the FTC issued a
proposed rule that would effectively mandate a prescribed warning
“prominently displayed” on all tobacco “advertisements and on every
cigarette pack . . . .”35 The tobacco industry fought back with an aggressive
lobbying effort on Capitol Hill, and despite there being strong support from
almost all public health groups on implementing this rule, the American
Medical Association (“AMA”)—due to political reasons—ordered that there
be more research before the adoption of these warnings come into effect.36
Despite the tobacco companies’ best efforts, in 1965, the Federal Cigarette
Labeling and Advertising Act (“FCLAA”) was enacted, which required
health warnings on cigarette packages for the first time.37 This legislation
required manufacturers, packagers, and importers to place health warning
labels on cigarette packages and advertisements, along with the submission
of FTC reports to Congress on the effectiveness of labeling.38 While the
FCLAA prompted Congress to keep consumers completely informed on the
health risks of tobacco use, the legislation did not regulate all types of
cigarette advertising—especially advertising that targeted the youth
population.39 In 1975, an internal document by R.J. Reynolds outlined its
primary marketing goals:
Increase our Young Adult Franchise: 14–24 age group in 1960
was 21% of the population; in 1975 will be 27%. As they mature,
they will account for key market share of cigarette volume for
next 25 years . . . We will direct advertising appeal to this young
adult group without alienating the brand’s current franchise.40

33.
Id. at 5.
34.
See id.
35.
Blum, supra note 25, at 60.
36.
Id.
37.
See Federal Cigarette Labeling and Advertising Act, Pub. L. No.
89-92, § 1, 79 Stat. 282, 282 (1965); TOBACCO CONTROL LEGAL CONSORTIUM, THE
FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION AND TOBACCO 1 (2012) [hereinafter THE FEDERAL
TRADE COMMISSION AND TOBACCO].
38.
See THE FEDERAL TRADE COMMISSION AND TOBACCO, supra
note 37, at 1–2; Lauren L. Greenberg, The “Deeming Rule”: The FDA’s
Destruction of the Vaping Industry, 83 BROOK. L. REV. 777, 780–81 (2018).
39.
Greenberg, supra note 38, at 780–81.
40.
BATES & ROWELL, supra note 22, at 28.
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It would take the United States another thirty-three years before
implementing any significant prohibitions and restrictions on tobacco
advertising, marketing, and promotional programs—a delay that would result
in a substantial amount of smoking-related illnesses, deaths, and the largest
civil litigation settlement in United States history.41
C.

The Master Settlement Agreement

By the 1990s, individual states across the United States began to sue
large tobacco companies in order to recover the insurmountable costs
incurred due to treating sick and dying cigarette smokers.42 Several studies
between 1976 and 1993 revealed that smoking accounted for more than fifty
billion dollars in Medicaid expenditures.43 As a result, in 1998 the four
largest cigarette companies at the time—R.J. Reynolds, Philip Morris,
Lorillard, and Brown & Williamson—entered into a settlement agreement
with forty-six states titled the Master Settlement Agreement (“MSA”)—the
largest civil litigation settlement in United States history.44 As outlined in
the MSA, the Settling States (as defined therein) released all Participating
Manufacturers (as defined therein) from past and future legal claims brought
by the states for any smoking-related illnesses and death, in exchange for
equitable relief.45 “[T]he Participating Manufacturers agreed to make annual
payments in perpetuity to the Settling States . . . .”46
The base amounts of these annual payments were designed to
steadily increase between the years 2000 and 2018; in 2018, the Participating
Manufacturers paid approximately $7.2 billion to the Settling States.47 In
addition to making annual payments, the Participating Manufacturers also
agreed to, among other items: (i) implement significant prohibitions and
restrictions on tobacco advertising, specifically marketing that directly and
indirectly targets the youth, (ii) stop suppressing health-related research, and
(iii) cease making misrepresentations about the health consequences that
arise due to smoking cigarettes.48
As stated in the MSA, the primary goal was to have the Settling
States use the annual payments to initiate programs that would decrease

41.
42.
43.
44.
45.
46.
47.
48.

See PUB. HEALTH L. CTR., supra note 13, at 1–2.
Id. at 1.
Id.
Id. at 1–2; Greenberg, supra note 38, at 781.
PUB. HEALTH L. CTR., supra note 13, at 2.
Id.; Greenberg, supra note 38, at 781.
PUB. HEALTH L. CTR., supra note 13, at 4.
Id. at 5.
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smoking among the youth and promote overall public health.49 However, the
final version of the Settlement Agreement left out any type of provision that
would require the Settling States to use the money in this intended form.50
Nevertheless, the Settling States would follow through with this intended
purpose and tackle the health crisis head on by initiating many youth
prevention programs and promote the public health, right?51
Between 1998 and 2017, the Settling States received over $126
billion in annual payments.52 However, less than one percent of these funds
went towards tobacco prevention programs.53 Instead, these funds were used
to cover yearly budget shortfalls and to address various programs unrelated
to tobacco prevention among the youth or any tobacco prevention program
for that matter.54 In fact, each year the Settling States have received their
annual payments, tobacco prevention programs received the smallest amount
of allocated funds.55 In 2017, seventeen states did not allocate any portion of
their annual payment to tobacco prevention or cessation programs.56 Even
worse, select Settling States have even gone as far as selling their annual
payments to various investors in exchange for a large upfront lump sum
payment rather than waiting each year for payments under the MSA.57 As a
result, these states will no longer receive annual payments from the tobacco
companies that entered into the MSA but are still prevented from engaging in
any future litigation against these companies—no matter how much
healthcare costs rise due to the use of their products.58
D.

Family Smoking Prevention and Tobacco Control Act

In order to bridge the gap in legislation following the MSA,
President Obama signed into law the 2009 Tobacco Control Act and gave the
FDA the authority to regulate the manufacture, distribution, and marketing of
all tobacco products.59 A large purpose—if not the main purpose—of the
Act was to finally put into place adequate and effective restrictions on
tobacco advertising and marketing that had been directly targeting minors
49.
Id. at 8.
50.
Id.
51.
See id. at 5, 8.
52.
PUB. HEALTH L. CTR., supra note 13, at 8.
53.
Id.
54.
Id.
55.
Id.
56.
Id.
57.
PUB. HEALTH L. CTR., supra note 13, at 9.
58.
See id. at 2, 10.
59.
Family Smoking Prevention & Tobacco Control Act - An Overview, supra
note 7; A SUMMARY OF THE FEDERAL REGULATION OF TOBACCO, supra note 6, at 1.
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since the beginning of the twentieth century.60 The Act vehemently asserts
that tobacco advertising and promotion plays a crucial role in adolescents
deciding to become first-time tobacco users and less restrictive approaches
have not, and will not, be effective or tolerated going forward.61 These
restrictions, it declares, will significantly reduce the number of minors using
and becoming addicted to these life-threatening products.62 “[The act] also
created a new FDA office, [called] the Center for Tobacco Products (“CTP”),
which would be completely funded by user fees from tobacco companies.”63
Under the Tobacco Control Act, when regulating and reviewing
products sold or distributed for the use to reduce risks or exposures
associated with tobacco products, the FDA will have the power to determine
whether manufacturers have adequately demonstrated that tobacco products
“meet a series of rigorous criteria, and [that the products] will benefit the
health of the population as a whole, taking into account both users of tobacco
products and persons who do not currently use tobacco products,” otherwise
known as premarket authorization.64
The Tobacco Control Act made a key compromise with tobacco
industries: Tobacco products that were on the market prior to the legislation
would fall under a grandfather clause and therefore would effectively not be
held to the same standard of scrutiny as new tobacco products entering the
market.65 Under the Tobacco Control Act, only new tobacco products are
required to go through premarket authorization.66 Therefore, any tobacco
product commercially marketed in the United States before February 15,
2007 is not required to undergo premarket authorization to be legally
marketed.67 The requirements and regulations under the Tobacco Control
Act applied to the following tobacco products: Cigarettes, cigarette tobacco,
smokeless tobacco, and roll-your own tobacco.68 It would take another nine
years before the law would extend the FDA’s authority to other types of

60.
Family Smoking Prevention & Tobacco Control Act, Pub. L. No. 111-31,
§ 2, 123 Stat. 1776, 1776–79 (2009).
61.
See id. § 2(31), at 1779.
62.
Id. § 2(14), at 1777.
63.
Jim McDonald, The Deeming Rule: A Brief History & Timeline of the
FDA’s
Vaping
Regulations,
VAPING360:
LEARN
(Feb.
11,
2019),
http://vaping360.com/learn/fda-deeming-regulations-timeline/.
64.
Family Smoking Prevention & Tobacco Control Act § 2(36), at 1779.
65.
Grandfathered Tobacco Products, FDA, http://www.fda.gov/tobaccoproducts/market-and-distribute-tobacco-product/grandfathered-tobacco-products (last updated
June 17, 2020).
66.
Id.
67.
Id.
68.
21 U.S.C. § 387a(b).

2021]

E-CIGARETTES AND GEN-Z

279

tobacco products such as e-cigarettes, hookah tobacco, cigars, cigarillos, and
pipe tobacco.69
III.

THE EMERGENCE OF ELECTRONIC CIGARETTES

In 1958, a scientist at Philip Morris, an American multinational
cigarette and tobacco manufacturing company, acknowledged the various
health problems associated with cigarette smoking and stated “[an] allsynthetic aerosol to replace tobacco smoke . . . I know this sounds like a wild
program[], but I’ll bet that the first company to produce a cigarette claiming
a substantial reduction in tars and nicotine . . . will take the market.”70 This
statement was most likely met with a few raised eyebrows and chuckles at
the time, however, in the year 2020—with electronic cigarettes being the
most popular tobacco product among the youth—this statement now reads as
an early foreshadowing of the grim reality we live in today as approximately
forty million people in the world use electronic cigarettes.71
A.

What are Electronic Cigarettes?

ENDS products were first introduced to the United States market in
2007.72 ENDS products represent the evolution of tobacco products in the
United States.73 These products were invented initially in 2003 by a Chinese
pharmacist, Hon Lik, who created the device in order to help him quit his
heavy cigarette smoking habit—a habit that also killed his father.74
Electronic Cigarettes are non-combustible devices that usually contain
nicotine—the addictive additive in traditional combustible cigarettes—and
comes in various shapes, sizes, and models.75 Ordinarily, electronic
69.
See Final Rule, 81 Fed. Reg. at 28974–75.
70.
BATES & ROWELL, supra note 22, at 54.
71.
E-Cigarettes: Effective Cessation Tool or New Gateway to Smoking
Tobacco?, UNION INT’L CANCER CONTROL (Oct. 9, 2019), http://www.uicc.org/news/ecigarettes-effective-cessation-tool-or-new-gateway-smoking-tobacco; see also U.S. DEP’T OF
HEALTH & HUM. SERVS., E-CIGARETTE USE AMONG YOUTH & YOUNG ADULTS: A REPORT OF
THE SURGEON GENERAL 5 (2016) [hereinafter E-CIGARETTE USE AMONG YOUTH & YOUNG
ADULTS].
72.
Vagnoni, supra note 5, at 277–78.
73.
E-CIGARETTE USE AMONG YOUTH & YOUNG ADULTS, supra note 71, at 6.
74.
Sarah Boseley, Hon Lik Invented the E-Cigarette to Quit Smoking — But
Now
He’s
a
Dual
User,
GUARDIAN:
NEWS
(June
9,
2015),
http://www.theguardian.com/society/2015/jun/09/hon-lik-e-cigarette-inventor-quit-smokingdual-user.
75.
About Electronic Cigarettes (E-Cigarettes), CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL
&
PREVENTION,
http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/basic_information/e-cigarettes/about-ecigarettes.html (last updated Feb. 24, 2020).
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cigarettes contain a battery, a heating element or an atomizer, and a reservoir
for holding liquid solution (“E-Liquid” or “E-Juice”) which contain varying
amounts of nicotine and flavorings.76
The device works by heating the liquid solution, which then
produces an aerosol through which users inhale through their lungs and then
exhale the aerosol into the air, creating a smoke-free vapor, where bystanders
can also breathe in this aerosol.77 Users will experience a rush of nicotine
similar to that of a traditional combustible cigarette.78 When electronic
cigarettes were first introduced into the United States market, the products
were designed to resemble traditional cigarettes (e.g., white body and brown
tip) and were closed-system devices, often referred to as the “cig-alike.”79
More recent generations of ENDS developed rapidly, reflecting an increase
in technology and a consumer demand to exercise more control over the
device.80 As noted, while electronic cigarettes were created as a way for
current smokers to stop smoking tobacco cigarettes, these devices—like
tobacco-based cigarettes—are primarily nicotine delivery devices and thus,
are highly addictive and dangerous devices.81
1.

E-Cigarette Market Players

ENDS products were originally sold exclusively by internet retailers,
but as popularity grew throughout the United States, the product quickly
expanded its market into kiosks at shopping malls and, more recently, to
independent “vape shops.”82 As the rapid evolution of both the e-cigarette
market and the industry itself has grown at an unprecedented level, large
tobacco companies such as Altria and R.J. Reynolds began investing in ecigarette technology in order to maintain revenue due to a steep decline in
cigarette sales.83 As of 2014, electronic cigarette use rapidly surpassed
conventional cigarette use amongst the youth, making e-cigarettes the most

76.
See id.
77.
Id.
78.
Johnson, supra note 3, at 647.
79.
Id.; William Tilburg et al., FDA Regulation of Electronic Nicotine
Delivery Systems and the “Deeming” Rule: What’s Left for States?, 20 J. HEALTH CARE L. &
POL’Y 27, 30 (2017).
80.
Tilburg et al., supra note 79, at 32.
81.
See Jennifer S. Bard, Introducing New Users to an Old Poison: The
Tobacco Industry’s Efforts to Thwart the FDA’s Regulation of E-Cigarettes, 8 ST. LOUIS U.J.
HEALTH L. & POL’Y 213, 217, 221 (2015).
82.
E-CIGARETTE USE AMONG YOUTH & YOUNG ADULTS, supra note 71, at
149.
83.
See id. at 150; Johnson, supra note 3, at 648.
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commonly used tobacco product among the youth and young adults.84 Big
tobacco companies have successfully entered the market, making up half of
all e-cigarette sales, and a valuation of $1.5 billion thus far.85
While ENDS products were relatively popular in the early 2000s,
one brand, in particular, was introduced into the market in 2015 and has
dominated e-cigarette sales in the United States—a brand that goes by the
name of Juul.86 Between 2015 and 2017, Juul has transformed from a littleknown brand into the largest retailer of electronic cigarettes in the United
States.87 Juul devices are sleekly-designed rechargeable e-cigarettes that
closely resemble a USB flash drive.88 Juul’s instant popularity can be
accredited towards the “product’s ability to mimic the user experience of
traditional cigarettes” and through their use of aggressive and strategic
marketing.89 As with most tobacco companies, the creator of Juul has stated
that their product was intended solely for adults; however, the device has
been extremely popular with teenagers and has aided in creating many firsttime smokers.90 Amongst high school and middle school students, Juuls are
incredibly popular due to them being discreet enough that students can use
them during school hours while going virtually unnoticed.91
In addition, Juul has captivated a more mainstream audience than
any other e-cigarette brand has, so much so that when using Juul, users do
not consider it to be “vaping”—a verb used when smoking other brands of
electronic cigarettes—but is considered “JUULing.”92 In 2018, tobacco giant
Altria, the nation’s leading tobacco company, invested $12.8 billion into
Juul—giving Altria a 35% ownership in the country’s most popular ecigarette.93 Altria’s investment in Juul valued Juul at $38 billion and gave
84.
E-CIGARETTE USE AMONG YOUTH & YOUNG ADULTS, supra note 71, at 5.
85.
Johnson, supra note 3, at 648; see also Clark et al., supra note 2, at 3.
86.
Vagnoni, supra note 5, at 278–79.
87.
Jidong Huang et al., Vaping Versus JUULing: How the Extraordinary
Growth and Marketing of JUUL Transformed the U.S. Retail E-Cigarette Market, 28
TOBACCO CONTROL 146, 146 (2019).
88.
Id.
89.
Vagnoni, supra note 5, at 280.
90.
See Anne Hurst, Note, Marketing, Federalism, and the Fight Against Teen
E-Cigarette Use: Analyzing State and Local Legislative Options, 69 CASE W. RES. L. REV.
173, 193 (2018).
91.
See id.; Angus Chen, Teenagers Embrace JUUL, Saying It’s Discreet
Enough to Vape in Class, NPR: NEWS (Dec. 4, 2017, 11:58 AM),
http://www.npr.org/sections/health-shots/2017/12/04/568273801/teenagers-embrace-juulsaying-its-discreet-enough-to-vape-in-class.
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Chen, supra note 91.
93.
Jamie Ducharme, Tobacco Giant Altria Just Made a $12.8 Billion
Investment in Juul, TIME: HEALTH (Dec. 20, 2018, 11:18 AM), http://time.com/5485247/juulaltria-investment/.
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Juul direct “access to Altria’s ‘infrastructure and services,’ as well as retail
space . . . .”94 This contradictive duo raised many questions due to Juul’s
statement that their mission is to give adult smokers a healthy alternative to
cigarettes.95
A doctor and member of the American Thoracic Society stated that
he was “amazingly worried” about how the partnership will affect the
already record-high teen vaping rates, and that these two companies together
could generate an astonishingly unprecedented number of teens who are
hooked on nicotine.96 This is because large tobacco companies, such as
Altria, “have the resources to exploit the gaps in the law” that have been
“long prohibited for conventional cigarettes.”97 From a tobacco industry
perspective, e-cigarettes are a transformative product because they have the
ability to effectively reduce their opposition to anti-smoking public health
laws and regulations and shift their current and potential smoking customers
to e-cigarettes—a product they are already heavily invested in.98
2.

Health Risks of E-Cigarettes

As of 2019, “[a]pproximately [forty] million people use e-cigarettes
worldwide.”99 According to the Surgeon General, both the youth and young
adults have most commonly cited that the reason they started using ecigarettes was due to curiosity, taste, and because they believed e-cigarettes
caused minimal harm in comparison to other tobacco products.100 The
perception that e-cigarettes are not as harmful is most likely due to the
products not being on the market long enough for long-term data to tell us
otherwise.101 However, even in the absence of long-term studies, the effects
of e-cigarettes have been making an appearance as people begin to vape
more and more each day, at an alarming rate.102 Researchers have indicated
that the most worrying aspect of e-cigarettes is nicotine, which studies have
94.
Id.
95.
Id.
96.
Id.
97.
Bard, supra note 81, at 215.
98.
See Eric N. Lindblom, Should FDA Try to Move Smokers to E-Cigarettes
and Other Less-Harmful Tobacco Products and, If So, How?, 73 FOOD & DRUG L.J. 276, 277,
279 (2018).
99.
E-Cigarettes: Effective Cessation Tool or New Gateway to Smoking
Tobacco?, supra note 71.
100.
E-CIGARETTE USE AMONG YOUTH & YOUNG ADULTS, supra note 71, at 6.
101.
See Amanda Mull, Vaping’s Plausible Deniability Is Going Up in Smoke,
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See id.
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proven is damaging to brain development and is extremely addictive.103
During adolescence, the part of the brain that is responsible for impulse
control and decision making does not fully develop until about age twentyfive; until then, the brain is still growing.104 Due to this, younger people are
uniquely at risk for long-term, lasting effects when exposing themselves to
nicotine.105 The long-term effects of nicotine include nicotine addiction,
mood disorders, and permanent lowering of impulse control.106 In addition,
research has revealed that nicotine also affects the way synapses are formed,
which has the ability to harm the parts of the brain that control attention and
learning.107
In 2019, the CDC reported 450 cases across thirty-three states of a
mysterious “vaping illness,” now known as “E-Cigarette or Vaping Product
Use Associated Lung Injury” (“EVALI”) that affects the lungs of people who
were previously healthy with no underlying conditions; most of the cases
came from people under the age of thirty.108 As of February 18, 2020, a total
of 2807 hospitalized EVALI cases have been reported to the CDC, along
with sixty-eight deaths due to EVALI across the United States.109 Studies
have shown the outbreak of EVALI cases might be due to both retailers and
users adding vitamin E acetate to their vaping devices, most notably in THCcontaining ENDS products.110 Vitamin E acetate is a vitamin that is usually
found in the foods we eat, “including vegetable oils, cereals, meat, . . . and
vegetables.”111 While the intake of vitamin E acetate through our food does
not usually cause harm to the human body, however, when this vitamin is
heated and inhaled, it has the potential to create great interference with
normal lung functioning.112
Health experts across the United States have also warned that vaping
may provide a gateway to smoking conventional cigarettes.113 Following a
103.
104.

Chen, supra note 91.
See E-CIGARETTE USE AMONG YOUTH & YOUNG ADULTS, supra note 71,

at 105.
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http://www.cdc.gov/tobacco/basic_information/e-cigarettes/severe-lung-disease.html#whatwe-know (last updated Nov. 27, 2020).
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two year study conducted at the Yale School of Medicine between the years
of 2013–2015, a research scientist found that out of the 808 high school
students who participated in the study, students who used e-cigarettes were
seven times more likely to smoke cigarettes by the second study, and almost
four times more likely to smoke cigarettes by the third survey.114 Regardless
of age, people who use a combination of both cigarettes and ENDS products,
“commonly referred to as ‘dual use,’ present[] a growing public health
concern.”115 Many tobacco users believe that cutting down on cigarettes—
by adding in another tobacco product—is an effective way to improve their
health.116 Health experts are strongly advising against this method, stating
that dual use may result in an increased exposure to harmful toxicants and
“an increased risk of negative health outcomes” such as “cardiovascular
disease [and] pancreatic and esophageal cancers . . . .”117 Dual use among
current tobacco users usually “prevents, rather than assists,” the ability for
users to quit smoking.118 The FDA has currently approved five products that
are safe and have been scientifically proven to be effective in helping
smokers quit: nicotine patches, gum, lozenges, inhalers, and nasal sprays.119
B.
E-Cigarettes—Taking a Page from Big Tobacco Companies’
Playbook
Within the Smithsonian’s National Museum of American History
lies a collection of over 50,000 advertisements produced by big tobacco
companies that range from “magazines, newspapers, billboards, television,
and the internet [produced] from the turn of the [twentieth] century to the
present day.”120 These advertisements highlight the tobacco industry’s
efforts to draw the American people into using its products and reveals the
depth to which these companies would go to deceive the public about the
known health risks during that time associated with using the products.121
From kid-friendly tobacco advertisements that featured cartoon characters, to
enticing flavors such as strawberry, grape, and chocolate, e-cigarette
companies have taken note and mirrored most of their advertising and
marketing techniques from these infamous—now banned—tobacco
114.
Chen, supra note 91.
115.
Tilburg et al., supra note 79, at 41.
116.
Dual Use of Tobacco Products, CTRS. FOR DISEASE CONTROL &
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updated Mar. 23, 2020).
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strategies in an effort to target the youth and entice a new generation of
nicotine users.122 In the mid-1980s, a marketing report at R.J. Reynolds once
said:
Younger adult smokers have been the critical factor in
the growth and decline of every major brand and company over
the last [fifty] years. They will continue to be just as important to
brands/companies in the future for two simple reasons: The
renewal of the market stems almost entirely from [eighteen]year-old smokers. No more than [five] percent of smokers start
after age [twenty-four]. The brand loyalty of [eighteen]-year-old
smokers far outweighs any tendency to switch with age. . . .
Once a brand becomes well-developed among younger adult
smokers, aging and brand loyalty will eventually transmit that
strength to older age brackets. . . . [B]rands/companies which
fail to attract their fair share of younger adult smokers face an
uphill battle. They must achieve net switching gains every year
to merely hold share. . . . Younger adult smokers are the only
source of replacement smokers. . . . If younger adults turn away
from smoking, the industry must decline, just as a population
which does not give birth will eventually dwindle.123

Similar to conventional cigarettes, e-cigarettes fell outside of the
FDA’s tobacco regulatory powers for almost ten years, and during that time,
more than 8,500 vape shops “sprung up in strip malls and stand-alone stores”
across the United States, aiding in the current unprecedented amount of new
generation tobacco users.124
1.

Marketing

The Tobacco Control Act of 2009 explicitly stated that research has
undoubtedly proven that tobacco marketing plays a large part in the initiation
of smoking by youth.125 Due to this, the use of tobacco advertisements were
extremely restricted throughout the United States in order to combat the
tobacco youth epidemic.126 However, when electronic cigarettes were first
introduced into the United States market in 2007, the product did not
immediately fall under the FDA’s jurisdiction and went virtually unregulated
122.
Id.
123.
BATES & ROWELL, supra note 22, at 31–32 (quoting R.J. REYNOLDS
TOBACCO CO., YOUNGER ADULT SMOKERS: STRATEGIES AND OPPORTUNITIES i–3 (1984)).
124.
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until 2016.127 Since electronic cigarettes hit the United States market in the
early 2000s, close to 13,000 e-cigarette advertisements across various
platforms have been collected, and when placed side-by-side with old
tobacco companies’ advertisements, the similarities are strikingly almost
identical.128 In 2013, e-cigarette advertisements were rife with celebrity
spokespeople, magazine ads featuring glamorous women and rugged men,
and had sponsorships with major sporting companies and music festivals—
sound familiar?129
In 2014, e-cigarette companies spent a total of $125 million on
advertising alone.130 However, this data did not reflect all expenditures for
retail marketing, social media, and sponsored events, all of which were
essential components of the industries marketing strategies.131 The leading
e-cigarette brand, Juul, had advertisements appearing on billboards in Times
Square, YouTube videos, and various magazines which used bright,
attention-grabbing colors and designs that illustrated beautiful, young adults
dancing and laughing while vaping.132
In 2013, BAT received heavy criticism after one of their e-cigarette
advertisements appeared on an online children’s game.133 For its launch in
2015, Juul used various social media outlets such as Instagram, Twitter, and
YouTube to market their products, which directly targeted the youth.134
These paid advertisements promoted images that associated Juul with being
cool, fun, and embolized a sense of freedom and sexual appeal.135
2.

From Sponsorships to Scholarships

Following the Master Settlement Agreement in 1998, tobacco
companies were banned from participating in any sponsorship with
companies and events that had the potential to reach a significant amount of
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7 Ways E-Cigarette Companies Are Copying Big Tobacco’s Playbook,
supra note 21.
130.
E-CIGARETTE USE AMONG YOUTH & YOUNG ADULTS, supra note 71, at
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youths.136 E-cigarettes, on the other hand, did not have any such sponsorship
regulations before 2016.137 In 2011, Blu, an electronic cigarette brand owned
by tobacco giant Imperial Brands, sponsored a NASCAR driver and even
had its own car in some races.138 In addition, in 2013, Blu and six other ecigarette companies distributed free samples during large events and even
sponsored events at large music festivals.139 Even as recent as 2018, Juul
sponsored the “Music in Film Summit” at the 2018 Sundance Film Festival
in Utah.140
What is even more troubling is the fact that several e-cigarette
companies, in a mission to combat negative studies being released on the
dangers of e-cigarettes, began offering scholarships to students with a value
of up to $5,000 through which students were asked to write essays on topics
like whether vaping could have potential benefits and whether e-cigarettes
minimize the negative effects of smoking.141
3.

Flavors and Addictive Additives

Electronic cigarette flavors such as chocolate, cookie dough, mango,
peanut butter, and pistachio played a major role in attracting youth ecigarette users before the recent temporary flavor ban was implemented in
2020 by President Donald Trump in order to combat the vaping youth
epidemic.142 As e-cigarettes became more popular in the United States, more
than 7,000 unique e-liquid flavors became available to e-cigarette users.143
In 2013, a study was released that revealed young adults between the ages of
eighteen and twenty-four were more likely to be enticed into smoking
flavored tobacco products than of those in older age groups.144 Over eightyone percent of youths who use e-cigarettes have stated that it was the flavors
that ultimately drew them into initiating the use of the products.145 Flavors
such as the ones listed were previously used by tobacco companies before
136.

E-CIGARETTE USE AMONG YOUTH & YOUNG ADULTS, supra note 71, at
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the Tobacco Control Act banned them in 2012 in order to prevent youth use
of tobacco and thereby reduce future healthcare costs across varying states.146
In 2016, it was discovered that the founders of Juul mimicked
decades-old tobacco company strategies by adding in nicotine salts to their
devices—salts that contained up to three times more nicotine found in
previous e-cigarettes.147 The owners of Juul acknowledged that they
intentionally copied this decade-old tobacco company strategy but said that it
was to satisfy cravings of adult smokers, not children.148 Nonetheless,
“[d]octors [believe that] nicotine salts allow [for] the chemical[s] [in ENDS
products] to ‘cross the blood-brain barrier and lead to potentially more
[damaging] effect[s] on the developing brain in adolescents.’”149 Thus, it
follows that a large amount of new generation nicotine addicts have already
been established and may have already been exposed to damaging effects on
the brain due to Juul’s products and their additives.150
IV.

CURRENT REGULATIONS ON ELECTRONIC CIGARETTES

The United States has taken many critical steps in a relatively short
time frame to regulate electronic cigarettes and decrease the current epidemic
of youth nicotine addiction.151 The FDA, in conjunction with health experts,
has successfully advocated for laws that significantly restrict the ability for
large tobacco companies to sell ENDS products to minors, and even raised
the minimum tobacco purchasing age from eighteen to twenty-one.152
However, much more work is needed to be done in the eyes of health experts
due to large vaping and tobacco companies finding loopholes in order to
continue fueling the electronic cigarette epidemic amongst youth and young
adults.153
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147.
Al Cross, Juul Labs Used Research that Tobacco-Cigarette
Manufacturers Wanted to Use to Get Young People to Become Addicted to Nicotine, KY.
HEALTH NEWS (Dec. 2, 2019), http://ci.uky.edu/kentuckyhealthnews/2019/12/02/juul-labsused-research-that-tobacco-cigarette-manufacturers-wanted-to-use-to-get-young-people-tobecome-addicted-to-nicotine/.
148.
Id.
149.
Id.
150.
See id.
151.
Obama Administration Takes First Step to Protect Kids from ECigarettes, supra note 12.
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The Final Rule

Cigarettes, cigarette tobacco, roll-your-own tobacco, and smokeless
tobacco were immediately regulated when President Obama’s 2009 Tobacco
Control Act went into effect.154 For other kinds of tobacco products not
listed in the initial act, the Tobacco Control Act authorizes the FDA to issue
regulations, “deeming” them to be subject to such authorities.155 Once the
FDA declares a tobacco product “deemed,” the product’s sale and
distribution may be restricted, which includes age-related access restrictions
and advertising and promotion restrictions.156 This final rule has two
purposes:
(1) To deem all products that meet the definition of a “tobacco
product” under the law, except accessories of a newly deemed
tobacco product, and subject them to the tobacco control
authorities in chapter IX of the FD&C Act and FDA’s
implementing regulations; and (2) to establish specific restrictions
that are appropriate for the protection of the public health for the
newly deemed tobacco products.157

In delegating this authority to the FDA, the FDA can aggressively
and successfully take action in reducing the amount of deaths and diseases
that result from the use of newly introduced tobacco products in the United
States.158 In 2016, the FDA decided to use their deeming power to issue a
final rule that would deem various products which met the statutory
definition of “tobacco product” to be subject to the Federal Food, Drug, and
Cosmetic Act (“the FD&C Act”), as amended by the Tobacco Control Act.159
The newly deemed products included e-cigarettes, cigars, hookah, pipes, and
pipe tobacco.160 After the FDA deemed ENDS products to meet the statutory
definition of tobacco products, the FDA’s authority extended to e-cigarette
components and parts, such as: e-liquids, atomizers, batteries, tank systems,
flavors, and programmable software.161 However, their related accessories
would not be regulated under the FDA’s authority due to the FDA believing
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See 21 U.S.C. § 387a.
Final Rule, 81 Fed. Reg. at 28,974, 28,975.
Id.
Id. at 28,975.
Id.
Id.
McDonald, supra note 63.
Final Rule, 81 Fed. Reg. at 28,975.

290

NOVA LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 45

that accessories of newly deemed tobacco products pose little to no direct
impact on the public health.162
Consistent with the statute, the deeming provisions included a
federal minimum age limit of eighteen to purchase ENDS products,
mandated health warnings on product packages, severely limited e-cigarette
vending machine sales, and subjected ENDS products to the premarket
approval requirement.163 In addition, the Deeming Rule mandates that
ENDS producers and retailers must first obtain permission from the FDA
before stating that their products are less dangerous than tobacco cigarettes
or that there are potential health benefits from switching to e-cigarettes from
tobacco cigarettes.164 This regulation falls “[u]nder the Tobacco Control Act,
[which states that] it is illegal to sell a ‘modified risk tobacco product’
(MRTP) without FDA approval.”165 While the Obama administration took
the first critical step in protecting future youth generations from the dangers
that are associated with using tobacco products, there is still much more
work to be done in the eyes of health experts due to the rule failing to restrict
e-cigarette marketing targeted at the youth; failing to ban flavored e-cigarette
products—including menthol—which has been proven to be a key reason
children begin using tobacco products in the first place; and not taking strong
enough steps to prevent online sales of e-cigarettes to children under the age
of eighteen.166
B.

Youth Tobacco Prevention Plan

In 2017, the FDA put forth a comprehensive plan for tobacco and
nicotine regulation.167 This regulatory effort placed nicotine, and the issue of
addiction to nicotine—specifically amongst the youth—at the forefront of the
agency’s regulatory efforts.168 A major component of this plan was the
Youth Tobacco Prevention Plan (“YTPP”), which aimed to combat the rising
epidemic levels of e-cigarette use among the youth by implementing
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vigorous enforcement of the FDA’s regulatory rules announced in 2016.169
In 2019, the FDA took several actions against brick-and-mortar storefronts
who have notoriously ignored the law and illegally marketed and sold ecigarettes and other tobacco products to children under the age of eighteen.170
Over the years, these storefronts have simply paid the associated fines and
penalties and written it off as a cost of doing business.171 One popular brickand-mortar storefront in particular, Walgreen Co., has on numerous
occasions—1,800 times to be exact—violated the FDA’s rules on selling
tobacco products to the youth.172 Walgreen Co., who pride themselves with
being a health-and-wellness minded business, is currently the top violator
among all pharmacies across the United States who has illegally sold tobacco
products to minors.173
On March 4, 2019, the FDA announced that they sent a letter to the
corporate management at Walgreen Co. and requested a meeting to discuss
the possibility of a corporate-wide issue of illegally selling tobacco products
to children, and to discuss the important role they play, as a nationwide
retailer, in curbing the youth e-cigarette epidemic.174 However, Walgreen
Co. is not alone when it comes to ignoring the law and illegally selling
tobacco products to minors.175 Wal-Mart, Mobil, 7-Eleven, Family Dollar,
and Exxon, to name a few, have all been identified as storefronts who have
illegally sold tobacco products to children since the inception of the FDA’s
retailer compliance check inspection program in 2010.176
The FDA has also sent warning letters to several companies whose
ENDS products have failed to include the required nicotine warning
statement.177 Research has shown that consumers—especially children—are
misinformed of the presence of nicotine in tobacco products and of the risks
that nicotine tobacco products may pose.178 The FDA has stated that
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continued failure to place the required nicotine warning statement on ENDS
products may result in enforcement action in the near future.179
C.

Tobacco 21

In March 2015, the National Academy of Medicine released a
landmark report that stated if the government raised the minimum tobacco
purchasing age from eighteen to twenty-one, such a law could prevent over
223,000 deaths among people born between 2000–2019, including reducing
over 50,000 deaths caused by lung cancer.180 The American Lung
Association (“ALA”) applauded this study and commemorated
Congresswoman Diana DeGette on her efforts to require the FDA to conduct
mandatory studies about raising the age limit to twenty-one during the
passage of the Tobacco Control Act.181 Prior to the passage of the federal
law, sixteen states across the United States increased the legal sales age for
tobacco products, including e-cigarettes, to twenty-one.182 The list of these
states are as follows: California, Connecticut, Delaware, Hawaii, Illinois,
Maine, Maryland, Massachusetts, New Jersey, New York, Ohio, Oregon,
Pennsylvania, Utah, Vermont, Washington, and the District of Columbia.183
On December 20, 2019, President Donald Trump signed into
legislation an act that raised the federal minimum age of the sale of tobacco
products from eighteen to twenty-one.184 This legislation amends the FD&C
Act, and makes it illegal for a retailer to sell any tobacco product—including
cigarettes, smokeless tobacco, hookah tobacco, cigars, pipe tobacco, and
ENDS products along with e-liquids—to anyone under the age of twentyone.185 In order to carry out this legislation, the FDA will conduct
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compliance check inspections of tobacco product retailers.186 Following this
legislation and protocols, experts predict that there will be a huge reduction
in the use of e-cigarettes amongst the youth.187 As research has shown,
youth under the age of eighteen have often sought after older classmates as a
source for tobacco products and raising the minimum age to purchase
tobacco products, in theory, drastically lowers the ability for this transaction
to occur.188
D.

Temporary Ban on Flavors

On January 2, 2020, President Donald Trump and his administration
announced a partial and temporary ban on all flavored e-cigarette cartridges,
except for the flavors menthol and tobacco.189 The exception to continue to
allow menthol-flavored e-cigarette cartridges is a large step back from the
Trump administration’s previous announcement a few months prior, which
stated their intention to ban fruit, mint, and dessert flavors, including
menthol, in an effort to combat the rising rates of youth nicotine addiction.190
The temporary ban applies to pre-filled nicotine cartridges—cartridges
popularly sold by Juul out of gas stations and convenient stores.191 However,
the flavor restriction does not ban refillable tank-based systems; therefore,
users will continue to be able to purchase these products and fill their device
with the flavor of their choice.192 While this temporary ban represents the
Trump Administration’s efforts to combat the e-cigarette epidemic among
the youth, “the decision to permit menthol and exempt tank-based vapes was
immediately condemned by anti-tobacco advocates who have [urged] the
Trump [A]dministration to follow through on its initial [plan] to ban all
flavors except tobacco.”193
In addition to not banning refillable tank-based systems, the policy
also permits all flavors to be continually sold in devices that cannot be
186.
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refilled and are designed to be disposed of after the flavored nicotine has run
out.194 While this has effectively diverted students away from using Juul
products, it has, in turn, led them to use a new mysterious e-cigarette
company called Puff Bar, whose products are disposable.195 Established in
2019, Puff Bar’s brightly colored e-cigarettes and fruity flavors such as
orange, mango, and banana have handsomely profited from this temporary
flavor ban on refillable nicotine cartridges.196 This controversial multimillion dollar company has effectively found a loophole, and concerns
continue to rise as lawmakers and numerous public health advocates have
been unable to clearly pinpoint who is really in control of the company.197
Through diligent research, it appears that Puff Bar is entangled with many
other companies in the United States and China.198 The co-founder and
medical professor of a program called Stanford Research into the Impact of
Tobacco Advertising has stated that his research team has discovered that the
first trademark application for a Puff Bar product was made by a Chinese
company, and has said that many of the producers of Puff Bar’s products are
concentrated in China.199 When investigations on Puff Bar were close to
unraveling who the owner was of this mysterious company, on July 9, 2020,
two men in California claimed to be the CFO and CEO; however, they
refused to disclose who originally hired them or anything about the company
for that matter.200 In an interview, the two men stated that despite their titles,
their job was to run the Puff Bar website.201
As the novel coronavirus pandemic continues to surge throughout
the United States, public health and anti-smoking groups have urged the
FDA to punish Puff Bar for using ads that target children after evidence has
demonstrated that the use of e-cigarettes leads to worse outcomes for
coronavirus patients.202 Recently, an Illinois Democrat has demanded the
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FDA take action and ban the sales of Puff Bar due to the company targeting
children.203 On July 13, 2020, the Puff Bar website stated that they would
suspend sales in the United States until further notice.204 However, health
experts are concerned and expecting that these highly addictive products will
soon be reintroduced to the United States’ market, under different brand
names, and continuing this seemingly endless rat-race.205
V.

POLITICAL ROADBLOCKS PREVENTING A PERMANENT BAN ON
FLAVORED E-CIGARETTES

Throughout the twenty-first century, there has been insurmountable
evidence that points to the sweet flavors of electronic cigarettes as the cause
of what initially entices youth and young adults into initiating the use of
electronic cigarettes.206 While there have been notable attempts by both
health experts and the FDA over the past five years to ban all flavored ecigarettes; these attempts have fallen by the wayside, as aggressive political
roadblocks have successfully prevented the placement of such a ban.207
A.

White House Block on E-Cigarette Flavor Ban in 2016

When the FDA exercised its deeming authority under the Tobacco
Control Act and extended its jurisdiction over cigarettes and smokeless
tobacco to e-cigarettes and other tobacco products in the 2016 Final Rule, the
FDA’s own data indicated that there was a high public health danger posed
by sweet electronic cigarette flavors, including menthol.208 The FDA’s
research, published in an October 2015 study in the Journal of the American
Medical Association (“JAMA”), revealed that 81.5% of current youth ecigarette users began and continued to use ENDS products because they were
available in the various flavors that they enjoyed.209 As the youth e-cigarette
epidemic began to spread like wildfire across the United States at an
unprecedented level, the FDA announced plans to place sweeping
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restrictions on newly deemed flavored tobacco products in the Final Rule.210
The FDA stated that their draft of the Final Rule would extend the current
ban of flavored cigarettes to flavored ENDS products—including the flavor
menthol—absent specific evidence proving that a certain flavor or flavors
was necessary and “appropriate for the protection of the public health.”211
However, the final document that outlined the Final Rule, released in 2016
by the Obama Administration, failed to include these restrictions despite the
FDA’s recommendation.212
The FDA’s initial draft of the Final Rule did not fall short of their
intended promise to protect future youth generations from the wellestablished dangers associated with ENDS products as they dedicated an
entire section—spanning across fifteen pages—titled Flavored Tobacco
Products, which explained at great length how flavored tobacco
disproportionately impacts youth and young adults.213 In this section, the
FDA stated that since flavoring ensures a pleasant taste and makes tobacco
products easier to use, this “increases their appeal among new users, most
notably, among [youth and] young [adults].”214 It was also stated that
internal tobacco company studies confirmed that sweeter flavors appealed to
new tobacco users by “masking the strong tobacco taste” and evoking the
perception that these products were somehow more mild than traditional
tobacco.215
The FDA’s research also revealed, as stated in the Flavored Tobacco
Products section, that the flavored chemicals used when making flavored
tobacco products largely overlapped with the same chemicals used in several
brands of candy and Kool-Aid drink mix, concluding that the chemicals from
candy and Kool-Aid were shockingly similar to flavored tobacco flavors
such as “cherry, grape, apple, peach, and berry . . . .”216 Similarly, mentholflavored products would be treated the same as other characterizing flavors
“because when it is used as a characterizing flavor, menthol has a similar
impact on a product’s appeal to youth and [other] adults as such other
characterizing flavors.”217 However, the FDA stated that tobacco-flavored
210.
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products would not be banned and/or restricted, because unlike other
characterizing flavors (as stated therein), tobacco-flavored products were not
as appealing to youth and young adults when compared to their appeal to
older adults.218
Unfortunately, this monumental attempt from the FDA to protect the
youth from becoming addicted to newly deemed tobacco products was
deleted by the White House Office of Management and Budget (“OMB”)
prior to the release of the rule, opting to keep these youth-attractive flavored
products on the market despite the insurmountable evidence provided by the
FDA that proved these flavors would continue—if not increase—the
addiction levels among the youth in the United States.219 The OMB is an
organization within the White House, staffed mostly by economists, whose
role includes: (1) coordinating the Executive Administration’s financial
management and regulatory policies; (2) assisting the President in overseeing
the preparation of the Federal budget; and (3) supervising the Federal
budget’s administration.220 The OMB is responsible for overseeing all
federal rules that may potentially have a large impact on the national
economy and has the authority to make significant changes that impact the
public health, safety, and welfare of the United States.221
When a reporter at the Los Angeles Times asked why the White
House decided to strike this provision, officials said that a cost-benefit
analysis revealed that “the economic burden on vape shops appeared to
outweigh [the] potential health benefits” that would accrue from the ban.222
According to the CDC, “[t]here were 1.5 million more . . . youth e-cigarette
users in 2018 than 2017,” and in 2018, 4.9 million middle and high school
students were current tobacco product users.223 After the Final Rule took
effect in 2016, Juul sales increased more than six-fold, and essentially erased
decades of progress on the prevention of youth smoking in the United
States.224 The Obama Administration’s decision to strike this key provision
in the Final Rule has led millions of youth and young adults to become
218.
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220.
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addicted to e-cigarettes and “quashed an important opportunity to protect the
public health of all Americans . . . .”225
B.

Lobbying Efforts

In October 2019, the Los Angeles Times released an investigation on
why the White House decided to strike down the FDA’s proposed rule to ban
all flavors of newly deemed tobacco products in 2016.226 The investigative
report indicated that lobbying had a large part to do with the Obama
Administration’s Final Rule, as reports revealed that over the course of fortysix days, more than one-hundred large tobacco industry lobbyists and small
business advocates met with OMB officials as they decided on whether to
include the ban on flavors in the Final Rule or not.227 As stated earlier, OMB
officials ultimately decided to side with the vape shops and large tobacco
industries as they stated the economic burden on these companies
outweighed the benefits that would result from the ban.228 In 2015, over $20
million was spent on lobbying tobacco.229
In 2019, the Trump
Administration announced a plan that would direct the FDA to remove all
non-tobacco flavored e-cigarettes from the market due to the rising concerns
of youth use and related vaping illnesses believed to be correlated with
vaping.230 When the Trump Administration initially sketched out their plans
to remove flavored e-cigarettes, menthol was among the flavors listed.231
President Donald Trump was quoted during the announcement saying that
the country needed “strong rules and regulations” in order to make these
225.
See Stanton A. Glantz, The White House Told FDA That Black Lives
Don’t Matter, UCSF CTR. FOR TOBACCO CONTROL RSCH. & EDUC. (June 6, 2016),
http://tobacco.ucsf.edu/white-house-told-fda-black-lives-don’t-matter [hereinafter The White
House Told FDA That Black Lives Don’t Matter].
226.
See David Dayen, Big Tobacco Lobbied to Save Vaping: Now It Controls
the
Leading
E-Cigarette
Company,
AM.
PROSPECT
(Oct.
4,
2019),
http://prospect.org/health/big-tobacco-lobbied-to-save-vaping-juul-altria/.
227.
Id.
228.
Baumgaertner, supra note 222.
229.
Industry
Profile:
Tobacco,
OPENSECRETS.ORG,
http://www.opensecrets.org/federal-lobbying/industries/summary?cycle=2015&id=A02 (last
visited May 12, 2021).
230.
See Press Release, Harold Wimmer, President & CEO, Am. Lung Ass’n,
American Lung Association Responds to Trump Announcement to Remove Flavored Ecigarettes from Market, (Sept. 11, 2019), http://www.lung.org/media/press-releases/flavorede-cigarettes-announcement.
231.
See Press Release, Matthew L. Myers, President, Campaign for TobaccoFree Kids, Trump Administration Breaks Its Promise to Kids and Families to Eliminate
Flavored E-Cigarettes, Prioritizes Industry Over the Health of Our Kids (Jan. 1, 2020),
http://www.tobaccofreekids.org/press-releases/2020_01_01_trump_admin_broken_promise.
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harmful devices less appealing to youth.232 It is important to note, that as of
2020, all e-cigarette products that are on the market have essentially slid by
without many rules or any regulations due to the fact that all e-cigarettes on
the market are currently there illegally because no e-cigarette product has yet
to apply for approval from the proper FDA channels.233 This lack of
regulation is due to the United States Department of Health and Human
Services (“DHHS”) deciding to allow these products to be sold illegally in
order to determine whether or not they could effectively serve their initial
purpose of off-ramping adults who are currently addicted to combustible
cigarettes.234 More recently, however, the Secretary of DHHS was quoted
stating “[the] off-ramp from addiction must not come at the expense of these
[e]-cigarette[s] becoming an on-ramp for addiction for a new generation of
children, which is what is occurring today.”235
In spite of these statements from both President Donald Trump and
Secretary of DHHS, when the list of temporarily banned electronic cigarette
flavors was finalized and released, the Trump Administration left menthol
off the list—breaking their promise to health experts and families across the
United States who are in the midst of fighting the youth epidemic of nicotine
addiction driven by flavored electronic cigarettes.236 This decision was a
large retreat from the Trump Administration’s initial plan to ban menthol
flavored e-cigarettes and vaping cartridges and comes after President Donald
Trump met with large vaping industry representatives in November to
discuss the potential e-cigarette regulations amid the nationwide outbreak of
On the day the Trump
vaping-related injuries and deaths.237
Administration’s plan was released, the ALA President and CEO stated in a
press release that he was deeply disappointed that President Donald Trump
decided to allow menthol-flavored products—along with thousands of other
flavors of e-cigarettes—to continue to be sold on the market, and also stated
that it was disturbing to see how these results were a product of industry
lobbying.238 The retreat from the original plan is a compromise with large
vaping industries and “will preserve a significant portion of the multibillion-

232.
Ebbs, supra note 190.
233.
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234.
Id.
235.
Id.
236.
Press Release, Myers, supra note 231.
237.
Ebbs, supra note 190; see also Doina Chiacu & Tim Ahmann, Trump to
Meet with Vaping Industry as He Mulls Tighter Regulation, REUTERS: HEALTHCARE &
PHARM. (Nov. 11, 2019, 9:17 AM), http://www.reuters.com/article/us-health-vapingtrump/trump-to-meet-with-vaping-industry-as-he-mulls-tighter-regulation-idUSKBN1XL1SP.
238.
Press Release, Wimmer, supra note 16.
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dollar vaping market.”239 Thus, it follows that large tobacco companies, such
as Altria and R.J. Reynolds, who are also major players in the vaping market,
have yet again defeated public health advocates in their mission to combat
the current vaping epidemic amongst the youth.240
In addition, White House advisors advised President Donald Trump
that a total flavor ban could potentially have political consequences and cost
him votes in the next upcoming election.241 This advisement comes from the
aggressive social media launch by industry groups, including Vapor
Technology Association, which released a campaign called “#IVapeIVote”
and has had a successful following by current electronic cigarette users who
are against a total flavor ban.242
C.

Proposal to Remove FDA’s Authority over Tobacco Regulation

Another attempt by the White House to undermine the FDA’s ability
to effectively regulate e-cigarettes was taken on February 10, 2020, as
President Donald Trump presented a $4.8 trillion budget proposal, for the
2021 fiscal year, that included moving the oversight of all tobacco products
out of the FDA’s hands and into a new agency within the DHHS, that would
be led by a Senate-confirmed Director appointed by the President.243 This
announcement was released shortly after a promising new bill began to make
waves on Capitol Hill titled Protecting American Lungs and Reversing the
Youth Tobacco Epidemic Act of 2020, that would, among other items, ban
menthol in e-cigarettes and “prohibit marketing and advertising that ‘appeals
to . . . individual[s] under [twenty-one] years of age.’”244 On February 28,
2020, this bill was introduced and passed by the House of Representatives.245
239.
Trump Administration to Ban Most E-Cigarette Flavors, But Not TankBased Products, supra note 10.
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Id.
243.
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Agency, CIGAR AFICIONADO (Feb. 11, 2020), http://www.cigaraficionado.com/article/trump-sbudget-would-create-new-tobacco-regulation-agency.
244.
Executive Office of the President, Statement of Administration Policy:
H.R. 2339 - Reversing the Youth Tobacco Epidemic Act of 2019 (Feb. 27, 2020),
http://www.whitehouse.gov/wp-content/uploads/2020/02/SAP_HR-2339.pdf;
see
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2339, 116th Cong. (2019).
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However, just a day before, on February 27, 2020, the Executive Office of
the President published a statement showing its concerns about the current
version of the bill:
The bill takes the wrong approach to tobacco regulation.
Rather than continuing to focus on the FDA’s Center for Tobacco
Products, Congress should implement President Trump’s Budget
proposal to create a new, more directly accountable agency within
the Department of Health and Human Services to focus on tobacco
regulation. This new agency would be led by a Senate-confirmed
Director and would have [a] greater capacity to respond to the
growing complexity of tobacco products and respond effectively to
tobacco-related public health concerns. If presented to the
President in its current form, the President’s senior advisors would
recommend that he veto the bill.246

While the Administration makes a less-than-reassuring statement
that it is “committed to protecting the Nation’s youth from the harms of
tobacco,” this wage of war on the FDA could lead to new legislation to
amend the Tobacco Control Act, which would potentially open the doors to
large delays in the current efforts at combatting the youth nicotine addiction
epidemic.247 The American Heart Association’s Executive Vice President of
Advocacy stated that the Trump Administration “has repeatedly placed the
needs of the [large] tobacco industr[ies] on equal footing with public health”
and should allow the FDA to continue exercising its authority it has been
granted in order to protect the public health; and in turn, the Trump
Administration should focus its attention on creating “meaningful efforts to
end youth tobacco . . . and nicotine [use].”248
VI.

CONCLUSION

At the beginning of the twenty-first century, health experts lowered
their swords as nicotine addiction in the United States drastically minimized
and the stigma of smoking cigarettes was seemingly here to stay.249
However, this victory was relatively short-lived, as electronic cigarettes
entered the United States’ market in 2007, and with the help of decade-old
246.
Executive Office of the President, supra note 244.
247.
Id.; see also Michael Nedelman & Jen Christensen, Trump Budget Plan
Could
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Tobacco
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CNN:
HEALTH,
http://www.cnn.com/2020/02/10/health/tobacco-regulation-fda-trump/index.html (last updated
Feb. 10, 2020).
248.
Nedelman & Christensen, supra note 247.
249.
See 2014 Surgeon General’s Report, supra note 18, at iii.
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tobacco product strategies, created a new generation of nicotine addicts
without any of the stigma and without virtually any regulation for the first
ten years.250
While it would be remiss to ignore the milestones that have been set
in place over the years, which range from the Final Act in 2016—which
allowed the FDA to gain authority over ENDS products—to raising the
minimum tobacco purchasing age from eighteen to twenty-one, there is still
much more work to be done before health experts lower their swords.251 The
temporary ban of flavored e-cigarette cartridges is a step in the right
direction, however, the only way to successfully end the worsening of the
youth e-cigarette epidemic is to permanently eliminate all flavored ecigarette flavors, including menthol, and to place public health over large
tobacco companies.252

250.
See Johnson, supra note 3, at 648–49.
251.
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